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Abstract
Transportation safety has been recognized as a public health issue worldwide,
consequently, transportation researchers and practitioners have been attempting
to provide adequate safety performance for the various transportation components
and facilities to all road users given the usually scarce resources available. Safety
engineers have been trying to make decisions affecting safety based on the knowledge
extracted from different types of statistical models and/or observational before-after
analysis. It is generally recognized that this type of factual knowledge is not easily
obtained either statistically or empirically. Despite the intuitive link between road
safety and observed crashes, a good understanding of the sequence of events prior
to the crash can provide a more rational basis for the development of engineering
countermeasures.
The development of more comprehensive mechanistic models for safety assess-
ment is heavily dependent on detailed vehicle tracking data that is not readily
available. The potential of microscopic simulation in traffic safety and traffic con-
flict analysis has gained increasing interest mostly due to recent developments in
human behaviour modelling and real-time vehicle data acquisition.
In this thesis, we present a systematic investigation of the use of existing be-
havioural microscopic simulation models in short-term road safety studies. Initially,
a microscopic framework is introduced to identify potentially unsafe vehicle inter-
actions for different vehicle movements based on three types of traffic behaviour
protocols: car-following, lane change and gap acceptance. This microscopic model
for safety assessment applies a safety performance measure based on pairwise com-
parisons of spacing and speed differential between adjacent vehicles and individual
braking power in real-time. A calibration/validation procedure using factorial anal-
ysis is presented to select best model input parameters for this safety performance
measure by using high resolution vehicle tracking data. The ability of the pro-
posed safety performance measure to reflect real-life observed high-risk vehicular
interactions is explored in three intuitive tests using observed crash data. Finally,
the usefulness of the model is illustrated through its application to investigate the
safety implications of two different geometric and operational traffic strategies.
The overall results indicate that, notwithstanding the fact that actual behavioural
microscopic algorithms have not been developed strictly to model crashes, they are
able to replicate several factors directly related to high risk situations that could
lead to crashes with reasonable accuracy. With the existing upward trend in com-
puting power, modelling techniques and increasing availability of detailed vehicle
tracking data, it is likely that safety studies will be carried out using a more mech-
anistic and inclusive approach based on disruptive driving behaviour rather than
ultimate unpredictable and heavily restrictive crash events.
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One of the main goals of transportation researchers and practitioners is to ensure
adequate safety performance of the various transportation components and facilities
to all road users given the resources available. This has proved to be one of the
most challenging subjects since the first documented traffic related fatality in 1896.
According to the World Health Organization, 1.2 million fatalities and 50 million
injuries are estimated every year worldwide due to crashes [83].
Road crashes statistics in Canada reveal that approximately three thousand
fatalities are expected to occur every year. In 2006, for instance, 2,889 fatalities and
199,337 injuries were registered [24]. According to Transport Canada [23], despite
the relative reduction in casualties over the last two decades, traffic collisions is still
one of the main contributors to years of lost life among Canadians. The annual
economic cost associated with these traffic collisions is estimated to be over $11
billions.
Government agencies and private organizations usually need to allocate limited
resources in order to maximize safety improvements of existing network compo-
nents. Furthermore, in transportation planning, different geometric features and
operational strategies are required to have their safety implications adequately ver-
ified prior to implementation. Thus, it is crucial to both transportation operation
and planning field to initially establish an objective framework to evaluate the
safety performance of transportation systems.
This thesis is primarily focused on assessing the safety performance of the var-
ious transportation components and facilities. In traffic safety literature, one can
find terms, such as “accident”, “collision” and “crash” being used interchangeably
to represent events between one (or more) road users that resulted in property dam-
age, injury or fatality. In this thesis the term “accident” will be avoided due to its
inherent connection to unforeseen random occurrences rather than causal factors
that lead to those events.
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Traffic collisions usually happen in consequence of a very specific combination
of factors that, in many cases, can not be unveiled thus compromising the accuracy
and reliability of road safety diagnosis. Hauer [40] has pointed out that unlike other
fields, one can not design scientific experiments to estimate changes in safety by
controlling road system attributes for ethical and operational reasons.
The most common approach to estimate safety makes use of inferential statistics
applied to police-reported crashes therefore being considered a reactive approach to
the problem. Despite the intuitive link between road safety and observed crashes, a
good understanding of the sequence of events prior to the crash can provide a more
rational basis for the development of engineering countermeasures. Furthermore,
issues related to data reliability and availability as well as methodological challenges
posed by the very random and unique nature of accidents have fostered comple-
mentary approaches to improve road safety assessment, such as the observation of
traffic conflicts and the use of microscopic traffic simulation.
Computer simulation models applied to transportation engineering are recog-
nized as a powerful tool in the analysis and assessment of highway transportation
systems and its components [68]. Individual representation of vehicles travelling
in a transportation network is the fundamental goal of microscopic traffic simula-
tion programs. One of the most relevant features of this analytical approach is to
allow the occurrence of experiments with new engineering alternatives before its
implementation in the real world.
The use of microscopic traffic simulation over the last two decades has essentially
focused on the analysis of transportation efficiency, such as signalized intersections,
arterial networks and freeway corridors. The potential of microscopic simulation
in traffic safety and traffic conflict analysis was initially recognized by Darzentas
et al. [30] and has gained increasing interest mostly due to recent developments in
human behaviour modelling and real-time vehicle data acquisition.
The usefulness of microscopic simulation for assessing safety depends on the
ability of these models to capture complex behavioural relationships that could lead
to crashes and to establish a link between simulated safety measures and crash risk.
Moreover, it becomes necessary to estimate model inputs such that they accurately
replicate safety performance at a given location over time. Accordingly, one of
the major steps in applying simulation is to ensure that important model inputs
have been accurately determined based on observational data, and that simulation
models produce estimates of safety performance that can be verified from real world
observations.
This thesis explores the use of microscopic simulation models to evaluate and
predict the safety impact of alternative traffic engineering strategies applied to the
various components of transportation systems.
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1.2 Objectives and Scope
The primary objective of this thesis is to present a systematic investigation of
the potential for adopting a more mechanistic approach to short-term road safety
studies based on microscopic simulation of safety performance. The following five
specific objectives are also addressed in this work:
1. Develop a microscopic framework to identify potentially unsafe vehicle in-
teractions for different vehicle movements based on three types of traffic be-
haviour protocols: car-following, lane change and gap acceptance.
2. Introduce a safety performance measure obtained from microscopic simulation
as a function of pairwise comparisons of spacing and speed differential between
adjacent vehicles in the traffic stream in real-time.
3. Calibrate and validate microscopic models input parameters for a specific
safety performance indicator using high resolution vehicle-tracking data.
4. Provide a link between simulated safety performance indicator and observed
high risk vehicular interactions.
5. Evaluate safety implications of two different geometric and operational traffic
strategies applied to urban intersections and freeway segments using micro-
scopic simulation.
1.3 Thesis Outline
This thesis is structured in eight chapters. Chapter 2 presents basic definitions
and concepts used in traffic safety, as well as explores a number of safety perfor-
mance measures developed for alternative safety studies, such as the traffic conflict
technique and simulation-based safety studies. The various advantages as well as
shortcomings associated with their use are also discussed.
Chapter 3 presents the most common underlying theories and approaches ap-
plied to the science of traffic safety, including observational traffic safety studies,
traffic conflict studies and real-time and simulation based safety analysis.
Chapter 4 introduces the microscopic safety assessment model to identify poten-
tially unsafe vehicle interactions for different vehicle movements based on existing
types of traffic behaviour protocols.
An heuristic procedure for calibration and validation of microscopic simulation
models for safety purposes is presented in Chapter 5.
Chapter 6 describes three tests applied to explore the relationship between the
proposed safety performance measure and empirical observational crash data.
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Chapter 7 illustrates the merits of the proposed microscopic safety assessment
model and explores its sensitivity to a number of geometric and traffic attributes
when applied to investigate the safety implications of two engineering counter-
measures: 1) Upgrading a 4-legged stop controlled intersection into a signalized
intersection, and 2)Introducing mandatory speed limiters for large trucks in free-
ways.
Chapter 8 summarizes the major contributions of this research along with gen-
eral conclusions and recommendations for possible further research to enhance the
use of simulation for safety purposes.
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Chapter 2
Traffic Safety Concepts and Safety
Performance Measures
2.1 Introduction
From the engineering perspective, traffic safety studies are heavily dependent on
how safety is defined and measured. Historically, researchers have been trying to
represent safety throughout empirical studies based on observed crash occurrences.
The underlying assumption of these studies is that crashes are individually un-
predictable, although groups of crashes observed on a given location can produce
predictable statistical pattern [31].
On the other extreme, individual crashes can be treated as deterministic events
that resulted from failures of human-made systems. These systems are hypothe-
sized to be modeled if the required knowledge of their inherent mechanism is avail-
able. In-depth crash investigation or accident reconstruction analysis attempts to
provide this background knowledge, however, this kind of an approach demands a
considerable amount of information not often available in police-reported collisions.
This Chapter presents fundamental definitions and concepts in traffic safety and
introduces a number of indicators applied to evaluate the safety performance of
transportation systems components. The potential applications and shortcomings
of these safety performance measures are also discussed.
2.2 Safety Research: a Multidisciplinary Science
Roadway transportation systems can be divided into three basic components: 1)
The road users, 2) The vehicles, and 3) The roadway environment. These three
sub-systems interact in a dynamic and often complex fashion, consequently a com-
prehensive understanding of all these areas of expertise acting as one system can
not be found in isolated disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, or engineering.
5
2.2.1 Road Users
The road user and its interaction with vehicles, the roadway environment and other
road users while driving is the main subject of human research in traffic safety. In
high level hierarchy, the driving task can be broken down into three elements:
control, guidance, and navigation [33].
Control refers to drivers interaction with the vehicle to maintain desirable align-
ment and speed during the journey by acting on vehicle components, such as the
steering wheel, throttle, and brake pedals. The guidance component is the driver’s
interaction with the roadway environment (alignment, grade, and geometric fea-
tures), traffic (speed, relative position, and gaps) and traffic control devices (signs,
signals, and markings) in order to maintain safe speed and path. Navigation is the
process of planning and executing trips using past experience or other information,
such as maps, guide signs and landmarks.
The control level is related to activities with low demand of driver’s cognitive
capabilities that are executed almost automatically by the driver. Information
has to be frequently processed in intermittent short time intervals varying from
few seconds to almost continuous feedback. Drivers responses at this level have
the highest priority when compared to both guidance and navigation components
given that unexpected events that could jeopardize the journey (e.g. a flat tire or
a crossing vehicle) can only be avoided at this low level. The guidance component
requires higher level of cognitive skills from driver’s when compared to control and,
the decision-making process demands information in periods from few seconds to
minutes. The navigation process, on the other hand, is usually more time consuming
and complex as compared to the other two processes.
It is worth noting that there is a chaotic pattern associated with the informa-
tion exchange among these three levels of control [107]. Figure 2.1 illustrates the















Figure 2.1: Levels of the driving task (Source: [107])
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2.2.2 Vehicles
The automobile industry has been responsible for considerable advances in safety
since the first patent for a restraining belt for passengers in road vehicles was
granted to E.J. Claghorn in 1885. Safety devices in vehicles can be classified ac-
cording to its role in avoiding crashes or minimizing its severity as passive or active
in-vehicle safety features.
Active safety features help the driving task in situations where drivers could
lose control of the vehicle, such as in slippery conditions, sharp curves, and con-
gested highways with vehicles subjected to frequent stops. Most commonly active
safety devices presented in high-end vehicles are: anti-lock braking system (ABS),
adaptive cruise control (ACC), traction control (TCS), dynamic steering response
(DSR), intelligent speed adaptation (ISA), electronic stability control (ESC), di-
rectional headlights, reverse backup sensors, among others.
Passive safety features are designed to minimize the consequences of a crash
given that its avoidance is no longer possible. Some of the most commonly found
passive safety devices are: seat belts, air-bags, side impact bars, and collapsible
steering columns.
With increasing application of electronic systems and wireless technologies to
the automobile industry, a number of new active safety features will be commercially
available soon. According to Leen and Heffernan [58], more than 80 percent of
all modern automotive innovation comes from electronics. Modern vehicles have
more than 4 kilometers of wiring compared to approximately 45 meters in vehicles
manufactured in 1955.
More recently, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
has sponsored a number of crash avoidance research projects under the Intelligent
Transportation Systems program. The aim of the program is to enable real-time
wireless communications among motor vehicles and between motor vehicles and
roadside infrastructures. This real-time inter-vehicle communication can provide
the state of the art for the development of more effective safety devices in vehicles
[20].
The crash avoidance database structure suggested by the NHTSA would make
use of four driving states grouped according to levels of evasive action needed and
types of countermeasure (active or passive) to keep vehicles interacting at a low risk
level [102]. The driving conflict states, potential countermeasures and applications
are shown in Figure 2.2.
2.2.3 Roadway Environment
The roadway environment can be defined as the main infrastructure available in
the transportation system for vehicles to travel efficiently. Planning, design, and































Figure 2.2: Driving states, countermeasures and potential applications (Source:
[102])
Safety in the roadway environment depends primarily on factors, such as pave-
ment materials, standards for road geometry, and traffic control devices. While
great advances in pavement materials and highway design standards have been
achieved in the last century, geometric improvements to existing roads are now
becoming costly and disruptive in nature. Common pavement and road geome-
try related engineering countermeasures that frequently result in safety benefits
are: lane widening, shoulders paving, dedicated left-turn and right-turn lanes, and
roundabouts.
Traffic control devices are designed with the purpose of standardizing as much as
possible the driving behaviour and optimize the traffic flow pattern where conflicting
trajectories are apparent. Pavement marking, signs, traffic signals, and variable
message signs (VMS) are examples of such devices.
Over the last 20 years major safety improvements have been obtained through-
out the application of electronic systems to the roadside environment. As noted
previously, there is an increasing number of researches focusing on cooperative
systems that integrate both in-vehicle and roadside devices throughout wireless
communication protocols.
The FHWA and the states of California, Minnesota and Virginia are investi-
gating the application of ITS technology to help drivers in making safer judgments
with respect to crossing path manoeuvres at intersections. This research project
called Intersection Decision Support (IDS) analyzes potential conflicting trajecto-
ries and estimates if there is sufficient time for the manoeuvre to be finished. When
it is not safe to proceed, according to a safe gap criteria, the driver in the lower
priority movement receives an advisory “no go” message [101].
8
2.3 Police-reported Crashes as a Measure of Safety
In the context of this thesis, a crash or collision is defined as an event between one
or more road users that results in property damage, injury, or fatality. Crashes
are considered by safety engineers as ultimate failure of transportation systems and
therefore highly undesirable events.
Historically, safety has been defined and measured in terms of observed number
of crashes in part by the intuitive and logical link between these two. The majority
of safety studies found in the literature are based on police-reported crash data.
As noted previously, the main advantage of using these data is that these are
objective measures of failures in at least one of the three major components of the
transportation systems: the vehicle, the road user or the road environment.
Unfortunately, a number of problems related to the use of this source of infor-
mation are found in the literature, such as low reportability rates, incomplete and
mis-reporting information, errors in the data entry, and statistical challenges posed
by the inherent rare nature of crash occurrences [31, 40, 41, 46, 79, 95].
The reportability criteria, i.e. the minimum requirement for drivers to report a
crash, is not uniform between jurisdictions and it is also subjected to changes over
time in a given jurisdiction. For example, in Ontario, when the police is not on the
scene, collisions where damage to vehicles or property is more than $1,000 must
be reported to collision reporting centres [81]. Nevertheless, in several occasions
drivers are prone not to report crashes since this would affect their driving records
and subsequently automobile insurance premiums.
According to Hauer and Hakkert [43], the number of crashes that are not re-
ported increases as the crash severity decreases. Around 20% of crashes that re-
sulted in serious injuries and 50% of cashes with injuries that did not require hospi-
talization are not reported to the police. They also estimated that approximatelly
60% of property damage only (PDO) collisions are not present in police accident
database systems.
A study on the reliability of police-reported information for determining crash
and injury severity was performed by Farmer [35]. Police-reported information
of posted speed limit and driver injury severity were investigated for a sample
of more than 10,000 crashes obtained from the National Automotive Sampling
System/Crashworthiness Data System (NASS/CDS) from 1996 to 2000. One of the
key findings of this study was that police reports frequently overstate drivers injury
severity, in particular, 49% of the drivers coded by police as having incapacitating
injuries actually had sustained only minor injuries.
As noted previously, crashes represent a complex hierarchical process of inter-
related causes and consequences for different driving situations, locations and time
intervals and are very random in nature. These underlying characteristics produce
a number of challenges to the development of reliable statistical models to correlate
historical crash data with traffic and road attributes, and these are:
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1. The high frequency of zeros in collision counts and unobserved/unexplained
heterogeneity leads to data over-dispersion. This undermines the power of
statistical models based on crash data and raises concerns related to their
spatial and temporal transferability [39, 60, 71, 89, 97].
2. Discrepancies between predicted and actual crash rates following the imple-
mentation of a countermeasure could occur normally as a result of historical
trends in crash occurrence regardless of the countermeasure. This is frequently
referred to as the regression-to-the-mean (RTM) phenomenon [8, 40, 66].
3. Statistical models developed using historical crash data assume that group of
crashes observed on a given location can yield predictable statistical pattern.
Researchers have argued that this is only true if the underlying mechanism
generating the aggregated data is understood. Otherwise, relationships ob-
served in aggregated data may not hold true at disaggregated level (ecological
fallacy) [31].
4. Variables that are identified as been potentially significant for reducing crashes
may fail to meet minimum thresholds for inclusion in statistical models. Their
contribution to crashes may be plagued by problems of collinearity [1, 94, 97].
5. Due to the rare random nature of crashes and data availability, the effect of
an important variable may not be large enough to be detected reliably in a
before and after observational data, despite the fact that its effect cannot be
denied intuitively [94].
Despite the intuitive link between road safety and observed crashes, a good
understanding of the sequence of events prior to the crash could provide a more
rational basis for the development of engineering countermeasures. In addition,
some researchers argue that observational studies using only reported crashes con-
stitutes in essence a reactive approach to the safety problem by which countermea-
sures are often triggered after a significant number of collisions has been observed
[88, 95, 107].
2.4 Safety Continuum
The notion of safety for road users while in the transportation system can be
hypothesized as a series of time-dependent events that range from undisturbed
passages to actual collisions. This is referred to as the safety continuum of traffic
events [13, 40, 49, 107].
A visual representation of the frequency and severity of these events proposed by
Hydén in 1987 is illustrated in Figure 2.3. The volume corresponding to the class of
events described in Figure 2.3 can be linked to its relative rate of occurrence. This
theoretical concept provides a bottom-up and more rational approach to safety
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research as opposed to the traditional top-down perspective of safety given by
collision frequency. However, it is well recognized that while the extremes of the
pyramid are promptly detected (crashes and undisturbed passages), intermediate












Figure 2.3: The safety pyramid (Source: [49])
The next section describes a number of performance measures applied to safety
studies based on the bottom-up approach.
2.5 Safety Performance Measures
Safety performance measures, also known as proximal safety indicators or surrogate
safety measures [13, 36], are defined to reflect high risk events in relation to a
projected point of collision. These measures are usually based on pair-wise vehicular
velocity and spacing attributes.
The main assumption underlying the use of safety performance measures is that
if one is able to detect high risk situations that occur considerably more frequent
than crashes, then statistically reliable results would be possible without the need
of historical crash data. The use of safety performance measures also constitutes in
essence a proactive approach to road safety studies since it is able to detect safety
problems before they result in crash [15, 30, 88].
A potential problem to the application of such measures is the need for an
objective definition of “high risk” situations or “near-misses” that did not result in
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a crash because of some evasive manoeuvre or other factors to be used in lieu of
historical crash data. One of the first attempts to outline a definition of high risk
situations was given by Perkins and Harris in 1967 in the form of traffic conflicts
[87]. Amundsen and Hydén [11] provided the most accepted definition of traffic
conflict as “an observable situation in which two or more road users approach each
other in space and time to such an extent that there is a risk of collision if their
movement remain unchanged”.
The vast majority of the safety performance measures described in this section
makes use of the above definition to define thresholds between undisturbed passages
and high risk situations. These assumptions and definitions ultimately lead to the
development of a new technique for safety assessments that is described in the next
Chapter.
2.5.1 Time Based Measures
A number of safety performance measures based on the projected time of a potential
collision can be found in the literature. The most common are: time to collision
(TTC), time to accident (TTA), post-encroachment time (PET), encroachment
time (ET), and gap time (GT).
Time to Collision (TTC)
The concept of time to collision, initially proposed by Hayward in 1972, is defined
as “the time required for two vehicles to collide if they continue at their present
speeds and on the same path” [45]. For vehicles traveling in the same direction
TTC can be continuously measured over time using the following expression
TTCi ,t =
(Xi−1 ,t − Xi ,t) − Li−1 ,t




X= position of the vehicles (i = following vehicle, i-1 = lead vehicle)
L= vehicle length
V = velocity
In situations where vehicles coming from a minor approach should yield for
vehicles in the major approach there is a potential for angled crashes. Time to







Di,t= distance between the projected point of collision and vehicle i on the major
approach
Obviously, the TTC measure implies the existence of a collision course, i.e., ve-
hicles traveling in the same direction must be approaching each other (Vn,t > Vn−1,t)
and, for potential angled crashes, the projected position of conflicting vehicles must
overlap at a given time interval.
Values of TTC can vary from infinity when vehicles are not in collision course
to minimum safe values ranging between 1 and 1.5 seconds [22, 45, 107]. A classical
illustration of the TTC concept is given in Figure 2.4. While in a collision course,
driver from vehicle 1 normally requires a certain amount of time to perceive and
react to the situation (point A in the Figure 2.4). A brief time interval after the
beginning of the evasive action, TTC reaches its minimum value (TTCmin) in point
B increasing sharply thereafter. Point C in Figure 2.4 is the potential point of


















Figure 2.4: TTC empirical curve
As noted before, the usefulness of TTC for safety assessments depends on the
use of some arbitrary scale of danger between inter-vehicle interactions that sep-
arates undisturbed passages from near-misses. Several researchers have tried to
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establish minimum value of TTC that could be used to estimate the number of
conflicts in field studies [22, 45, 108, 109]. van der Horst [109] noted that the likeli-
hood of crashes becomes a concern when TTC for a given vehicle is less than 1.5s.
This result was obtained from an experiment involving the application of a driver
simulator to a closed course road. It is worth noting that TTCmin usually occurs
after the evasive action taken by the driver and thus it does not include the reaction
time of the road user. Nevertheless, alternative measures of TTC can overcome this
problem, such as a continuous measure of TTC for the entire event [13].
A problem that limits the application of this safety measure is that several
combinations of speed and distance can produce the same TTC measure, for exam-
ple, consider conflict A where two vehicles are 42m apart approaching at a rate of
100km/h and conflict B with vehicles 4.2m away approaching at a rate of 10km/h.
Although both situations yield TTC values of 1.5s, it is reasonable to expect that
conflict A, with considerable higher kinetic energy and linear momentum would
result in a higher severity crash when compared to conflict B.
Another issue that has prevented the widespread use of the TTC concept is
related to techniques to estimate reliable TTC values. Continuous measurements
of TTC require detailed speed-spacing information normally available through the
use of resource-demanding and laborious techniques, such as photometric video-
analysis [13].
Time to Accident (TTA)
The Time to accident (TTA) attempts to simplify TTC measurements and was
defined by Hydén as “the time that passes from the moment that one of the road
users reacted and starts braking or swerving until the moment the involved road user
had reached the point of collision if both road users had continued with unchanged
speed and direction”. In other words, instead of continuous measurements of TTC,
one would only record the TTC value at the moment the evasive action took place.
This measure is the basis for the development of the Swedish version of the traf-
fic conflict technique (TCT). Since TTA is measured only once during the conflict,
traffic conflict studies can be performed by trained observers that judge the pre-
cise moment of the evasive action and estimate speed and distance measurements
relative to conflicting vehicles. The observers reduce much of the data acquisition
effort as compared to TTC-based studies, however, a new type of bias is introduced
to the process since judgments of speed and distance could result in unreliable
measurements [42].
More than a decade after his initial studies with TTA, Hydén [49] improved
its scope by introducing a series of “uniform severity levels” and “uniform severity
zones” to provide different conflict categories ranging from “non-serious” to “se-
rious”. These categories were based on equidistant parallel non-linear functions
considering average rate of deceleration needed to avoid a collision at different
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speeds and standard coefficient of friction (Figure 2.5). Thus, TTA and the pro-
posed conflict categories can provide a better platform for determining severity in
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Figure 2.5: Severity levels and zones according to Hydén (Source: [13])
Post Encroachment Time (PET)
The Post Encroachment Time (PET) is defined as the time difference between the
moment an “offending” vehicle leaves the area of potential collision and the moment
the other vehicle arrives the collision area [26]. Figure 2.6 illustrates the definition
of post encroachment time for an angled conflict.
This measure differs from TTC and TTA in the sense that the collision course
is not required, thus the data acquisition process can be simplified since relative
speed and spacing are no longer needed.
Major drawbacks of the application of PET in traffic safety studies include: 1)
The basic event used for defining PET may not be comparable to processes that lead
to crashes, 2) Likewise TTC, the “pure” PET measure has limited application in
studies focused on crash severities, and 3)The measure is more suitable for crossing
conflicts (angled crashes). For rear-end conflicts there is a “moving” conflict area
as vehicles progress along their path which adds considerable complexity to field
measurements [13, 107].
Allen et al. [10] examined 347 left-turn conflicts events from two weeks of video
records to investigate the feasibility of three other time based safety performance:
encroachment time (ET), initially attempted post encroachment time (IAPT), and
gap time (GT). Figure 2.7 shows the time-space diagram for a left-turn manoeuvre
illustrating the concept of these measures.
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Figure 2.7: Time-space diagram for a typical left-turn conflict (Source: [10])
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Encroachment Time (ET)
The Encroachment Time (ET) reflects the period that the “offending” vehicle oc-
cupies the conflict area therefore infringing the right-of-way of the vehicle in the
major approach.
According to Allen et al. [10], ET would be a good measure of conflicts if vehicles
on the major approach could be hypothesized as having constant speeds. If this was
true, longer ETs would mean higher severity conflicts since vehicles on the major
approach would need higher deceleration rates to avoid potential collisions.
The use of ET requires objective definitions of conflict areas for each manoeu-
vre as well as precise measurements of the time interval during which “offending”
vehicles is occupying these conflict areas. These requirements can be complex and
difficult to detect and quantify hence limiting the scope of this measure.
Initially Attempted Post Encroachment Time (IAPT)
This measure is similar to PET, however it uses the projected arrival time at the
conflict area of the major approach vehicle (t5 in Figure 2.7) with respect to the
moment the encroachment has ended.
Gap Time (GT)
Gap Time (GT) is given by the projected time arrival of the vehicle in the main
traffic stream reaches the conflict area minus the time required for the yielding
vehicle to clear the conflict area. The projected time arrival of the main road
vehicle is estimated using distance and speed relatives to the moment which the
yielding vehicle begins the manoueuvre.
Several other time based safety performance measures have been suggested with
limited application. Most of them using variations of the initial time to collision
concept. Examples of these measures are: time to intersection (TTI), time to
stopline (TTS), time to zebra (TZ), and time to line crossing (TLC).
2.5.2 Required Braking Power Measures
The differential speeds of vehicles at the moment of impact plays a major role in
crash severity due to the kinetic energy of the system right before the collision.
Safety measures based on the required rate of speed reduction or braking power of
vehicles have the best theoretical formulation to provide good estimates of potential
conflicts, as well as to produce an objective platform for safety studies on which
severity is a major factor.
Two safety performance measures based on vehicles require braking power while
in conflicts are: deceleration rate to avoid the crash (DRAC) and proportion of
stopping distance (PSD) [10, 13, 25, 30, 36].
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Deceleration Rate to Avoid the Crash (DRAC)
Cooper and Ferguson [25] made one of the first documented attempts to use the
deceleration rate to avoid the crash (DRAC) as a measure of conflicts. DRAC can
be defined as the rate at which a vehicle must decelerate to avoid the collision with
other conflicting vehicle [13, 36]. A more complete definition requires assumptions
about the vehicle that initiated the conflict (“offending vehicle”). In this thesis,
DRAC is defined as the required deceleration rate to avoid a collision if the offending
vehicle continues with the same speed and trajectory.
For vehicles traveling in the same direction, DRAC can be expressed as
DRACi ,t+1 =
(Vi ,t − Vi−1 ,t)
2




X= position of the vehicles (i = following vehicle, i-1 = lead vehicle)
L= vehicle length
V = velocity






Di,t= distance between the projected point of collision and vehicle i on the main
stream
The use of DRAC allows a more intuitive (but not less arbitrary) classification
of traffic conflicts. In a study of simulated conflicts from gap acceptance manoeu-
vres, McDowell et al. [69] introduced five grades of severity according to ranges of
deceleration (Table 2.1). Severity grade 1 and 2 were considered low severity while
grades 3 to 5 were considered high severity conflicts.
Table 2.1: Severity grade and deceleration ranges (Source: [69])
Severity grade 1 2 3 4 5
DRAC (m/s2) <1.5 1.5<3.0 3.0<4.5 4.5≤6.0 >6.0
Hydén [50] have suggested an alternative classification for conflicts using DRAC
that is based on the expected driver reaction in order to achieve the required de-
celeration. The severity levels proposed are presented in Table 2.2
The main drawback of this safety measure relates to the data acquisition process.
In order to calculate DRAC, detailed speed/spacing information of both vehicles
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Table 2.2: Braking levels suggested by Hydén (Source: [50])
Conflict level DRAC (m/s2) Description
No conflict 0 evasive action not necessary
No conflict 0 to 1 adaptation necessary
1 1 to 2 reaction necessary
2 2 to 4 considerable reaction necessary
3 4 to 6 heavy reaction necessary
4 ≥6 emergency reaction necessary
involved in the conflict must be available. This detailed information is normally
obtained through the application of laborious and non-trivial photometric analysis.
In theory, DRAC has the potential to be applied in safety evaluations of traffic
scenarios that include different weather conditions, such as dry, wet or snowy condi-
tions and for different traffic composition. It is reasonable to suggest that achieving
a DRAC of say, 6m/s2 can be more challenging when under adverse (wet) pavement
conditions as compared to normal (dry) conditions. Furthermore, due to differences
in braking systems and masses, a DRAC of 6m/s2 for a truck must correspond to
a more serious conflict when compared the the same level of DRAC for small cars.
Unfortunately, studies involving this safety measure that explores these aspects
are not commonly found in the literature. In the scope of this thesis, DRAC is
considered the most promising safety performance measure.
Proportion of Stopping Distance (PSD)
The proportion of stopping distance (PSD) was initially suggested by Allen et
al. [10] and can be defined as the ratio between the remaining distance to the
potential point of collision and the minimum acceptable stopping distance. This






RD= remaining distance to the potential point of conflict (m)
MSD= acceptable minimum stopping distance = V 2/2D (m)
V = approaching velocity (m/s)
D= acceptable maximum deceleration rate (m/s2)
It is worth noting that according to Allen and colleagues, PSD values must be
measured at the moment that the “offending vehicle” starts to infringe upon the
right-of-way of the other vehicle (t1 in Figure 2.7). However this does not guarantee
that vehicles are in a collision course.
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2.5.3 Safety Indices
Recent developments in real-time data acquisition techniques and increasing use
of microscopic simulation in safety studies have fostered the development of safety
indices that incorporate a temporal dimension to traditional safety performance
measures. The fundamental assumption underlying the use of safety indices is that
the conflict severity and the correspondent time exposed to such conflict can provide
a better measure of safety that a single measurement, such as the lowest TTC, the
highest DRAC, etc.
Three safety indices will be discussed in this section: time exposed time to
collision (TET), time integrated time to collision (TIT), and the unsafety density
parameter (UD) [15, 70]
Time Exposed Time to Collision (TET)
Minderhoud and Bovy [70] define TET for a given vehicle as the summation of
all time intervals this vehicle experienced TTC-values lower than a specific TTC
threshold value (TTC∗) representing the boundary between safe and critical confl-
cits. TET also needs specification of the total observed time (H) and the length (L)





δi(t) · τsc (2.6)
δi(t) =
{




TET ∗i = time exposed time-to-collision (s) for vehicle i given the threshold TTC*
T = H/τsc total number of observed time intervals
H = total time considered in the study (s)
τsc = time interval to assume a constant TTC (e.g. 0.1s)
An overall TET value can be produced for the entire scenario by accumulat-
ing TET for all observed vehicles. Furthermore, this indicator can be calculated
separately for different vehicle categories or different weather conditions.
Unfortunately, the TET indicator does consider the severity of the conflict, once
it is expected that, the risk of collision for a very low TTC value is higher than for
a higher TTC value, although both remain under the established threshold.
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Time Integrated Time to Collision (TIT)
This parameter was also suggested by Minderhoud and Bovy [70] to account for the
severity of conflicts based on a time to collision threshold value. TIT measures the
difference between observed TTC and threshold TTC value (TTC∗) for a given time








[TTC ∗ − TTCi(t)]dt (2.7)
∀ 0 ≤ TTCi(t) ≤ TTC
∗
Figure 2.8 exemplifies TET and TIT concepts with typical observed time to


















=   TET     [S]
=   TIT     [S]i
2
i
Figure 2.8: Time extended and time integrated time to collision concepts (Source:
[70])
Parameters TET and TIT can provide useful insights about safety using micro-
scopic simulation, however the same issues found in TTC are “transfered” to these
parameters and need to be further investigated. For a given TTC, for example,
the likelihood of a crash is influenced by factors, such as weather conditions, ve-
hicle type and configuration, and driver’s braking skills. In other words, different
TTC threshold values should be assigned for different combinations of the variables
described above.
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Unsafety Density Parameter (UD)
Barceló et al. [15] presented a safety performance measure for car-following situa-
tions based on vehicle speeds, relative position between the lead and the following
vehicle and the reaction time of the following driver. The basic rules of Newtonian
physics are applied to verify if a hypothetical crash would have taken place if the
lead driver was required to stop the vehicle at its maximum braking capacity. The
reaction time of the following driver was assumed equal to a standard value of 2
seconds for all drivers.
If during a given time interval the hypothetical crash would have occurred then
both the speed of the following vehicle (S) and the speed differential (∆S) at the
moment of the collision are calculated. The authors use these speed attributes to
define an “unsafety” parameter as follows:




b/bmax if b > 0
0 else
b = deceleration rate of the leading vehicle
bmax = maximum possible deceleration rate of the leading vehicle
In order to assess the safety level of different links of the network over time, the
“unsafety density” (UD) safety indicator is estimated using the summation of the
“unsafety” paremeter for all the vehicles in the simulation normalized with respect












St = number of simulation time steps
N = total number of vehicles in the simulation
∆t = simulation step duration (s)
The use of the UD as a safety performance measure is limited in scope due to
some conceptual problems as follows: 1) Adopting a fixed following driver reaction
time will increase the bias in the UD measure, 2) UD values are greater than zero
only when the lead vehicle is braking and thus some conflicts that take place during
stop-and-go situations are not considered, 3) The measure is restricted to potential






The ultimate goal of transportation engineers is to maximize safety of the road
network, whether by improving existing projects or enhancing design standards for
new transportation components. Traffic safety studies provide a systematic tool for
transportation professionals to evaluate safety of existing projects and rationally
direct scarce resources to improve safety in the network (network screening).
Another important application of traffic safety studies relates to evaluating of
the safety implications associated with changes in existing characteristics of a given
entity of the road system (before-after studies), for example, what would be the
safety impact of installing a traffic signal in a previously stop controlled intersec-
tion?
The most common category of safety studies makes use of inferential statistics
applied to historical crash data, known as observational traffic safety studies. Addi-
tional methodologies for safety studies have been introduced mostly to address some
of the methodological challenges posed by the very random and unique nature of
accidents and these are: traffic conflict safety studies and real-time and simulation-
based safety studies. This chapter discusses the advantages and shortcomings of
these approaches.
3.2 Observational Traffic Safety Studies
Observational studies can be viewed as a passive learning process where the knowl-
edge comes from meticulous analysis of the outcome of events that have not been
formally designed to address the problem. The fundamental assumption in obser-
vational traffic safety studies is that safety is a property of traffic entities and can
be defined as “the number of crashes by kind and severity, expected to occur on the
entity during a specific period”[40].
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Researchers have been applying a number of statistical methods and numerical
techniques to model the number of crashes of a given road entity based on geomet-
ric and traffic attributes, and other relevant information found in police-reported
crashes.
Statistical models for safety assessment also known as crash prediction mod-
els (CPMs), accident prediction models (APMs) or safety performance functions
(SPFs) are regression models describing the relationship between the number of
crashes and relevant geometric and traffic attributes, such as traffic flow, number
of lanes, segment length, etc.
Initially, CPMs were developed using linear regression modelling, which assumes
normal distribution of errors and homoscedasticity. These assumptions were found
to be inconsistent with the nature and frequency of crash events and further research
have confirmed the advantages of using Poisson models over standard regression
models. In this case, the generalized linear modelling (GLM) approach can provide
an adequate platform for better models once it is possible to assume a non-normal
distribution of errors. Recently, it has been suggested that crash data used in the
calibration of CPMs are usually more dispersed than what would be consistent
with the Poisson assumption. This is why most recently developed CPMs assume
crashes follow a negative binomial distribution [39, 32, 65, 79].
According to Sawalha and Sayed [97], mathematical expressions of CPMs must
satisfy two basic requisites: 1) It should yield logical results, i.e. neither negative
number of crashes must be obtained nor positive number of crashes in case of zero
values of explanatory variables and 2) The expression must be linear for the purpose
of coefficient estimation in order to use generalized linear regression. These models
are calibrated from crashes observed in sites with “similar” characteristics assuming











j=1 (γjGj ) (3.1)
where
Ec= expected number of crashes/year (intersections) or expected number of crashes/km–
year (road segments)
F,G = relevant road and traffic attributes such as major and minor road AADT,
#lanes, segment length, pedestrian volume, intersection skew angle, etc (explana-
tory variables)
α, β, γ = model parameters
Different CPMs developed for intersections and road segments are normally
found in the literature. The basic difference between these models is that the length
of the segment must be included either as an independent variable or accounted for
by the dependent variable (e.g. expected number of crashes/km-year).
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Bonneson and McCoy [19] developed a CPM for stop controlled intersections
for Minnesota rural highways. The study considered 125 intersections which expe-
rienced 250 crashes in 3 years (1985-1987). The data included two general types of
major road geometry: 1)108 intersections with two lanes and no median and 2)17
intersections with 4-lane major road and median (median width ≥ 10.4m).
The analysis of the calibrated model results indicated that the model based on
negative binomial error structure produced the best results for predicting collision
frequency for the sample investigated. The proposed model is as follows:










Ec= expected number of crashes/year
Tm = major road volume (veh/day)
Tc = cross road volume (veh/day)
The coefficients in the model were found to be statistically significant at the
95% level of confidence. The model goodness of fit was evaluated using the Pearson
chi-square statistic, a visual assessment using a plot of the predicted and observed
crash rate and the dispersion parameter. These indicators suggested that the model
provides a good fit between independent variables and crash rate and the error
structure assumed (negative binomial) was approximately equivalent to what was
found in the data.
A study focused on the development of crash prediction models for a sample of
270 three-legged and four-legged signalized intersections in Ontario was carried out
by Persaud and Nguyen [91]. A total of 12,661 crashes recorded in the period from
1988 to 2003 was used in this analysis.
Two basic types of models were developed with respect to data availability and
aggregation level. In level 1 models (aggregated), equations were calibrated for
three and four-legged intersections by accident severity (injury and PDO) for all
impact types combined and separately for angle, rear-end, and turning movement.
For level 2 models (dissagregated), CPMs considered four-legged intersections for
15 different crash types defined by the movements of involved vehicles before colli-












Ec= expected number of crashes/year
F = sum of all entering flows for the corresponding time period (daily, weekday
morning peak, and weekday afternoon peak)
F1, F2 = AADT for the smaller and larger conflicting flows, respectively, for a
specific accident pattern
Model parameters for angle and rear-end crashes for four-legged rural intersec-
tions are illustrated in Table 3.1. This Table also includes models for different crash
severities and time of the day.










Angle Daily 77924 0.171 0.073 24609 0.283 0.075
AM peak 1684 0.422 0.105 12831 0.155 0.105
PM peak 1790 0.441 0.108 2781 0.309 0.116
Rear-end Daily 0.054 1.569 0.062 0.323 1.352 1.730
AM peak 0.158 1.659 0.089 0.930 1.364 2.490






Several other crash prediction models for intersections can be found in the lit-
erature. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide a summary of other relevant studies focused on
the development of CPMs worldwide.
Table 3.2: Crash prediction models for intersections (Source: [16, 44, 55, 74, 99])
Researchers Location Years of
data
# crashes Explanatory variables
# Int. Control Configuration
Hauer et al.
(1988)




Quebec/CA - 1,084 149 Stop controlled 4-legged Total, minor and major AADT,
flashing beacon, sight distance,
turning lanes, speed limit
Kulmala, R.
(1995)
Finland 5 - 1,762 - 4 and 3-legged AADT
Montain et al.
(1996)
7 counties/UK 5 to 10 25,983 5,359 Stop controlled 4 and 3-legged AADT, # minor intersections in the




Vancouver/CA 3 2,160 419 Stop controlled 4 and 3-legged AADT major and AADT minor
road
Intersection
Since not every transportation agency is able to develop CPMs from local crash
data, it is important to investigate the possibility of using CPMs developed for
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Table 3.3: Crash prediction models for road segments (Source: [37, 90, 96, 110])
Researchers Location Years of
data
# crashes Explanatory variables
Persaud and
Mucsi (1995)






8 3,400 ADT, total road width, roadside hazard






3 - AADT, segment length and unsiganlized
intersection density
Greibe (2003) Denmark 5 1,058 AADT, posted speed, # exits/km, minor side
roads/km, parking, land use, road width
Road segment attributes
2,104 two-lane rural road
sections
392 segments of arterial roads




“similar” entities but using a different population of drivers (spatial transferability).
Researches indicate that models developed in other jurisdiction can not be used
interchangeably among different jurisdictions and must be recalibrated using local
data to better suite the model to local conditions [89, 97, 110].
It has been recognized that CPMs reliability is improved if the model is based
on data for as many years as possible, however, it is necessary to account for the
year-to-year variation or trend in the collision dataset. This trend can be caused
by factors, such as traffic growth or the impact of national road safety policies and
local programs in observed crashes and creates a temporal correlation that presents
difficulties for traditional model calibration procedures [61, 75, 89, 97].
Sawalha and Sayed [97] suggested that another concern with the development
of CPMs is the process by which model explanatory variables are selected. There
is a considerable amount of judgment based on experience to select the variables
and to choose the way these variables will be considered, i.e., continuous versus
categorical variables. In their study an attempt was made to introduce a procedure
for building a more parsimonious and best-fit models.
CPM expressions applied alone to specific sites may lead to inaccurate estima-
tions of crashes mainly because of the over dispersion phenomenon in crash data.
A relatively recent methodology to improve crash estimations known as the Empir-
ical Bayes method (EB method), uses concepts of conditional probability applied
to both the reference population (represented by CPMs) and the specific site to
produce a weighted value of the expected number of crashes. The EB estimate of
crashes is given by [40]
E (m|x ) = w · E (m) + (1 − w) · x (3.5)
where
E(m|x) = the expected number of crashes for entity m given that x crashes have
been observed for the same entity
E(m) = crash estimate obtained from regression model developed using crash data
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of similar sites (CPMs)
w = weight assigned to E(m) (0 ≤ w ≤ 1)
x = observational crash data for the site






where V AR(m) is the variance associated with the regression model developed.
Basically, the weight w in Equations 3.5 and 3.6 is a function of the variability found
in the data used to develop the crash prediction model. The lower the variation
in these data the higher the weight placed on the model estimates of crashes, i.e.,
higher level of confidence in the model. The EB method has been largely adopted
in hot-spot identification (network screening) and in before-after analysis.
A number of alternative techniques to investigate safety using crash data that
are less frequently applied than CPMs and EB method include the use of contin-
gency tables, log-linear analysis, logit models, tree-based regression, artificial neural
networks, among others.
In the contingency tables the data is grouped by the levels of the discrete vari-
ables. For two variables X and Y with m and n levels respectively, a matrix m x n
can be produced with the observed number crashes in the correspondent combina-
tion of X and Y category. Contingency tables display the data in a suitable format
and permits the use of significant tests such as chi-square. Sunanda and John [103]
explored the relationship between driver age (15-25, 25-65, 65+), light condition
(daylight, dusk, dawn, darkness with and without street lights), and crashes using
contingency tables. The major conclusions of the work can be summarized as fol-
lows: 1) As lightning condition worsens, the involvement of old drivers in crashes
increases, 2) Under all light conditions older drivers are more likely to be involved
in crashes, and 3) Middle age drivers were found to be less involved in crashes when
compared to young and old drivers for all light conditions.
Abdel-Aty et al. [3] developed four log-linear models to explain crashes ob-
served in Florida as a function of driver age, crash severity, collision type, average
daily traffic (ADT), roadway configuration (straight or curve), speed ratio, alcohol
involvement, and accident location. The data was categorized according to com-
binations of three variables and log-linear models were developed for both main
factors, as well as two-way interactions assuming the general form














mijk = expected frequency of cell in which x = i, y = j, z = k
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ν = overall effect and all other terms are the effect of the level of each variable and
the interaction between variables on the response variable
Abdel-Aty and colleagues found that old drivers tend to be involved in angle
and turning collisions and that young and middle age drivers have higher likelihood
to be involved in collisions where alcohol was a factor.
Mannering and Grodsky [67] used logit models to investigate factors influencing
motorcyclists’ perceived likelihood of being involved in a crash. The results of a
questionarie with 23 questions applied to a sample of 1,373 riders were used to








Pni = the probability that rider n would categorize himself as having low, medium
or high risk of being involved in an accident in the next 10 years
Uni = linear function of variables which determine the probability of a rider himself
in the low, medium or high risk group
In the study, model coefficients were estimated using the maximum likelihood
procedure. Mannering and Grodsky found that the estimate of self-risk is signif-
icantly affected by the age, gender, and driving experience and that, in general,
riders have a good “grasp” or their relative crash risk.
A tree-based regression methodology was adopted by Abdel-Aty et al. [1] to
model crash occurrence at signalized intersections. This method reduces problems
related to the multicollinearity between variables and missing observations in the
database. Furthermore, the hierarchical tree based regression (HTBR) does not
require assumptions about population’s functional form in advance given that, the
model is developed by splitting data into branches on a tree diagram that is built
using independent variable categories and average number of crashes for each node.
A sample of 33,592 crashes obtained from 832 intersections in Florida in the period
1999-2002 was used in the study and a total of 23 independent and 14 dependent
variables were included in the final database for the model development. One of
the key findings was that different types of collision often rely on different variables
to better predict the number of crashes, consequently aggregated models may not
be able to provide accurate estimations of the predicted number of crashes.
Artificial neural networks (ANN) have been recently applied to predict crashes
and their severity from observational crash data [2, 4, 59, 77]. This methodology
is particularly indicated in situations where analytical functional relationships are
complex and laborious, since it does not require any a priori information about
the relationship between independent and response variables. In a neural network
model, simple nodes or “neurons” are linked together by algorithms designed to
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change the weights by which each variables must be weighted in order to achieve a
given objective function.
3.3 Traffic Conflict Safety Studies
Safety studies using traffic conflicts were initially proposed by Perkings and Har-
ris, researchers from the General Motors laboratory, as an alternative approach to
overcome some of the issues found in the observational traffic safety studies [88].
Traffic conflicts have been defined as “an observable situation in which two or
more road users approach each other in space and time to such an extent that there
is a risk of collision if their movement remain unchanged”[11].
The gist of safety studies using traffic conflicts is that these events occur more
frequently than crashes, although the mechanism leading to both types of events
is reasonably comparable. As a consequence of this, traffic conflicts are deemed to
produce short-term safety studies and address some of the statistical issues linked
to the rare nature of crashes. Additionally, such an approach has been advocated
to be more inclusive than observational crash studies since it considers the vehicle
collision failure mechanism from a somewhat broader perspective than observational
crash data alone [22, 98, 107].
Following the research of Perking and Harris in 1968, a number of studies in
different parts of the world have formed what is known today as the traffic conflict
technique (TCT). Most of the research effort over the last two decades have been
toward the development of objective and reliable measurements of traffic conflicts
and to link these measurements to “real” crashes. Unfortunately, differences in
the way conflicts (and their severity) are measured and consequently, how traffic
conflict surveys are conducted are found to vary considerably between countries,
thus, different versions of the TCT are now available [13, 14, 26, 48, 86, 107].
Two methodological issues regarding the TCT have raised doubt and skepticism
about the potential use of this approach as a technique for safety assessment[13,
22, 38, 45, 98]:
1. Measurements of traffic conflicts and conflict severity have been heavily based
on subjective judgment by conflict observers and therefore considerable bias
is introduced in the methodology. This influences the statistical requirements
of sample size and the minimum required time duration of conflict surveys,
undermines the predicting power of developed regression models and reduces
significantly the transferability of such models to different jurisdictions.
2. Despite its intuitive and somewhat rational link to crashes, some researchers
have argued that results from traffic conflict surveys have not been adequately
linked to conventional observed crash data or other comparable safety mea-
sure.
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The Swedish version of the TCT is considered to be one of the most successful
applications of traffic conflicts to investigate safety. This technique is based on
situations where two vehicles would have collided if no evasive manoeuvre was
taken by any of the drivers. The point at which the evasive action was is taken
determines the point where observers should estimate the value of the time to
accident (TTA)(refer to Chapter 2 for additional information).
TTA is calculated on the basis of estimations of speed and distance for the
vehicles involved made by conflict observers. The severity of a given traffic conflict
is graphically estimated from TTA and speed differential values obtained for the
vehicles involved (Figure 2.5)[13, 49, 107].
A typical application of the Swedish TCT to signalized intersections from Stock-
holm is found in a study by Archer [13]. This research tried to address important
issues concerning the usefulness of the TCT for safety assessment, particularly,
aspects related to its validity and measurement reliability.
Traffic conflict surveys were performed by three trained observers in four signal-
ized urban intersections in the city of Stockholm, Sweden. For each intersection, 18
hours of conflict observation were carried out during morning and afternoon peak
periods. Three types of conflicts were considered: 1) Conflicts between vehicles
and vulnerable road users (pedestrians and cyclists), 2) Rear-end conflicts, and 3)
Conflicts between vehicles with different trajectories. The study also considered
two categories of conflict severity: serious and non-serious. Figure 3.1 illustrates
the results of the TCT survey for the four intersection considered in this research.
This study also investigated the relationship between serious traffic conflicts
and crash occurrences obtained from the period 1997-2002. The author found that
there was a “reasonable” level of agreement between vehicle-vulnerable road user
events since these were more frequent in either the TCT and the historical crash
data. Similar trend was not observed for rear-end interactions suggesting that such
type of conflict is more difficult to identify and quantify for observers in comparison
to other types of conflicts.
An attempt to explore the transferability of the traffic conflict survey performed
by Archer was made by comparing the number of observed conflicts with similar
studies from Canada. Linear regression models developed by Sayed and Zein [100]
estimating the number of conflicts as a function of traffic volume were compared to
the traffic conflict survey. The results showed that in three of the four intersections,
the survey yielded higher observed conflicts when compared to the upper limit of the
model estimation thus, raising doubts regarding the transferability of such studies
to different jurisdictions.
Recent efforts to improve TCT have focused on the development of objective
(and more reliable) measurements of traffic conflicts. Studies have supported that
better measures of traffic conflict can be obtained from the application of video
data collection techniques or by using microscopic simulation of traffic conflicts
[10, 13, 30, 95, 98].
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Figure 3.1: Observed traffic conflicts at four Swedish intersections (Source: [13])
A study from Saunier and Sayed [95] investigates the application of advanced
vehicle tracking algorithms to the automatic detection of traffic conflicts using video
taped data. The merits of the approach were illustrated with an evaluation of 10
traffic sequences recorded for training traffic conflict observers in the 1980s. A total
of 1,501 interactions were detected by the calibrated model and 5 traffic conflicts
initially recognized by observers were also detected by the algorithm, however, the
number of false alarms in the algorithm, i.e., “normal” interactions being counted
as traffic conflicts could be as high as 38. The results were found to be promising,
although the detection algorithm needs to be improved and a more representative
dataset is needed to further confirm the validity of the technique.
The following section describes in detail the most relevant studies focused on
the use of real-time traffic information applied to traffic safety studies.
3.4 Real-time Traffic Safety Studies
Over the past few years many traffic jurisdictions have developed instrumented free-
way traffic management systems (IFTMS) consisting of road sensors, surveillance
cameras, variable message signs, algorithms for automatic incident detection and
ramp meters. These systems can provide real-time traffic flow information obtained
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from road sensors installed under the pavement (loop detector stations) in specific
sections of the freeway [56].
In theory, real-time information from loop detectors is valuable for the devel-
opment of preemptive systems to identify short-term turbulence in the traffic flow
and intervene on these high risk situations before it evolves into a crash. This has
motivated several researchers to investigate the application of real-time information
to predict crash occurrence [5, 56, 57, 63, 82, 84].
One of the first attempts to predict crashes from real-time loop detectors infor-
mation was presented by Oh et al. [82]. Real-time traffic conditions were hypoth-
esized as having two discernible patterns: disruptive and normal. The disruptive
pattern is defined as a series of traffic attributes leading to a crash occurrence and,
normal traffic conditions, would be linked to traffic dynamics patterns typically ob-
served in situations where no crash was verified. According to Oh et al., this traffic











Figure 3.2: Crash occurrence caused by traffic dynamics (Source: [82])
Real-time traffic data corresponding to 30 minutes prior the occurrence of 52
crashes in I-880 freeway in California was used by Oh et al. The authors defined
two traffic conditions as follows: the normal condition as a 5-minute period 30
minutes before the crash and the disruptive traffic condition as a 5-minute period
right before the crash occurrence. Average values of volume, occupancy, speed,
and their respective standard deviations were compared for normal and disruptive
conditions in order to identify an indicator that best represents the difference be-
tween traffic conditions. Using statistical t-tests, non-parametric density functions
and Bayesian theory the authors concluded that the standard deviation of vehicle
speed, as recorded by loop detectors, provides reasonably strong explanation of
crash occurrences in real-time.
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Lee et al. [57] developed a probabilistic real-time crash prediction model relating
crash potential to a number of traffic flow attributes that lead to crash occurrence.
In their study, these traffic flow conditions prior the crash occurrence were called
“crash precursors”. Log-linear models were calibrated as a function of the coefficient
of variance of speed (CVS), traffic density (D), average speed difference between
upstream and downstream loop detectors (Q) assuming the following functional
form:
ln (F ) = α + λCVS(i) + λD(j ) + λQ(k) + λR(l) + λP(m) + βln (EXP) (3.9)
where
F = expected number of crashes over the analysis time frame
λ = variable effect on expected number of crashes
α, β = model parameters CV S,D,Q = crash precursors
R = road geometry (straight or merge/diverge section)
P = time of day (peak or off-peak)
EXP = exposure (veh.km)
i, j, k, l,m = levels for corresponding variables
Some key findings of this study can be summarized as follows:
1. Abrupt transition in speed within the road section, i.e., the formation and
dissipation of queues has a significant impact on crash occurrences.
2. The observed time slice duration before crash occurrence should be deter-
mined so that the difference between traffic conditions obtained for crash and
corresponding non-crash situations is maximized. The study suggested that
this optimum time slice duration may vary for different crash precursors.
3. The categorization of each crash precursors should be determined on the basis
of the its overall fit and the statistical significance of coefficients.
A study from Abdel-Aty and Pande [5] was focused on determining optimum
time interval prior the crash and road segment length that optimize the detection
of high turbulence situations resulting in crashes. This research investigated the
logarithm of coefficient of variation of speed (Logcvs) and average occupancy up
to 5 upstream loop detector stations, the station where the crash occurred and
one station downstream. Additionally, six 5-minute intervals were used to explore
the effect of time prior the crash on the precursors. Traffic information from a
sample of 377 crashes recorded on the Interstate-4, Orlando, from April 1999 to
November 1999 and corresponding non-crash conditions were analyzed throughout
a probabilistic neural network (PNN) classification paradigm.
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The results of the research by Abdel-Aty and Pande suggest that PNN models
achieved the best classification performance between 10-15 minutes prior the crash
from three stations: the station of the crash and two adjacent upstream stations.
The authors also suggested that these models would function better under the
congested traffic flow regime, since rear-end crashes are more likely to be caused
by frequent formation and dissipation of ephemeral queues.
Unfortunately, the use of crash precursors in safety studies is limited to instru-
mented freeway segments. Studies involving real-time traffic flow attributes and
crashes for different road entities, such as intersections and roundabouts appear to
be more challenging since different types of conflicts and traffic flow regimes are
involved. In addition, crash precursors are representative of overall traffic stream
conditions at specific road sections and thus, individual vehicle interactions over
time that caused the crash are not directly considered.
The following section describes major aspects of studies focused on the use
of driving simulators to assess crash risk as a function of driving behaviour and
roadway attributes.
3.5 Safety Studies Using Driving Simulators
Driving simulators have been applied mostly to investigate psychological and er-
gonomic aspects of driving including aspects of impaired driver behaviour (effects
of drugs, alcohol, and driver fatigue) and vehicle dynamics and layout (e.g. vehicle
braking systems, 4-wheel driver, vehicle interior design, etc) [18]. More recently,
transportation researchers increased their interest in applying advanced driving
simulators to investigate safety aspects of ITS devices, such as crash avoidance sys-
tems, in-vehicle navigation systems, active pedals and impacts of innovative road
design [9, 52, 72, 114, 115].
Driving simulators usually provide considerable control over important variables
affecting road safety such as, geometry, traffic control devices, and vehicle features,
thus creating a desirable platform for human factors research. Moreover, since these
simulators are linked to computer systems, data can be obtained in various types
and formats and it can also be processed in real-time [18, 80].
In general, driving simulators consist of a series of projectors linked to computer
units that simulates the field environment in high resolution screens. These screens
are strategically mounted to provide from 150 to 180 degrees of field view to drivers
in the simulation cab (Figure 3.3). Softwares provide the graphical display and
simulation dynamics as well as help researchers to edit traffic scenarios and establish
the interface for the data acquisition [53, 114].
Considerable research effort over the last three decades have aimed to address
three fundamental problems posed by the use of simulators for training, vehicle
design, and safety research as follows: 1) The issue of transferability, 2) The issue















Figure 3.3: Schematic of a typical driving simulator
The issue of transferability, i.e, how comparable are drivers (or pilots) opera-
tional actions in the simulator to the “real world”. This is of critical importance
when simulators (especially flight simulators) are used for training purposes. Ac-
cording to Blana [18], in order to be valid, driving simulators must provide an
environment where basic driving skills are transfered from real driving and drivers
are subjected to realistic visual and auditory cues from traffic scenarios.
Simulators reliability or physical validation refers to how accurate the simulator
represents vehicle dynamics and the visual environment surrounding the traffic
scenario. With increasing computing power and technological advances in driving
simulator systems, a number of vehicle dynamics types have been fully validated
[18, 114].
A more complex issue is the simulator’s ability to induce drivers responses that
would be comparable to those observed in real life similar situations (behavioural
validity). Two types of behavioural validity are considered: the absolute validity,
when simulated and observed measurements are directly matched and the relative
validity, when relative differences from simulated and observed measurements are in
the same direction [17]. As noted by Yan and colleagues [114], several behavioural
validation studies focused on traffic performance measures such as speed, lateral
position and route choice can be found in the literature, however, validation efforts
focused on traffic safety measures are scarce.
A driving simulator experiment was carried out by Alexander et al. [9] to explore
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the impact of a in-vehicle device designed to assist old drivers in choosing suitable
gaps for right-turn movements (in UK) from major to minor roads. A sample of
2004 right-turns was collected from 30 volunteer drives aged 65 years or over and 10
drivers under 65 years subjected to different combinations of lightning conditions
(day/night), average speed (30/60mph), and status of the in-vehicle device (on/off).
The authors developed a probit model to represent the probability of a gap being
accepted as follows:
ϕ =0.401gs − 0.377s + 0.917v − 0.438c + 0.462m − 0.587g−
− 0.371a − 0.266t − 3.456 (3.10)
where
ϕ = normalized probability of gap being accepted
gs = gap size (s)
s = sex (female = 1, male = 0)
v = velocity (60mph = 1, 30mph = 0)
c = vehicle colour (red = 1, non-red = 0)
m = device (on = 1, off = 0)
g = lag or gap (lag = 1, gap = 0)
a = age (old = 1, young = 0)
t = vehicle type (truck = 1, car = 0)
Using the above expression, the probability of a near-miss or accident was esti-
mated using the expression:
Pnm = Pgs · Pt (3.11)
where
Pnm = probability of accident or near-miss at gap size gs
Pgs = probability of a gap size gs being accepted
Pt = probability that time taken to cross is greater than gap size - 1s
Probabilities curves drawn for male and female drivers have shown that female
drivers have higher probability of being involved in incidents than male drivers
when gaps are higher than 7s. This can be explained by the fact that, in general,
female drivers tend to reject gaps below 7s as compared to male drivers, however,
since female drivers are not as aggressive as male drivers (higher crossing time), 7s
(or higher) gaps are slightly more problematic for female drivers. Notwithstanding
the usefulness of the study, two major caveats mentioned by the authors warn that
the results have validity limitations given the artificial environment provided by the
simulator and, since drivers were not influenced by having other vehicles queuing
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behind them (a quite common situation in real world), the gap choice process was
not fully replicated.
A study to investigate the effect of different speed control strategies in highway
work zones using driving simulators was presented by Mitchell and colleagues [72].
Three scenarios were investigated in the simulation experiment: 1) Base case (no
speed reduction strategy), 2) Rumble strips in two location prior the work zone,
and 3) Narrow traffic lane through the work area. Tests were conducted by 15
drivers to investigate differences in speed pattern for the simulated scenarios. The
results indicate that narrow traffic lanes appear to be effective in reducing average
speed when compared to the base case. Rumbles strips, on the other hand, appear
to be effective only in the vicinity of the area they are installed.
Inman et al. [52] conducted a study to provide partial validation for a concep-
tual system to warn potential victims of red-light violators using driving simulators.
Red light violators were deliberately generated (simulated) and warnings to poten-
tial victims (subject drivers) were sent in terms of changes in the normal signal
plan by reducing the amber phase, changing from green to red phase or reducing
the green phase as soon as the red light violator was detected. In this case, it
was important that participants were not told that emergency warnings would be
present or that the research was focused on red light running. The results from the
driving simulator experiment were compared to a field experiment carried out in a
closed course road (Virginia Tech Smart Road). The overall results indicate that in
the two studies, most drivers would respond appropriately to the collision warning
system, however, as no other vehicles were in the study, it’s not clear how the pres-
ence of following vehicles would have affected drivers reactions and furthermore,
what would be the impact of these abrupt decelerations/stops in rear-end crashes.
Yan et al. [114] investigated rear-end crash risk from stop/go decisions due to
signal change using the University of Central Floria driving simulator. In the driving
simulator experiment, 62 participants from different age groups (15-19, 20-24, 25-
34, 35-44, 45+) were requested to drive in two virtual scenarios representing two
approaches of a major signalized intersection from Orange County. When subjects
were approaching the intersection at 90m away from the stop line, the traffic signal
was changed from green to amber and red in order to investigate drivers reactions
to the dilemma zone.
A logistic regression model was developed to estimate the probability of drivers
to stop when facing the amber phase at the dilemma zone. Four independent
variables were selected to describe the model as follows: 1) The projected travel
time from the time of onset of amber phase to the moment the vehicle reaches the
stop line (GAP), 2) The two test locations (LOC), 3) Drivers gender (GENDER),
and 4) Drivers age (AGE). The results showed that only GAP, LOC, and GENDER
were statistically significant (5% level). Males drivers were found to be 72.7% less
likely to stop when facing the crossing dilemma than female drivers, keeping the
other variables constant. The authors concluded that driver simulators have the
potential to be applied to investigate rear-end crash risk at intersections, however,
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differences between the simulation environment and the “real world” need further
research in order to support the validity of such studies.
Advances in data acquisition techniques coupled with increasing computational
power seem to suggest that driving simulators have the potential to provide an
objective platform for the delopment of engineering countermeasures to enhance
road safety.
3.6 Safety Studies Using Microscopic Simulation
The use of computer simulation applied to transportation has become more fre-
quent since the mid 1980s, as transportation planners and engineers focused their
efforts to improve the efficiency and safety of existing transportation systems. New
transportation technologies emerging from this effort, also known as intelligent
transportation systems (ITS), make extensive use of modern computers, electronic,
communication systems coupled with an improved psychological knowledge of the
human behaviour while driving. Some examples of existing ITS are the advanced
vehicle control and safety systems (AVCSS), adaptive cruise control (ACC), ad-
vanced traveller information system (ATIS), and advanced traffic management sys-
tem (ATMS).
Over the last two decades, microscopic traffic simulation has been essentially
applied to investigate the operational efficiency of different transportation compo-
nents measured in terms of average speed, travel times, average delay, average queue
length, etc [68]. The potential of microscopic simulation in traffic safety and traffic
conflict analysis was initially recognized by Cooper and Ferguson [25] and Darzen-
tas et al. [30]. One of the most attractive features found in the use of simulation
is that potential alternatives can be tested in a “virtual world” before implemen-
tation. This is especially appealing in situations where geometric and operational
changes to a given scenario are expensive and operationally troublesome.
According to Archer [13], simulation allows the possibility of tailoring models
to traffic situations with considerably high level of details (factors) that have direct
or indirect influence on traffic safety such as:
• High level of geometric details of the traffic site including, correct lane widths
and stop/yield signs positions.
• Accurate representation of traffic control devices, including vehicle actuated
and coordinated traffic signals.
• Good representation of traffic flows, turning movements, and traffic composi-
tions over time and link specific.
• Flexibility and accuracy in terms of different speed levels and speed variation
over time and link specific. It is possible to control speed in specific location
such as turning movements and speed humps.
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• Differences in vehicle characteristics such as length, weight, engine-power, and
acceleration/braking power.
• Differences in behaviour and performance of different driver categories are
allowed.
Cooper and Ferguson [25] and Darzentas et al. [30] attempted to develop a sim-
ulation model to account for the occurrence of traffic conflicts at 3-leg intersections
(T-junctions). In their model, vehicles were assumed to be identical and having the
same acceleration and braking capabilities. A total of six vehicle movements were
identified and an exponential gap acceptance model was used to represent turning
attempts that could develop into crossing conflicts. It was assumed that conflict
seriousness between left-turn vehicles from the minor approach and thru vehicles
on the major is proportional to the deceleration rate to avoid collision. This study
found that conflict rate was independent of average vehicle speeds, however, con-
flict severity increased with increasing mean speed and increasing speed standard
deviation.
In order to produce data for traffic conflict studies, Sayed et al. [98] developed
a stochastic model to simulate traffic conflicts at unsignalized intersections.The
major assumptions in the model were:
• No overtaking or lane changing allowed at the intersection.
• The subject intersection is isolated.
• All drivers have an unobstructed view of the intersection.
• There is no pedestrian interference.
• Drivers must allow a minimum headway with the vehicle immediately ahead.
• All drivers coming from lower priority road have perfect knowledge of signal-
ization and priority rules of the road.
Two major components in the simulation model were the initial vehicle headways
and the gap acceptance model. A shifted negative exponential distribution was
used to create vehicle headways from the the average headway obtained from the
assumed flow rate. The gap acceptance model considered an initial critical gap for
four types of drivers: youg males, young females, old males, and old females drawn
from a truncated normal distribution with mean and standard deviation as shown
in Table 3.4. This gap acceptance algorithm also included factors to account for the
number of lanes to be crossed, heavy vehicles, and delay for vehicles in the minor
road traffic stream.
Three types of conflicts considered in the study were: crossing, merging, and
rear-end. Whenever vehicles accept gaps from the minor approach that would
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Table 3.4: Mean and standard deviation of critical gap time (Source: [98])
Group Yield control Stop control
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
(s) (s) (s) (s)
Young males 4.0 0.75 5.0 0.75
Old males 4.5 0.85 5.5 0.85
Young females 5.5 1.00 6.5 1.00
Old females 6.0 1.25 7.0 1.25
bring about a collision course with another vehicle in the main stream, the time to
collision (TTC) measure is estimated by the model. Traffic conflicts were defined
to occur when the estimated TTC is lower than 1.5 seconds.
An important aspect of Sayed’s research is that he has attempted to validate
the model by comparing simulated and observed traffic conflicts using a sample of
two hours (7:00-9:00AM) traffic conflict survey in four urban unsignalized inter-
sections. Three different computational speed limits were tested and the results
are summarized in Table 3.5. While limited to a small number of intersections,
the results on Table 3.5 suggest that the model can be used in similar applications
with reasonable confidence. This study also found simulated conflicts to increase
exponentially with volume and conflict severity (as measured by TTC) to increase
with approaching speed.























Recently, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) [36] presented a study
that investigates the application of microscopic simulation in safety studies for in-
tersections. This report explores the use of different safety performance measures
(surrogate safety measures), compares nine commercially available microscopic sim-
ulation packages with respect of their strengths and limitations for safety assess-
ments and, attempts to provide some guidelines regarding data requirements and
41
analysis for simulation-based safety studies.
The simulation packages CORSIM, SIMTRAFFIC, VISSIM, HUTSIM, PARAM-
ICS, TEXAS, AIMSUM, WATSIM, and INTEGRATION were evaluated in terms
of 5 major groups of attributes: 1) General features, 2) Behavioural modeling of
driver/vehicle interactions, 3) Ability to extract detailed data from the simulation,
4) Ability to calibrate and select parameters of models, and 5) Cost to modify source
or outputs to support safety performance measures. The detailed list of features
considered important to be present in simulation packages to allow simulation–
based safety studies are presented in Table 3.6.
The FHWA report does not indicate a clear superiority of any particular model
for safety assessments, although, VISSIM was found to support most of the fea-
tures required for safety studies using simulation at a reasonable level of fidelity.
An important section of this report was dedicated to the validation of safety perfor-
mance measures. Three hypothesis for the utility of simulated safety measures have
been presented and these are: 1) Discriminating between the safety of two design
alternatives in a simulation, 2) Correlation of the surrogate safety measure with
real world traffic conflict studies, and 3) Correlation of surrogate safety measure
reductions with predicted reductions in traffic conflicts. According to the FHWA,
simulated safety performance measures are not required to be correlated directly to
the actual number of crashes, but the relative difference of various intersection de-
signs as measured by simulated safety performance must be consistent with similar
studies with real world conflict measurements.
Huguenin et al. [47] applied the microscopic traffic simulator AIMSUM to
investigate the occurrence of potential for rear-end collisions in freeways. A safety
performance measure called “unsafety density”(UD) (refer to Chapter 2 for details)
defined as function of speed differential between the leader and following vehicles,
following vehicle speed and ratio between actual and maximum deceleration rate
of the lead vehicle was applied in this study. The usefulness of the UD parameter
was investigated by a case study using 3 years of crash data obtained from a 7km
road segment of a freeway in Geneva that included two on-ramp segments. In the
simulation exercise, the UD parameter was estimated for 13 simulation replicates
for the morning peak hour (7h00-8h00). A visual comparison between the evolution
of UD and observed crashes is presented in Figure 3.4.
Results in Figure 3.4 suggest that the simulation was able to detected spatial
variations in safety, although, a space shift between observed and simulated outputs
is noticeable. Unfortunately, the authors did not attempt to calibrate AIMSUM
algorithms with respect to UD estimations. This lack of calibration may have
caused the space shift observed in the results.
Archer [13] investigated the potential use in safety studies of the commercially
available microsimulation package VISSIM c©. This study was focused on the esti-
mation of traffic conflicts at 3-leg stop controlled intersections using microscopic
simulation. The author have selected VISSIM as simulation platform because of its
high level of detail in modeling, as well as the general flexibility regarding to road
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Figure 3.4: Crash rate and UD parameter values per freeway sections (Source: [47])
design, vehicle performance and road user behaviour.
The simulation experiment was designed to consider 3 different two-hour time
intervals: morning peak, off-peak, and afternoon peak period. A total of 20 simu-
lation runs for each time interval were performed. It is worth noting that Archer
formally attempted to calibrate and validate VISSIM algorithms with respect to
three measures of performance (MOPs): 1) Time gap distribution, 2) Traffic flow
rates, and 3) Speed and speed variance.
Four safety performance measures were tested in this study: 1) Time to colli-
sion (TTC), 2) Post-encroachment time (PET), 3) Time to accident (TTA), and
4) Required braking rate (RBR). Observed measures of TTC, PET, and RBR were
obtained from a resource-demanding video-analysis procedure over 6 hours of video-
taping and TTA values were obtained from 18 hours of conflict survey in same the
time-periods chosen for the simulation exercise. Figure 3.5 illustrates the five types
of conflicts of particular interest in this exercise.
In discussing the results, Archer suggested that, in general, the simulation ex-
periment shows a reasonable level of consistency in both frequencies and severities
in the four safety performance indicators tested. Furthermore, differences between
simulated and observed safety measurements were hypothesized to be due to the
nature of microscopic models which are not able to fully emulate the complex road
user behaviour and vehicle performance subjected to high crash risk situations.
In theory, microscopic traffic models have the potential to account for important
factors that heavily influence crash occurrences, including different behavioural
aspects of drivers and individual pair-wise vehicular interactions in real-time. This
would provide a platform for the development of safety studies that apply a more
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Figure 3.5: Simulated conflict types (Source: [13])
mechanism. However, some methodological aspects of this approach need to be
investigated as these are
1. Traditional microscopic car-following, gap acceptance, and lane changing al-
gorithms have not been developed specifically to account for the full range of
factors explaining the potential for crashes. Outputs from these models may
not be representative as to the “real life” behaviour, especially when drivers
are experiencing high risk situations. Models should allow errors to occur
as the result of “less-than-perfect” perception, decision-making, and action,
thereby causing different levels of risk in the interactions between road-users
and the environment [12, 13, 113].
2. These “less-than-perfect” models must have their inputs accurately deter-
mined based on observational data, and simulation models must produce
estimates of safety performance that can be verified from field observations
(model calibration and validation).
3. An objective link between simulated safety performance and observed high
risk traffic events would likely to enhance the scope of microscopic modeling
as a tool for safety assessments of transportation systems.
It is worth noting that advances in modeling techniques in conjunction with
powerful computers and readily available vehicle tracking information will likely to
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produce advanced behavioural microscopic algorithms. This seems to be a promis-
ing scenario for the use of simulation in safety studies. A recent study in Minnesota
[113] developed one of the first behavioural car–following models that explicitly
considered crash occurrence. A sample of 54 detailed vehicle trajectories extracted
from 10 “real life” crashes were used to calibrate and validate the model. Notwith-
standing the early stage of this research, preliminary tests indicate that the model
is able to replicate both normal and unsafe driver behaviour that could lead to a
rear-end crashes.
The next Chapter introduces the overall characteristics of the proposed model
for safety assessment using microscopic simulation.
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Table 3.6: Important features in microscopic models for simulation–based safety
assessments (Source: [36])
Group Characteristics
1. General features a. Availability of source code
b. Interaction with external codes
c. Post-processing analysis tools
d. Graphical network editor
e. Runs on PC
f. Object oriented structure
g. Actuated signals modeled
2. Behavioural modeling a. Parameterized gap–acceptance model
b. Parameterized lane change model
c. Parameterized car following model
d. Parameterized turn speed
e. Reaction to yellow
f. Variable driver reaction time
g. Intersection box movements
h. Sight distance limits
i. Rolling yield




n. Maneouvre failure recording
o. Parking manoeuvres
p. Turn signal modeling
q. U-turns
r. Driveways in the intersection corner
3. Data extraction capabilities a. Vehicle state variables exportable to file
b. Published animation file format
c. API available
d. Output file configurable
e. Gap-acceptance events exportable
f. Gap-acceptance rejections exportable
g. Lane change events exportable
h. Vehicle state variables include x,y, position
i. Currently includes conflict stats output
4. Calibration and validation a. Variable time steps
b. Time steps < 1.0s
c. Gap-acceptance criteria change by delay
d. Vehicle length
e. Vehicle length considered in gap logic
f. Variable headways
g. Variable queue discharge headways
5. Modification cost a. Cost to modify API
b. Cost to modify output
c. Cost to modify input
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Chapter 4
Microscopic Model For Safety
Assessment
4.1 Introduction
The safety performance of a given road entity can be hypothesized to be function
of the road geometry, traffic attributes, environmental conditions, and their inter-
action with different road users over time. This dynamic and complex combination
of factors introduces a level of “turbulence” to the traffic stream which dictates the
overall road safety performance.
According to the safety continuum concept previously introduced, traffic tur-
bulence could be expressed in terms of both frequency and severity of vehicle in-
teractions over time. For the purpose of this thesis, vehicle interaction is a time-
dependent event where two vehicles would collide if their respective trajectory and
speed remain unaltered. Crashes, on the other hand, can be viewed as a small
subset of relevant high risk vehicle interactions, which by their very random na-
ture represent a narrow somewhat biased view of the larger safety problem. This
conceptual framework is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Ideally, it would be preferable to obtain measures of traffic turbulence directly
from field studies. However, such an approach still not feasible given that it would
require real-time monitoring of vehicles in the traffic stream, including those rare
combinations of events when a crash is observed and this type of information is
not readily available. Microscopic simulation has been successfully applied for es-
timating transportation systems performance and, in theory, has the potential to
investigate traffic turbulence in lieu of real-time vehicle tracking data.
The proposed microscopic model for safety assessment attempts to reproduce
inter-vehicular interactions for different transportation scenarios using existing mi-
croscopic behavioural car-following, lane changing, and gap acceptance algorithms.
Traffic turbulence as represented by individual vehicle interactions is measured by
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a crash potential index (CPI) estimated over time. This Chapter describes major
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Figure 4.1: Traffic stream turbulence and vehicle interactions conceptual framework
4.2 Vehicle Interactions
An objective definition of vehicle interactions is required for the safety model since
these events will determine the overall group of vehicles exposed to various degrees
of crash risk. As noted previously, vehicle interactions are characterized by the
existence of a collision course between two vehicles over time.
The basic difference between vehicle interactions and traffic conflicts is that
the latter was initially conceptualized to allow field studies using “trained conflict
observers”. This implies the existence of a somewhat subjective threshold to define
the conflict. Moreover, in general, traffic conflicts are recorded only at the moment
that some evasion action happened, such as a sudden deceleration (brakes lights
on) and not continuously.
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The vehicle that triggers the interaction whether by decelerating to stop or turn,
changing lanes or accepting a gap to enter from a low priority road is named the
stimulus vehicle (SV). Once SV starts the manoeuvre, the driver of the vehicle
directly affected by this manoeuvre should react or respond the action to avoid a
possible crash. This vehicle is called the response vehicle (RV). The two basic types
of vehicle interactions can be defined as rear-end and angled interactions.
4.2.1 Rear-end Interactions
In this type of interaction, SV is usually a lead vehicle adjusting its speed to deal
with a stop sign, amber/red phases of traffic signals or to perform turning manoeu-
vres at intersections vicinity. Rear-end interactions can also be originated when
SV change lanes and the immediate following vehicle (RV) in the target lane is
traveling faster than the lane changing vehicle. These situations are illustrated in
Figures 4.2 and 4.3.
It should be noted that car-following situations where the following vehicle (RV)
speed is greater than the lead vehicle speed (SV) are also considered as vehicle
interactions even if the lead driver is not braking.
Vehicle 1
V = 45km/h
a  = -2m/s
Vehicle 2
V = 40km/h
a  = 0m/s
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Figure 4.3: Rear-end interaction during a lane change
4.2.2 Angled Interactions
Angled interactions normally begins when vehicles in lower level priority road (or
movement) cross or merge higher priority movements. This process is represented
in gap acceptance models. Figure 4.4 gives an example of an angled interaction
emerging from a stop controlled intersection. When vehicle 1 decides to proceed
(gap acceptance model), it becomes the stimulus vehicle (SV) to vehicles 2 which
should react to SV stimuli in order to avoid a potential collision. This vehicle is
referred to as the response vehicle (RV).
Since for angled interactions, SV and RV trajectories are not parallel, crash
zones need to be defined for all combination of approaching movements. Vehicle
speeds and distances to crash zones are used to verify the existence of a collision
course between SV and RV. Figure 4.4 also illustrates instantaneous requirements
for a collision course in angled interactions.
As illustrated in Figure 4.4, potential crashes are assumed to result from a
combination of both erroneous SV gap acceptance and RV actions taken in response
to SV stimuli. It is also reasonable to assume that the severity of a given interaction
should vary with respect to differential vehicle speeds and spacing and for how long
vehicles remained interacting. For example, vehicles with higher speed differentials
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Figure 4.4: Collision course in angled interaction
with lower speed differentials traveling further apart. The next section introduces
the safety performance measure used to express both frequency and severity of
simulated vehicle interactions for different traffic scenarios.
4.3 Crash Potential Index (CPI)
As discussed in Chapter 2, a number of safety performance measures have been
investigated over the past two decades. The literature review suggested that safety
performance measures based on individual braking requirements, such as the de-
celeration rate to avoid the crash (DRAC), provide a better measure to represent
both frequency and severity of high risk vehicle interactions.
Unfortunately, DRAC itself does not account for important factors that play
a major role in the braking process, especially in critical situations. For example,
consider a rear-end interaction where the following vehicle requires a deceleration
of 8m/s2 to avoid the crash. It is reasonable to expect that a car would have better
chances to achieve this braking rate as compared to a truck due to obvious differ-
ences in braking systems and vehicle masses, assumed everything else constant. The
same rationale can be applied for different environmental conditions, i.e. assuming
everything the same, achieving a DRAC of 8m/s2 for wet pavement is consider-
ably more challenging (reduced friction) than if conditions were satisfactory (dry
pavement).
The crash potential index (CPI) introduced in this work is a safety performance
measure that attempts to address some of the issues found in DRAC. This measure
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captures three important aspects of vehicle interactions, namely the RV braking
requirements to avoid the crash, the maximum available RV braking power and
the time exposed to the interaction. The RV braking requirements during a vehi-
cle interaction is represented by the deceleration rate to avoid the crash (DRAC)
estimated using Newtonian physics for every time interval.
The maximum available braking power or maximum available deceleration rate
(MADR) is a stochastic component introduced to account for different vehicles
categories under different pavement conditions (e.g. dry/wet) that are expected
to perform differently during a braking event that requires a specific DRAC level.
The analysis in this thesis considers two vehicles types, cars and trucks, operating
under good conditions, i.e. daylight and dry pavements. For these set of conditions
MADR was assumed to be normally distributed with average of 8.45m/s2 and
5.01m/s2 for cars and trucks, respectively, with standard deviation of 1.40m/s2.
These values were obtained from field tests for different vehicles with initial speeds
from 80 to 100km/h coming to a full stop [78, 76].
As noted previously, the total time vehicles interact corresponds to the time
exposed to a certain likelihood of crash and, consequently, should be considered in
the safety performance measure. The crash potential index (CPI) is defined as the
probability that a given vehicle DRAC exceeds its maximum available deceleration
rate (MADR) during a given time interval. The CPI index is obtained using an







MADR(a1 ,a2 ,...,an ) ≤ DRACi ,t
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CPIi = crash potential index for vehicle i
DRACi,t = deceleration rate to avoid the crash (m/s
2)
MADR(a1,a2,...,an) = random variable following normal distribution for a given set
of traffic and environmental attributes (a1, a2, ..., an) (m/s
2)
tii = initial simulated time interval for vehicle i
tfi = final simulated time interval for vehicle i
∆t = simulation time interval (sec)
Ti = total travel time for vehicle i (sec)
The parameter b in the above equation denotes a binary state variable, 1 if
a vehicle interaction exists and 0 otherwise. As noted previously, the probability
term in Equation 4.1 is function of DRAC, the vehicle type and environmental
conditions. Figure 4.5 indicates the difference in CPI calculations for a given time
interval considering different vehicle types under the same braking requirements
(DRAC). This probability is illustrated as the cross-hatched area in Figure 4.5.
From this figure it is apparent that for a given level of DRAC trucks are more
challenged to meet the braking requirements than cars. The same analogy can be
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applied within the same group of vehicles but for different environmental conditions









Figure 4.5: CPI calculations for a given DRAC level
DRAC can be calculated for both rear-end and angled interactions using the
following expressions
1. DRAC for rear-end interactions
DRAC rear endRV ,t =
(VRV ,t−1 − VSV ,t−1 )
2
2 [(XSV ,t−1 − XRV ,t−1 ) − LSV ]
(4.2)
where
V = RV or SV velocity (m/s)
X = RV or SV position (m)
LSV = SV length (m)

























































SV = position of the farthest boundary of the crash zone with respect to
SV trajectory (m)
While interacting, vehicles are supposed to apply DRAC in order to avoid high
risk situations. In reality, combinations of differential speed and spacing are per-
ceived by the RV driver which, after a given delay, will respond in a particular
fashion. The simulation algorithm updates DRAC for every time interval (0.1 secs)
based on driver reaction in the previous interval. For example, if in a given interval
(ti) the RV driver applies a deceleration rate greater than DRAC then in the next
time interval (ti+1) it is expected that DRAC will be lower assuming everything
else constant.
The above CPI expression is computationally sound since it reflects a proba-
bility that unsafe conditions present themselves to any given driver as he or she
progresses along the road. The CPI also captures the gamut of interaction levels
from undisturbed passages to vehicle crashes as a continuous measure.
As noted previously, although more desirable, estimating CPI directly from
field measurements would require a comprehensive and detailed vehicle tracking
data rarely available. This way, the procedure for estimating CPI in this work ap-
plies microscopic simulation as a platform to model geometric configuration, traffic
attributes and overall driving behaviour for different transportation scenarios. The
general framework for estimating CPI is illustrated in Figure 4.6.
4.4 Simulation Platform
The simulation platform is a key component in the safety model since its algorithms
should replicate with high fidelity the whole spectrum of traffic situations that could
lead to crashes. This way, it is possible to ensure that model outputs would yield
safety measures that closely match “real world” situations.
Notwithstanding the fact that the vast majority of microscopic models have
not been explicitly developed for safety assessment, recent advances in modelling






























Figure 4.6: Framework to establish CPI for a given time interval (Source: [28])
comprehensive and “non-normative” simulation algorithms. The most advanced
group of microscopic models known as psycho-physical or action point models are
based on the assumption that the driver would be able to ascertain if he/she is
approaching the leader vehicle by changes in its apparent size. Furthermore, drivers
would perceive relative speed by changes on the visual angle of the vehicle ahead.
These thresholds for human perception are usually referred to as action points [21].
Wiedemann [111, 112] created the first action point car-following model using
extensive research on the limits of human perception. Wiedemann’s car-following,
lane change, and gap acceptance models are incorporated in a traffic simulation pro-
gram developed in Germany called VISSIM which serves as the simulation platform
in this work.
4.4.1 VISSIM Psycho-Physical Car Following Model
Wiedemann’s car-following model (CFM) considers four types of regimes where
drivers adjust their desired spacing and speeds through changes in their accelera-
tion and deceleration rates. These four driving regimes are: un-influenced driving,
closing process, following process, and emergency braking.
In the un-influenced driving regime (gray area in Figure 4.7), the following driver
is trying to reach its desired speed once there is no lead vehicle in a reasonable
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distance (150m) or when the distance is decreasing but the perception threshold of
speed difference at long distance (SDV) has not been achieved. Speed differential
(DV) and spacing (DX) for this regime should satisfy the following conditions:
DV<SDV or DX>150m at each time interval.
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Figure 4.7: Perception and reaction thresholds and distances in Wiedemann’s CFM
(Source:[92])
When both the distance between the lead and the following vehicle is less than
150 meters and the SDV threshold have been surpassed, the following driver enters
the closing process regime. In this regime, drivers realize that a slower vehicle is
approaching and, after a given delay, begin to decelerate. At this point, drivers
intend to decelerate matching its own desired minimum following distance (ABX).
The applied deceleration rate is based on the kinematics equation for deceleration
to a moving target. An additional error term is added to represent the error of
human estimation, that varies for the same driver every second, and a parameter
to account for the learning process also updated each second (blue area in Figure
4.7).
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In the following process, the trailing vehicle has almost the same speed of the
lead vehicle and the following driver does not consciously react to movements of
front vehicle. Acceleration and deceleration rates are applied in a very low oscillat-
ing level around the average value equals to 0.2m/s2. The transition from the closing
to the following process happens when DV<SDX. The following process is delimited
by two perceptual thresholds for small speed differences at short, decreasing and
increasing distances (CLDV and OPDV) and two thresholds corresponding to the
minimum desired distance at low speed differences and the perception of growing
distance in the following process (ABX and SDX). This regime is illustrated in the
white area in Figure 4.7.
The emergency braking regime happens when drivers need to react to avoid a
crash and to come back to a distance longer than the minimum desired distance
for standing vehicles (AX). The transition to the emergency braking situation can
happen either from the closing process or from the following process. If the vehicle
still in the closing process (DV>SDX) and the spacing between the lead and the
follower vehicle becomes smaller than (ABX) the emergency braking regime begins.
If the vehicle is in the following regime and the lead vehicle brakes suddenly leading
to DV>CLDV and DX<ABX the emergency regime is also triggered (red area in
Figure 4.7) .
4.4.2 VISSIM Lane Change Model
In VISSIM, the human decision to change lane is represented by a hierarchical
scheme considering three major questions as follows [112]:
1. Is there a desire to change the lane?
2. Is the traffic situation at the target lane better than the traffic conditions at
the actual lane?
3. Is the movement to the target lane possible?
Initially, the desire to change the lane arises from obstructions on the current
lane by a slower vehicle. Changing to a faster lane is valued to be advantageous if the
vehicle is not obstructed by a new lead vehicle in the fast lane and, finally changes to
both faster and slower lanes are possible, given that no dangerous situations results
from the manoeuvre [112]. If all three questions are answered positively the lane will
be changed. This hierarchical process follows analogous perception models applied
in car-following situations, however, in this case, the vehicle changing lanes should
analyze up to two more vehicles in the target lane (lead and following vehicles in
the target lane). Figure 4.8 illustrates the parameters for lane change manoeuvres.
Lane changes can also be motivated by necessary adjustments in drivers posi-
tions in order to reach a necessary connector and maintain their routes (mandatory
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Lag, Lead, Gap, TR, TB = time headways (s)
LR = distance of reation (m)
Figure 4.8: Parameters in VISSIM lane changing manoeuvres (Source: [112])
lane change). Driver aggressiveness for mandatory lane changes in VISSIM 4.3 is
considered by defining deceleration thresholds for both the vehicle that is changing
the lane and the vehicle ahead in the target lane. While coding the network, users
can also specify the distance upstream of a given connector that drivers would start
to search for suitable gaps in order to perform a mandatory lane change. These
two features are especially useful when modeling congested situations.
4.4.3 VISSIM Gap Acceptance Model
Gap acceptance manoeuvres in VISSIM 4.3 can be modeled by using two strategies,
namely the “priority rules” and the “conflict areas”. When adopting the “priority
rules”, users must define major and minor priority movements, place virtual stop
markers on the minor road to determine where the vehicle should stop (if needed)
and define a minimum gap time bellow which the gap is rejected. This minimum
gap time is equivalent to the concept of a critical gap (a gap with equal probability
of acceptance and rejection). In essence, this is a deterministic gap acceptance
model, however, other types of models such as logistic regression model can be de-
fined throughout a programming tool embedded in VISSIM called Vehicle Actuated
Programming (VAP) [13, 92].
“Conflict areas” have been introduced to yield a more realistic and “intelligent”
vehicle behaviour in the gap acceptance manouvre. Based on intersection geometric
characteristics as defined by the user, VISSIM automatically detects overlapping
areas (conflict areas) and the user establish which movement should yield the right-
of-way. A visibility parameter determines the closest point to the intersection where
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drivers should observe other drivers approaching from conflicting movements. The
driver in lower priority approach evaluates gaps on the main stream, the situation
behind the conflict area, and its current speed/acceleration profile before deciding
to proceed or stop at the intersection.
One of the main differences of the use of “conflict areas” as compared to the
“priority rules” is that in the former gap acceptance approach, vehicles in the main
steam also react in case of a crossing vehicle misjudges the available gap or the
situation beyond the conflict area and has to stop or slow down in the middle of
the conflict area. In this case the main stream vehicle would react, changing lanes,
slowing down or even stopping to avoid the crash. Unfortunately, there is little
information about how the software perform these tests.
Accurate and complex behavioural modeling of driver/vehicle interactions is
not the only desirable characteristic in microscopic models in their use in safety
studies. Microscopic simulation packages should also allow detailed specification of
network components, provide detailed and user adjustable output information and
provide a rational platform for calibrate, modify, and manipulate key parameters
of sub-models [36].
A number of additional features present in VISSIM supported its selection as
the simulation platform in this thesis and these include:
1. Configurable output files.
2. Allows short simulation time interval (0.1sec).
3. Permits different vehicle dimensions and operational characteristics between
vehicle types and within the same vehicle type.
4. High flexibility in defining traffic flow and traffic composition, including turn-
ing movements and time-dependent traffic flow.
5. Allows modeling of speed reductions for turning movements.
6. Permits user to access objects and data in the model during run-time pro-
cessing throughout an open application programmer interface (API).
7. Allows high level of modeling details for traffic signals, including semi and
fully actuated traffic signals.
Notwithstanding that VISSIM algorithms have not been initially designed for
safety studies, this simulation package appears to support most of the modeling
features necessary for estimating safety performance measures of traffic scenarios
with reasonable level of fidelity [13, 36].
It has been recognized that microscopic simulation users should perform visual
inspections during simulation run-time to search for abnormal vehicle behaviour
such as, sudden vehicle stoppage, abrupt lane-change and others. Three of these
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situations have been observed during VISSIM simulations that would have impacted
our safety performance measure (CPI/veh): 1) “Crashes” during gap-acceptance
situations, 2) Sudden vehicle stoppage for vehicles trying to reach off-ramp links,
and 3) Vehicles too close during lane change manoeuvres.
Crashes have been observed in VISSIM for complex intersection environment
where a considerably high number of vehicles and turning manoeuvres exist. These
situations must be excluded for the analysis since it is considered that VISSIM can-
not realistically simulate crashes. In this research, VISSIM output files (.fzp files)
were filtered for vehicles occupying the “same” space at the same time throughout
a VB.net application developed for estimating CPI, named CPI calculator. Such
occurrences were identified by unreasonably high DRAC values (> 15m/s2) and/or
very low (or negative) spacing between leader and follower vehicles.
Problems with sudden vehicle stoppage were observed mostly for vehicles trying
to exit the freeway in high volume regime. In this case VISSIM generates an error
file that indicates that a vehicle has been removed from the simulation and the
respective number seed was not considered in the analysis.
In situations where the following vehicle has started to change the lane to im-
prove its travel speed (discretionary lane change) the following driver starts to
“look” at the target lane although for a brief period, say 0.2 to 0.5 seconds the
vehicle is still occupying its original lane. In some occasions, especially when the
lead vehicle in the original lane is too close, this transition yield very low spacing
between vehicles with considerably high speed differentials. In the CPI calcula-
tor VB.net application these situations have also been filtered by comparing the
status of follower vehicle’s VISSIM variable called Lch (direction of current lane
change). The signs “<” or “>” in Lch variable indicate that vehicle has started




CPI Calibration and Validation
Using Vehicle Tracking Data
5.1 Introduction
In order to estimate CPI values one would need highly detailed and almost contin-
uous (every 0.1s) information about speed and spacing for every vehicle traveling
on a given road segment. Additionally, in order to have a representative sample of
high risk situations in the traffic stream, it is necessary to gather sufficient data to
ensure these type of events are included in the dataset. These data prerequisites
bring considerable limitations to the use of existing vehicle tracking data in the
proposed safety framework. This thesis attempts to overcome this void by apply-
ing microscopic traffic algorithms to represent driver behaviour as observed in real
world situations.
It is recognized that the merits of microscopic simulation for assessing safety
depend on the ability of these models to capture complex behavioural relation-
ships that could lead to crashes and to establish a link between simulated safety
measures and crash risk. Furthermore, it becomes necessary to estimate model
inputs such that they accurately replicate safety performance at a given location
over time. Accordingly, one of the major steps in applying simulation for safety
purposes is to ensure that important model inputs have been accurately determined
based on observational data and that simulation models produce estimates of safety
performance that can be verified from real world observations.
The main objective of this chapter is to introduce a systematic and objective
procedure for determining best estimates of simulation model inputs that reflect
safety performance measures as obtained from field observations. This is referred
to as model calibration. A secondary objective is to assess the transferability of
selected model inputs for different traffic conditions (model validation). This objec-
tive investigates whether the input values suggested in the calibration yield safety
performance measures that reflect safety profiles verified in other “real world” com-
parable situations.
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5.2 NGSIM Vehicle Tracking Data
The observational vehicle tracking data used to calibrate and validate safety per-
formance was obtained from the Next Generation SIMulation (NGSIM) program
administered by the FHWA. One of the major aims of this program is to provide
high quality detailed vehicular information in real time that can be used to improve
driving simulation algorithms [54]. The products of the NGSIM program are freely
available to transportation researchers and practitioners from the FHWA web site
http://www.ngsim.fhwa.dot.gov.
5.2.1 The Lankershim Boulevard Dataset (Signalized Inter-
section)
This NGSIM vehicle tracking data was extracted for a segment of an urban ar-
terial road (Lankershim Boulevard) in Los Angeles, California. This segment is
approximately 500m in length consisting of three to four lanes and four coordi-
nated signal-controlled intersections. Digital video images were collected from 5
cameras mounted on a 36 story building over a 9 hour period from 7:00 a.m. to
12:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. [6]
Individual vehicle trajectories were transcribed for every 1/10 second and grouped
into two independent 15 minute samples from 8:30 to 8:45 a.m. and from 8:45 to
9:00 a.m. The first 15 minute sample was used for calibration, while the second
sample was used to validate the model results. The case study focuses on potential
rear-end crashes on the southbound approach of Universal Hollywood Driveway and
Lankershim Boulevard (intersection 2) and over a segment bounded by the stop line
on the major approach and a point 100 meters upstream (Figure 5.1).
5.2.2 The Highway 101 Vehicle Tracking Data (Freeway
Segment)
This NGSIM dataset was obtained from the southbound lanes of Highway 101 (US
101), also known as the Hollywood Freeway, in Los Angeles, CA, on June 15, 2005.
The study area was approximately 640 meters (2,100 feet) in length and consisted of
five mainline lanes throughout the section (Figure 5.2). Eight synchronized digital
video cameras installed on the top of a 36-story building adjacent to the freeway
were used to record vehicles trajectories in the study area [7]. Individual vehicle
trajectories were transcribed from the video images for every 0.1 second interval
and grouped into two independent 15 minute samples covering the periods: 1) 7:50
to 8:05 a.m. and 2) 8:20 to 8:35 a.m. The first 15 minute sample was used for
























Figure 5.1: Lankershim study area (Source: [29])
Two geometric scenarios were investigated using the NGSIM freeway dataset:
the off-ramp segment and the combined on/off ramp segment. In the off-ramp
analysis the area of interest was defined from the downstream end of the surveyed
segment to approximately 320m upstream, corresponding to the mid point of the
total segment length. The combined on/off-ramp considered the full segment length
(640m). These two scenarios served as a basis for inferences about differences
in input parameters for different regions of the freeway where drivers may have
conflicting preferences.
The NGSIM data analysis report also provides detailed information on several
parameters used in calibration and validation, including vehicle type distribution,
O-D matrix, traffic volume for 5 minute intervals, average speed, average travel
time, number of lane changes, headway, and spacing analysis.
5.3 Microscopic Calibration/Validation Procedure
The primary focus of the calibration/validation exercise is to obtain model inputs
and simulated outputs that closely match observed safety performance as obtained
from the NGSIM vehicle tracking data. Two safety performance measures obtained
from the proposed microscopic safety model were used as measures of performance
(MOP) in the simulation calibration/validation procedure and these are: CPI/veh
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Figure 5.2: Highway 101 study area (Source: [7])
and the number of vehicles in conflict. It is worth mentioning that this study
accounts only for rear-end vehicle interactions originated by drivers either adjusting
their speed/spacing or their traveling lane to account for the surrounding traffic
environment. This type of interaction is considered to be predominant in both
selected study areas.
The CPI/veh represents the average level of traffic turbulence and is expressed
by the sum of all individual CPI divided by the number of vehicles in the simulation.
In contrast, the number of vehicles in conflicts, represents a subset of interactions
such that the deceleration rate required to avoid a crash (DRAC) exceeds the
maximum braking capability of the vehicle (MADR). For conflicts, unique values of
MADR are assigned to individual vehicles entering the simulation from a truncated
Normal distribution with average of 8.45m/s2 for cars and 5.01m/s2 for trucks with
a standard deviation of 1.40m/s2. Every time interval where the DRAC exceeds
the MADR a conflict is ascribed by the model. To avoid unrealistic MADR values,
deceleration rates of 12.69m/s2 and 4.23m/s2 were used as upper and lower limits
respectively for cars and 7.98m/s2 and 2.05m/s2 for trucks.
As noted previously, the NGSIM vehicle tracking data is based on two “indepen-
dent” 15 minute time windows. As a result the calibration/validation framework
also uses the 15 minute simulation time window for the simulation exercise. A
visual basic.net application was developed to scan the original NGSIM output files,
determine CPI on a per vehicle basis, and to check for vehicles in conflict. Table
5.1 summarizes target values for CPI/veh and the number of vehicles in conflict as
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extracted from the NGSIM Lankershim and Highway 101 dataset.
Table 5.1: Target CPI/veh and number of vehicles in conflict from NGSIM dataset
NGSIM Dataset Time CPI/veh #Veh in conflict
Lankershim Boulevard 8:30 a.m. - 8:45 a.m.  (*) 3.40E-05 3
8:45 a.m - 9:00 a.m.  (**) 5.80E-05 6
Highway 101 7:50 a.m. - 8:05 a.m.  (*) 8.85E-05 20
8:20 a.m. - 8:35 a.m.  (**) 9.52E-05 17
Highway 101 - Off-ramp 7:50 a.m. - 8:05 a.m.  (*) 9.92E-05 8
8:20 a.m. - 8:35 a.m.  (**) 1.24E-04 10
(*) used for calibration
(**) used for validation
The microscopic model calibration/validation framework illustrated in Figure
5.3 consists of five computational steps:
1. Selection of initial model inputs.
2. Initial statistical screening of inputs (Placket-Burnman with foldover).
3. Establishing linear expression relating significant inputs to safety performance
(fractional factorial analysis).
4. Obtaining best estimates of model inputs using a genetic algorithm.
5. Validating selected inputs based on an independent traffic sample.
The first four steps apply to the model calibration procedure; i.e. obtaining
the best estimates for simulation inputs. The 5th step applies to validating the
simulated output based on independent observed traffic dataset, i.e. it investigates
whether the input values suggested in the calibration yield safety performance mea-
sures similar to those observed in the independent dataset.
This heuristic procedure is based on sequential applications of factorial designs
that provide a systematic investigation of factors (independent variables) that can
influence a given response (dependent variable). One of the main advantages of
factorial designs is that it is more efficient than one-factor-at-a-time experiments.
Furthermore, when there is interaction between factors, this approach is essential
to avoid misleading conclusions [73].
The step-by-step procedure is initially illustrated below throughout its applica-
tion to the NGSIM Lankershim dataset (signalized intersection) and subsequently,
the major findings obtained from the application of the same calibration/validation
framework to the NGSIM freeway segment are summarized.
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Figure 5.3: Calibration/validation framework
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5.3.1 Selection of initial model inputs
VISSIM requires specification of 15 input parameters for use in its car-following
model, 10 inputs for the lane change model as well as 8 driver behaviour input
functions. Based on sound engineering judgment these inputs were initially re-
duced to 13 parameters of relevance for explaining safety performance at signalized
intersections. This reduced list of inputs is summarized in Table 5.2 along with
their corresponding low/high values and explanatory comments. The low and high
input values given here were suggested by Park and Schneeberger [85] and Lownes
and Machemehl [62] based on analysis of each individual parameter definition and
acceptable ranges.
Table 5.2: Initial model input parameters (Source: [29])







30 60 Individual free flow speed. Vehicles will travel at this








-4.5 -1.3 It is the maximum deceleration drivers are willing to
apply in “normal” (not emergency) situation
D Observed vehicles
ahead
1 4 Influences drivers’ ability to adjust their
speed/distance according to a given number of lead
vehicles
E CC0 0.5 3 Standstill distance (m). Defines the desired distance
between stopped cars
F CC1 0.5 1.5 Headway time (s). Defined as the minimum time a
driver wants to keep from the lead vehicle. The higher
the value, the more cautious the driver is. CC0 and
CC1 are combined to express the safety distance
G CC2 1.5 6 Following variation (m). It controls the longitudinal
oscillation in the car-following process
H CC3 -15 -4 Threshold for entering “following”. Influences the
start of the deceleration process when a following
driver recognizes a slower vehicle ahead
I CC5 0.1 2 Positive “following” threshold. Controls speed
differences in the following process. Small values lead
to a more sensitive reaction of following vehicles to
decelerations of the lead vehicle
J CC6 2 20 Speed dependency of oscillation. Controls speed
oscillation with distance to the lead vehicle
K Min. headway (m) 0.5 4 Minimum distance to the lead vehicle that must be
available for a lane change in standstill condition.
L Safety distance
reduction factor
0.2 0.8 Factor applied to the original safety distance during
lane change situations. Lane changing driver will







5.3.2 Statistical screening of inputs (Plackett-Burnman with
foldover)
As noted previously, both the statistical screening of inputs and the linear expres-
sion with important input parameters apply concepts of two-level factorial design.
In this type of experimental design, the relationship between factors (independent
variables) and responses (dependent variables) is systematically investigated by ex-
periments exploring combinations of both the highest and lowest possible level of
each factor.
A typical outcome of factorial analysis is a linear model where the response is
estimated as a function of significant factors and their effects. For example, in a 23
(3 variables tested over 2 levels) factorial design, the underlying linear model is of
the form
y =β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + β4x1x2 + β5x1x3 + β6x2x3 + β7x1x2x3 + ǫ (5.1)
where
y= dependent variable or response
x =independent variables or factors
β = coefficients
ǫ = error
Usually, when designing factorial experiments, independent variables are nor-
malized within the range −1 ≤ x ≤ +1, where -1 and +1 represent the lowest and
highest possible level of a given factor respectively. This coded space representation
is useful for determining the relative size of factor effects and therefore eliminating
scale problems between different variables. In this case, coefficients (β) for different
variables provide the relative importance of a given factor over the others.
It is worth noting that as the number of variables increases the number of exper-
iments (runs) needed to produce the full linear expression increases dramatically.
For example, in testing 4 independent variables, the full factorial experiment re-
quires 24 = 16 runs in order to explore the full combination of factor levels. In the
calibration exercise described here 213 = 8192 simulation runs would be required
to fully investigate the variables. However, it is possible to adopt a sequential ap-
proach to avoid this excessive number of runs and focus initially on model inputs
that deserve further investigation. This initial step is referred to as the screening
design.
The Plackett-Burnman with foldover fractional design is a particular case of 2-
level factorial design that is recommended for screening purposes [73]. This design
is focused on the statistical significance of the main interaction terms. Since the
full experiment is not performed, a set of confounding variables arises and the
level of these confounding variables determines the overall quality of the model
(design resolution). According to Montgomery [73], screening experiments should
be designed in order to provide at least resolution IV.
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For the initial set of 13 factors, 32 simulations were performed using the Plackett-
Burnman with foldover design structure [73]. The simulation input parameter com-
binations as suggested in the Plackett-Burnman design with corresponding CPI/veh
is presented in Appendix A. An additional 12 simulations were run to obtain the
requisite number of 3 replicates for each level of the only discrete input variable
(observed vehicles ahead). Replicates of the experiment are necessary to estimate
the error/variance due to the random nature of the simulation and subsequently the
importance/significance of each factor can be established using a N-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA). The application of ANOVA to the 13 factor combinations in
this exercise is summarized in Table 5.3. This Table also includes information on
a fitted linear expression relating factor inputs to model response or safety perfor-
mance in the coded space.














df MS Fobs p-value
Intercept 16.33
Factors
A -3.44 -6.87 0.38 1 0.38 7.29 0.03
B -0.29 -0.58 0.00 1 0.00 0.05 0.83
C -7.62 -15.23 1.86 1 1.86 35.81 0.00
D -1.56 -3.11 0.08 1 0.08 1.50 0.26
E -7.91 -15.81 2.00 1 2.00 38.58 0.00
F -10.35 -20.70 3.43 1 3.43 66.15 0.00
G -3.06 -6.12 0.30 1 0.30 5.79 0.04
H 0.69 1.38 0.02 1 0.02 0.30 0.60
I -1.95 -3.90 0.12 1 0.12 2.35 0.16
J -1.59 -3.18 0.08 1 0.08 1.56 0.25
K -0.88 -1.76 0.02 1 0.02 0.48 0.51
L -0.24 -0.47 0.00 1 0.00 0.03 0.86
M 3.82 7.64 0.47 1 0.47 9.01 0.02
Error 0.41 8 0.05
From Table 5.3 it should be noted that 6 first order factors were found to
be statistically significant at the 5% level, i.e., desired speed (average), desired
deceleration, CC0, CC1, CC2 and maximum deceleration for cooperative braking.
The relationship was also found to yield intuitively reasonable results for explaining
CPI. The next step in the procedure is to investigate the presence of possible higher
order interactions among significant factors as obtained from the screening exercise.
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5.3.3 Obtaining Linear Expression Relating Significant In-
puts to Safety Performance (Fractional Factorial Anal-
ysis)
This step attempts to refine the statistical relationship between safety performance
and input parameters by considering possible confounding effects in explaining CPI
that could not be identified from the above Plackett-Burnman design.
To reduce the number of factor combinations considered, 1/2 fraction of a 26
factorial design (26−1) was used. The 26−1 fractional factorial experiment produces
a design resolution VI and the recommended design generator for the experiment
(M = ACEFG) will produce a defining relationship of the form I = ACEFGM ,
where I is a column with only high levels of a given factor (plus signs). The sim-
ulation input parameters combination as suggested by the 26−1 fractional factorial
design with corresponding CPI/veh is presented in Appendix B.
It is possible to determine the confounding pattern of a fractional factorial
experiment by applying its defining relationship. For example, main factors or
higher order interactions confounded with the desired speed (factor A) can be found
by multiplying both sides of the defining relation by this factor:
A · I = ACEFGM · A
A · I = A2CEFGM note that X · I = X and X2 = I , therefore
A = CEFGM
This suggests that factor A (desired speed) can be confounded with the mix
of factors CEFGM in explaining CPI. The fractional factorial design expands our
search window of possible effects to include the input factors summarized in Table
5.4. To obtain these results a total of 37 simulation runs were carried out, 32 to
reflect the 26−1 fractional factorial design and 5 replicate simulations for the centre
points (Table 5.4).
The application of factorial analysis reduced the six significant factors from the
previous step to three first order effects, i.e. desired deceleration (C), CC0 (E),
and CC1 (F), and two second order interactions, i.e. desired deceleration and CC0
(CE) and desired deceleration and CC1 (CF). Table 5.4 indicates the statistical
significance of the parameters in the fitted expression and their respective values
in coded space. Converting the coded factors from Table 5.4 in terms of selected
VISSIM traffic inputs, an expression for CPI/veh (x10−5) is obtained of the form:
CPI/veh(x10−5) = 7.7 − 11.7 · Desired deceleration + 2.3 · CC0−
− 4.7 · CC1 + 2.2 · Desired deceleration · CC0+
+ 4.3 · Desired deceleration · CC1 (5.2)
The R2, residual sum of squares (SSE) and F-value for the above expression were
found to be 0.72 , 0.0020 and 16.1 respectively. The SSE from the fitted model can
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df MS Fobs p-value
Intercept 14.58 29.16 6.80 1.00 6.80 139.83 0.00
Factors
A 1.51 3.01 0.07 1 0.07 1.49 0.29
C 5.44 10.87 0.95 1 0.95 19.44 0.01
E 5.20 10.41 0.87 1 0.87 17.81 0.01
F 8.64 17.29 2.39 1 2.39 49.17 0.00
G 1.34 2.68 0.06 1 0.06 1.18 0.34
M 2.26 4.52 0.16 1 0.16 3.36 0.14
A * C 2.50 5.00 0.20 1 0.20 4.11 0.11
A * E 2.38 4.76 0.18 1 0.18 3.73 0.13
A * F 2.50 5.00 0.20 1 0.20 4.12 0.11
A * G 1.10 2.21 0.04 1 0.04 0.80 0.42
A * M 0.80 1.61 0.02 1 0.02 0.42 0.55
C * E 4.43 8.85 0.63 1 0.63 12.89 0.02
C * F 3.46 6.92 0.38 1 0.38 7.89 0.05
C * G 0.49 0.98 0.01 1 0.01 0.16 0.71
C * M 0.58 1.16 0.01 1 0.01 0.22 0.66
E *F 0.93 1.86 0.03 1 0.03 0.57 0.49
E * G 1.87 3.75 0.11 1 0.11 2.31 0.20
E * M 0.49 0.99 0.01 1 0.01 0.16 0.71
F * G 1.65 3.29 0.09 1 0.09 1.78 0.25
F * M 0.06 0.12 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.96
G * M 1.76 3.52 0.10 1 0.10 2.04 0.23
A * C * E 0.25 0.49 0.00 1 0.00 0.04 0.85
A * C * F 0.51 1.02 0.01 1 0.01 0.17 0.70
A * C * G 0.21 0.43 0.00 1 0.00 0.03 0.87
A * C * M 0.05 0.11 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.97
A * E * F 0.30 0.60 0.00 1 0.00 0.06 0.82
A * E * G 2.63 5.25 0.22 1 0.22 4.54 0.10
A * E * M 0.56 1.11 0.01 1 0.01 0.20 0.68
A * F * G 0.86 1.72 0.02 1 0.02 0.48 0.52
A * F * M 0.10 0.20 0.00 1 0.00 0.01 0.94
A * G * M 2.02 4.03 0.13 1 0.13 2.67 0.18
Error 0.19 4 0.05
be separated into two constituent components: the sum of squares of the pure error
(SSPE) and the sum of squares due to lack of fit (SSLF). A significance in the
lack of fit suggests that the above expression (Equation 5.2) could be improved
by considering the presence of curvature in the model (significant quadratic terms,
etc). Such a test was carried out that yielded a non statistically significant F-
value of 1.38. This result suggests that the above linear expression provides a good
explanation for CPI without the need to consider curvature.
Having established the statistical significance of factor inputs and structure of
the relationship linking CPI to these inputs, it remains to obtain best estimate
values of the parameters describing this relationship.
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5.3.4 Obtain Best Estimates of Model Inputs Using Ge-
netic Algorithm Procedure
The expression obtained from the previous step has an infinite number of solutions;
i.e. parameter values that yield a given CPI per vehicle. Clearly a procedure
needs to be established for obtaining the “best estimate” values of the parameters
in Equation 5.2. In this case, parameter values that yield a CPI per vehicle of
3.4x10−5 as observed in the vehicle tracking data.
A genetic algorithm procedure was used to search for an optimum solution to
the CPI expression given above. Genetic algorithm (GA) is a search technique
used to obtain exact or approximate solutions to a given optimization problem. A
typical genetic algorithm requires the specification of two constraints:
1. Genetic representation of the solution domain.
2. Fitness function to evaluate the solution domain.
In this case, the genetic representation of safety performance is the linear expres-
sion obtained from the fractional factorial experiment in the previous step (equation
5.2). The fitness function on the other hand, is defined in terms of the residual sum
of squares error obtained by comparing the simulated and observed (vehicle track-
ing data) measures of CPI per vehicle. This fitness function reflects the precision
of the represented solution.
Once the genetic representation and the fitness function have been defined, GA
proceeds to initialize a population of solutions randomly. These are then improved
through repetitive application of mutation, crossover, inversion, and selection op-
erators.
To reduce the number of optimal solutions a second measure of safety perfor-
mance namely, the number of vehicles in conflict during the 15 minute simulation
period was obtained from the simulation. Initially, 50 genetic algorithm runs were
carried out using MATLAB c©. Only desired deceleration rate was found to yield
any significant variation in values. Estimates of these deceleration rates were subse-
quently sorted in ascending order for the 50 feasible solutions. To obtain a reduced
number of representative values, these estimates were aggregated into 6 representa-
tive groupings for input into simulation. To ensure that the full spectrum of desired
deceleration values is included for simulation, minimum and maximum estimates
from the first and last groupings as well as midpoint values for the other 4 groupings
were obtained as summarized in Table 5.5.
Ten simulation runs were carried out for the six combinations of input values
in Table 5.5. This satisfies the FHWA guidelines [34] for the minimum number
of simulations for a desired 95% confidence interval and observed variability in the
response variable (CPI/veh). Best estimates of the inputs are those that correspond
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1 -4.5 2.7 1.5 5.2 4.4 0.21 3.25 1.96 0.50
2 -4.1 2.7 1.5 6.1 4.6 0.22 7.15 2.56 3.00
3 -3.7 2.7 1.5 4.7 3.8 0.21 1.74 0.64 1.10
4 -3.3 2.8 1.5 5.5 4.3 0.18 4.45 1.69 5.40
5 -3.0 2.8 1.5 5.4 4 0.21 3.95 1.00 0.60
6 -2.6 3 1.5 3.6 3.2 0.17 0.03 0.04 9.80
3.4 3 0.2
Sim. Input parameter (GA) Safety measures Squared error
Observed values
to the lowest sum of squares error. This was obtained for the set of parameter values
associated with simulation 6 (Table 5.5).
The number of vehicles in conflict was found to be 3.2 (average of 10 simulation
runs) comparing favourably with the observed number of 3 in the vehicle tracking
data. The optimum solution from Table 5.5 corresponds to parameter values of
-2.6m/s2 for desired deceleration, 3.0 for CC0, and 1.5 for CC1. These input values
yielded simulated average CPI/veh of 3.6x10−5, which compares favourably to the
observed value of 3.4x10−5 in the tracking data.
5.3.5 Validation of Selected Inputs Based on Independent
Traffic Sample
One of the major concerns in calibration is whether the inputs obtained from the ex-
ercise are transferable to separate and independent data sets with similar geometry
and traffic conditions (validation).
In selecting the validation dataset it is desirable that similar driving behaviour
relationships apply to both calibration and validation samples. For example, we
would not expect observations at intersections to explain vehicle/driver behaviour
on road segments all other factors constant. In this step the NGSIM 15 minute
vehicle tracking validation data was assumed to be representative of behavioural
relationships that are distinct and yet comparable to those observed in the calibra-
tion sample.
Table 5.6 summarizes the simulated and observed CPI/veh measure used to
reflect safety performance in the validation exercise. Assuming normality the 95%
confidence intervals was obtained based on the 10 simulation runs. The results
suggest that the average observed CPI/veh lies well within the 95% confidence
interval generated from the simulation. In addition the number of vehicles in conflict
and total conflict time per vehicle as obtained from the model compared favourably
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with the values obtained from the vehicle tracking data. Four vehicles in conflict
were obtained from simulation as compared to six observed.








Number of simulations 10
Confidence interval (95%) [2.71 , 7.22]
Observed 5.82
5.4 Calibration/Validation for Freeway Segments
The same calibration/validation procedure described for the signalized intersections
was applied to a sample of vehicles from NGSIM vehicle tracking data for a freeway
segment (Highway 101). This exercise was performed as part of a research project
sponsored by Transport Canada. The major goal of this project was to investigate
the safety impacts of mandatory speed limits for trucks on Canadian highways [93].
As noted previously, different calibration/validation exercises were performed for
the off-ramp and combined on/off-ramp segments.
5.4.1 Initial Model Inputs and Statistical Screening
The selection of initial model inputs yielded 16 candidate input parameters to be
further investigated using the factorial analysis. Table 5.7 summarizes selected
input parameters with their respective description and investigated range of values.
For the off-ramp segment, the Plackett-Burnman with foldover statistical screen-
ing of inputs found a total of 10 first order factors to be statistically significant at
the 5% level. These include: average desired speed, desired deceleration, observed
vehicles ahead, maximum look ahead distance, CC0, CC3, CC5, CC6, accepted
deceleration for lane change vehicle, and safety distance reduction factor. The
ANOVA results obtained for the 16 first order effects are summarized in Table 5.8.
For the combined on/off ramp segment, a total of 12 first order terms were
found to be statistically significant at the 5% level (Table 5.9). These significant
terms are: average desired speed, desired deceleration, observed vehicles ahead,
maximum look ahead distance, CC0, CC1, CC3, CC5, CC6, accepted deceleration
of lane change and trailing vehicles, and the safety distance reduction factor.
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A Desired Speed (average) (km/h) 80 120 100
B Desired Speed (standard deviation in
km/h)
2.9 8.7 5.8
C Desired Deceleration (m/s
2
) -4.5 -1.3 -2.9
D Observed vehicles ahead 1 3 2
E (max) Look ahead Distance (m) 50 300 175
F CC0 0.5 3 1.75
G CC1 0.5 1.5 1
H CC2 1.5 6 3.75
I CC3 -15 -4 -9.5
J CC5 0.1 2 1.05
K CC6 2 20 11
L Accepted deceleration fir the lane
change vehicle
-3.5 -0.5 -2
M Accepted deceleration for the trailing
vehicle
-2.5 -0.25 -1.375
N Min. Headway (m) 0.5 4 2.25





P Safety distance reduction factor 0.2 0.8 0.5
Parameter
5.4.2 Fractional Factorial Analysis
In order to reduce the number of factor combinations for the off-ramp case, a 1/8
fraction of a 210−3 factorial design was implemented. The 1/8 fractional factorial
experiment produces a design resolution V with a recommended design generator of
the form: H = BCGG; I = BCDE; J = ACDF resulting in a defining relationship
of the form: I = ABCGH = BCDEI = ACDFJ = ADEGHI = BDFGHJ =
ABEFIJ = CEFGHIJ , where I is the identity matrix with unit values along the
diagonal.
To obtain the results for off ramp segments, a total of 160 simulations were
carried out, 128 runs to reflect the 210−3 fractional factorial design, and 32 replicate
runs for the centre points. The application of factorial analysis reduced the 10
significant factors from the previous step (Table 5.8) to 4 first order effects: observed
vehicles ahead (A), CC5 (J), CC6 (K), and the safety distance reduction factor (P)
and 11 second order interactions: AD, AE, BE, CD, CG, CI, DE, EH, FJ, GI,
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) df MS F-value
A. Desired Speed
(average) (km/h)









-15.29 1870.0 1 1870.14 110.64
D. Observed vehicles
ahead
-4.19 140.0 1 140.49 8.31
E. (max) Look ahead
Distance (m)
-5.98 287.0 1 286.55 16.95
F. CC0 4.91 193.0 1 193.06 11.42
G. CC1 -0.70 3.9 1 3.94 0.23
H. CC2 0.47 1.8 1 1.77 0.1
I. CC3 -3.76 113.0 1 112.81 6.67
J. CC5 3.71 110.0 1 110.37 6.53




7.34 431.0 1 430.79 25.49
M. Accepted deceleration
(trailing vehicle)
2.70 58.4 1 58.40 3.45






-3.22 83.2 1 83.15 4.92
P. Safety distance
reduction factor
6.19 306.0 1 306.14 18.11
Error 118.0 7 16.90
Source
and HI. The linear expression relating CPI/veh (x10−5) for the significant first and
second order interactions in the coded space is:
CPI/veh(x10−5) = 13.71 − 36.47(D) + 10.97(P ) + 11.73(A)(E)−
− 30.60(A)(F ) − 42.79(D)(L) (5.3)
where
A = average desired speed (-1 = 80km/h; +1 = 120km/h)
D = observed vehicles ahead (-1 = 1; +1 = 3)
E = max. look ahead distance (-1 = 50m; +1 = 300m)
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Table 5.9: ANOVA Table - Plackett-Burman with Foldover (Combined On/Off





) df MS F-value
A. Desired Speed
(average) (km/h)









-8.55 585.0 1 585.00 128.35
D. Observed vehicles
ahead
-3.77 114.0 1 114.00 25.01
E. (max) Look ahead
Distance (m)
-4.92 193.0 1 193.00 42.44
F. C00 4.71 178.0 1 178.00 38.98
G. CC1 2.83 64.1 1 64.10 14.07
H. CC2 -0.17 0.2 1 0.24 0.05
I. CC3 -2.67 56.9 1 56.90 12.49
J. CC5 3.46 96.0 1 96.00 21.08








2.16 37.3 1 37.30 8.19






-1.74 24.3 1 24.30 5.33
P. Safety distance
reduction factor
3.84 118.0 1 118.00 25.87
Error 31.9 7 4.55
Source
F = CC0 (-1 = 0.5m; +1 = 3m)
L = accepted deceleration lane change veh (-1 = -3.5m/s2; +1 = -0.5m/s2)
P = safety distance reduction factor (-1 = 0.2; +1 = 0.8)
In the combined freeway segment, in order to reduce the number of factor
combinations to be considered, a 1/32 fraction of a 212−5 factorial design was
implemented. The 1/32 fractional factorial experiment produces a design reso-
lution IV and the recommended design generator for the experiment is of the form:
H = ABCDEFG; I = CDEFG; J = BDEFG; K = ADEFG; andL = BCEFG.
In this case, 128 runs to reflect the 212−5 fractional factorial design and 1 run for
the centre point were carried out. Additionally, each run was replicated four times
with different random seeds to obtain greater accuracy for the estimated pure error.
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This way, the full experiment comprised a total of 516 simulations. The application
of factorial analysis reduced the 12 significant factors from the previous step to 4
first order effects: average desired speed (A), maximum look ahead distance (D),
CC0 (E), and CC1 (F) and 7 second order interactions: AE, AF, DE, DF, EF, KJ,
and HL.The linear expression relating CPI/veh (x10−5) for the significant first and
second order interactions in the coded space is:
CPI/veh(x10−5) = 44.21 − 37.77(A) − 36.75(E) + 29.88(F ) + 37.06(G)+
+ 29.72(A)(F ) − 34.40(A)(G) − 28.66(E)(F )−
− 29.77(I)(M) − 31.63(J)(P ) (5.4)
where
A = average desired speed (-1 = 80km/h; +1 = 120km/h)
E = max. look ahead distance (-1 = 50m; +1 = 300m)
F = CC0 (-1 = 0.5m; +1 = 3m)
G = CC1 (-1 = 0.5m; +1 = 1.5m)
I = CC3 (-1 = -15; +1 = -4m)
J = CC5 (-1 = 0.1m; +1 = 2m)
M = accepted deceleration trailing veh (-1 = -2.5m/s2; +1 = -0.25m/s2)
P = safety distance reduction factor (-1 = 0.2; +1 = 0.8)
5.4.3 Best Estimate of Input Parameters - GA Procedure
In this step, Equations 5.3 and 5.4 were used to establish a mix of values that yields
the average CPI/veh observed in the NGSIM vehicle tracking data for both off-ramp
and combined freeway segments. The vehicle tracking data suggests target values of
CPI/veh of 9.92x10−5 and 9.53x10−5 for the off-ramp and combined freeway cases,
respectively.
The previously described optimization procedure based on genetic algorithms
was applied for both off-ramp and combined segments. The best estimate VISSIM
parameter values are summarized in Table 5.10.
For the off-ramp case, the inputs correspond to a simulated average CPI/veh of
1.05x10−4 slightly higher than the desired NGSIM target value of 9.92x10−5. The
average simulated number of vehicles in conflict (6.6) closely matched the NGSIM
target value of 8. For the calibration data, the percentage error in the CPI/veh
was found to be fairly low at about 5.7%.
For the combined on/off-ramp configuration, the inputs from Table 5.10 corre-
spond to a simulated average CPI/veh of 8.27x10−5 slightly lower than the desired
NGSIM target value of 8.85x10−5. For the calibration data, the percentage error
in the CPI/veh was found to be of 7%. The simulated average number of vehicles
in conflict was 10.7 as compared to 20 in the NGSIM data.
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Table 5.10: Genetic algorithm best estimates of inputs for freeway segment (Source:
[93])





Observed vehicles ahead 2* 2*
Safety distance factor 0.46 0.76
Desired average speed 106.8 106.7
Maximum look ahead distance 114.13 243.97
Acceptable deceleration of lane change vehicles -2.25 -1.00*






Despite the fairly good match between observed and simulated average turbu-
lence (CPI/veh) in the two cases, the higher number of vehicles in conflict obtained
from the vehicle tracking data suggests that the simulation may be underestimat-
ing high risk interactions in the freeway environment. Such a difference can be
explained by:
1. The lack of network “continuity” in the simulation. Since the highway seg-
ment was only coded in the area of interest (640m), traffic shockwaves caused
by downstream turbulence may not have been fully replicated in the simula-
tion environment.
2. VISSIM lane change algorithms were not able to completely handle the dy-
namic and complex environment represented by the combined on/off highway
lane configuration.
3. The main focus of the calibration was the CPI/veh and not the number of
vehicles in conflicts. The latter was used as an additional criteria for choosing
the best estimates in the GA procedure.
5.4.4 Validation of Selected Inputs
Using traffic conditions for the second 15-minute data sample and the input param-
eters as summarized in Table 5.10, the validation exercise yielded a “transferability
error” of approximately 6% for the off-ramp case and -13% for the combined seg-
ment case for the CPI/veh safety measure. This suggests that the VISSIM input
parameters obtained from calibration are indeed transferable to the validation vehi-
cle tracking sample for the two geometric configurations considered in this analysis.
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For the number of vehicles in conflict, the NGSIM data yield 10 and 17 conflicts
for off-ramp and combined on/off-ramp segment respectively, while the simulation
produced averages of 6.6 and 10.6 vehicles in conflict. This finding is consistent with
the same underestimation of high risk situations by the simulation model observed
in the calibration exercise for the freeway environment.
5.5 Major Findings
Microscopic simulation models are finding increased application in crash prediction
and evaluation of safety performance. Before these models can be applied they must
be calibrated based on real world traffic conditions. The main purpose of calibration
is to ensure that parameter inputs in the simulation model produce best estimates
of safety performance by minimizing residual error between simulated and observed
values.
This Chapter presents a systematic and objective procedure for calibrating mi-
croscopic simulation models based on safety performance. Safety performance has
been expressed in terms of a crash potential index (CPI) that relates deceleration
rate required to avoid a crash (DRAC) to vehicle braking capabilities (MADR). The
scope of the application is concerned with potential rear-end crashes at a signalized
four-legged intersection and freeway segments. For the calibration, real-time vehi-
cle tracking data extracted from the NGSIM study were used for a representative
urban intersection and freeway segment.
Best estimates of simulation input parameters were obtained as a result of the
calibration exercise. These input parameters yielded estimation errors between
average and simulated CPI/veh to be fairly low (between 5.7% and 7%) for all
traffic scenarios investigated.
In the validation exercise, the average simulated CPI/veh (obtained using best
estimate input parameters) was compared to observed values from an independent
sample of vehicle tracking data. In the intersection scenario, the observed CPI/veh
was well within the 95% confidence interval of the simulated values. In the freeway
scenario, the observed measures were found to be comparable to the values obtained
from the simulation (transferability errors between 6% and 13%). This suggests
that the model is able to replicate safety performance as reflected in rear-end crash
potential for a sample of vehicles that were not part of the calibration exercise.
The reasonably consistent match between observed and simulated average tur-
bulence (CPI/veh) was not observed for the average number of vehicles in conflict,
especially for the freeway segment. In this case, the simulation appears to underes-
timate high risk interactions ad this can be due to: 1) The lack of network “continu-
ity” in the simulation may have limited the simulation environment and therefore
traffic shockwaves caused by downstream turbulence may not have been fully repli-
cated, 2) VISSIM lane change algorithms were not able to completely handle the
dynamic and complex environment represented by the combined on/off highway
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lane configuration, and 3) The main focus of the calibration was the CPI/veh and
not the number of vehicles in conflicts. The latter was used as an additional criteria
for choosing the best estimates in the GA procedure.
The results of this analysis focus only on the accuracy and reproducibility of the
simulated output (CPI) and not on the ability of this performance measure to reflect
actual crashes. However, with an accurate estimate of CPI from the simulation it
would be possible to compare simulated safety performance to observed crashes or
high risk situations. This not only underscores the value of the simulation model
but also the need to provide accurate and reliable outputs that have been verified
based on real world conditions.
The following Chapter describes three tests performed to establish a link be-
tween simulated safety measures as obtained by the calibrated model and observa-
tional data that reflects high risk behaviour in the traffic stream.
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Chapter 6
Linking CPI to High Risk
Behaviour
6.1 Introduction
Unlike conventional empirical models of crash prediction, safety performance mea-
sures have not been adequately linked to observational crash occurrence. Re-
searchers have argued that such a link is a necessary step to enhance the scope
of safety performance measures as surrogates for collisions in road safety studies
[40, 95, 104]. There are essentially two reasons why safety performance has not
been adequately linked to crash occurrence:
1. Such a link has been deemed to be unnecessary, since most high risk events
that compromise safety at a given site may not be identified in the reported
crash data. Reported crashes can actually be viewed as a small “unlucky”
subset of relevant high risk events, which by their very nature represent a
narrow somewhat biased view of the larger safety problem. Lack of safety
can only be expressed from a thorough mechanistic understanding of complex
driver relationships and the road and traffic environment being faced. This is
clearly outside the scope of conventional empirical crash prediction models.
2. Even taking the position that validation of high risk behaviour in observa-
tional crash data is an important step in accepting safety performance mea-
sures, the task of establishing a reliable link can be quite challenging. The
nature of safety performance is both disaggregate (based on individual driver
responses and actions) and temporal (varying with changes in traffic con-
ditions over time at a given location). Hence, any objective link to crash
occurrence must be mindful of traffic conditions “prior” to the crash itself.
These conditions would have caused the crash but are not readily available
in historical crash databases.
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This Chapter describes an objective approach for linking safety performance
to observed crash occurrence. The underlying premise in this approach is that
if safety performance reflects high risk behaviour and crashes are caused by such
behaviour, then these crashes should be taking place when safety performance is
low (higher crash risk). This needs to be established for the period preceding each
crash. Conversely, it is expected that in non-crash situations this measure would
be closer to the average for the prevailing traffic conditions and location.
6.2 Simulation Test Framework
Three tests were proposed for exploring the link between simulated safety perfor-
mance and observed crash occurrence for a period preceding the crash. These tests
were applied to a sample of crash and non-crash data extracted from an instru-
mented freeway segment in Toronto. It is worth mentioning that the primary focus
this application concerns the safety performance for rear-end vehicle interactions.
The three tests can be summarized as follows:
• Test 1: compare safety performance measures in 1 minute increments for a
period five minutes prior to the time of the crash.
• Test 2: compare safety performance measures in aggregated 1 minute incre-
ments over five minutes prior to the crash and compare this to non-crash
results for the same location and traffic volumes.
• Test 3: compare average safety performance measures to crash rate observed
over a one hour period at the same site.
Test 1 investigates temporal variations in traffic turbulence in 1 minute time
intervals for a period of 5 minutes before the crash. The basic assumption here
is that in situations where traffic conditions played a major role in the crash, an
increase in observed traffic turbulence can be verified as the precise time of the
crash is approached. This increase in traffic turbulence is estimated in “real-life”
by average speed and vehicle spacing as well as speed variance as obtained from
loop detectors. If one can replicate these conditions in the simulation environment
and simulated CPI/veh can capture the increase in turbulence as the time of the
crash is approached, then CPI/veh could be applied as a surrogate measure for high
risk situations that lead to crashes.
In Test 2, the safety performance 5 minutes prior the crash is compared to the
safety performance of the same freeway segment using “normal” traffic attributes;
i.e. speed and volume profiles obtained when no crash occurred. It is expected
that the CPI/veh estimated from the crash situation is significantly higher than
the CPI/veh obtained under “normal” conditions.
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Test 3 attempts to link the traffic turbulence simulated over a 1-hour period to
the observed hourly crash rate in the same freeway segment. It is hypothesized that
the traffic pattern aggregated over 60 minutes is directly related to the observed
long term crash rate at the same location.
The framework for linking safety performance to crash occurrence is illustrated
in Figure 6.1. The framework consists of several steps: 1) Preparing an integrated
database of crash occurrence with corresponding real-time traffic information from
loop detector station counts, 2) Estimating the precise time of the crash from
speed profiles at upstream and downstream detectors, 3) Pre-simulation matching
of observed volume and speeds at both upstream and downstream detectors, 4)
Estimating safety performance measures for crash and non-crash events at the same
location for similar traffic conditions, and 5) Comparing the results for the three
tests.
6.3 ADS-IFTMS Data Integration
Step 1 is concerned with incorporating real-time traffic features extracted from in-
strumented loop detector data with detailed information on the crash itself (time
and location, etc). The data used in this analysis was extracted from an instru-
mented segment of the Queen Elizabeth Way (QEW) west of Toronto. This seg-
ment of QEW extends for 19km along the north shore of Lake Ontario from Royal
Windsor Drive to Highway 427 (Figure 6.2).
Traffic and crash data were extracted from the combination of two separate
databases, namely the Accident Data System (ADS) and the IFTMS incident data
log. The ADS is a compilation of accidents reported by the police and administered
by the Ministry of Transportation of Ontario (MTO). Speed, volume and occupancy
values were obtained from IFTMS loop detector counts aggregated in 20-second
time slices. The QEW segment in this study comprises a total of 50 loop detector
stations.
The IFTMS system also provides information on incidents with visual verifi-
cation to establish if these incidents can be classified as crashes. Crash logs from
IFTMS were matched to the loop detector traffic data and detailed information
on each crash as reported in the ADS database. The integration of data from the
IFTMS and ADS systems provides the connection between real-time traffic con-
ditions on the QEW near the time of the crash and the attributes of the crash
itself.
Freeway segments directly affected by on/off-ramps (i.e. first upstream and
downstream loop detectors from its entry/exit points) where excluded from the
analysis given that these segments have a more complex environment to be simu-
lated with respect to safety. Figure 6.3 illustrates the loop detector stations consid-
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Figure 6.1: Framework for linking safety performance to crash occurrence
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Figure 6.2: Study site along QEW (Source: [51])
or with adverse road surface conditions (other than dry) or adverse light condi-
tion (other than daylight) were also excluded from the dataset. It is understood
that additional calibration/validation would be needed to reasonably simulate these
conditions.
6.4 Estimating the Precise Time of the Crash
The initial procedure for estimating the precise time of the crash was developed in
a research by Corby [27]. The crash time was estimated to be the time of maximum
speed reduction for each crash at the first upstream detector minus an approximate
time it takes the crash shockwave to propagate back from the crash location to
this detector. Lee et al. [56] found the expected interval between the time the
shockwave reaches the first US detector and the time of the crash to be between 2
to 3 polling intervals (40 to 60 seconds).
Figure 6.4 illustrates the visual procedure used to determine the precise time of
the crash (crash number 118) using observed IFTMS speed profiles. The maximum
speed reduction at the first US loop detector takes place during the interval 16:51:00
and 16:53:00. The earliest estimate for the shockwave arrival time at this point is
16:51:00. For crash number 118, the estimated time of the crash is between 16:51:40
and 16:52:00. A similar line of reasoning was applied to the other crashes in the
IFTMS/ADS sample. For the QEW segment, Ibarrola [51] investigated a total of

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Detection: 16:56:20, Clearance: 17:39:40
Begin: 16:52:00, End: 17:55:20
Upstream                         Downstream
Figure 6.4: Speed profile for crash 118
6.5 Pre-simulation: Matching Observed Traffic
Attributes at Loop Detectors
For all three tests, a pre-simulation phase is performed to ensure that simulated
volume/speed profiles obtained at both upstream (US) and downstream (DS) de-
tectors match those observed in the IFTMS data. The pre-simulation attempts to
precisely match space headways and speeds at the moment vehicles enter in the
simulation (upstream loop detector) and to provide similar downstream environ-
ment as observed in the field. Obviously, a perfect match of speed/spacing inside
the area of interest (between the two loop detectors) cannot be verified since this
would require individual vehicle tracking data not available for crash occurrences.
In all tests, the observed US flow rate was used as initial input in the simulation
and the other variables (US speed and DS flow rate and speed) were recorded and
compared with observed data. As expected, as the traffic regime approached the
capacity, identified by reasonably high flow rate with medium to low speeds, the
input volume alone was not enough to replicate the somewhat complex driving
pattern observed in the field. To improve the matching process in those cases,
“artificial” congestion was created in the area downstream of the DS detector to
account for the discontinuity in the network. The congestion was imposed with
a function in VISSIM called “reduced speed areas” using speeds as observed in
the downstream loop detector station. To ensure that the system (US and DS) was
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operating in a similar traffic regime, variable warm-up periods from 5 to 15 minutes
were allowed to stabilize the flow.
The 10 best estimate simulation seeds were chosen after 1000 initial simulation
runs using volume at the upstream detector and speed at the downstream detector
as initial traffic attributes. These 10 best seeds were selected by considering the
root mean square percentage error (RMSP) for volume and speed measurements at
the two loop detectors corresponding to each situation. The RMSP error expression

















xi, yi = simulated and observed traffic measurement (volume and speed) for time
interval i
For test 1, target volumes and speeds as reported in the IFTMS data (for
crash situations) were obtained as the average aggregated every minute for both
downstream and upstream loop detectors. In Test 2 for the non-crash case, a
sample of 12 days was obtained at the same location during which time no crash
was observed. One weekday for each month of the year was randomly selected and
target volumes and speeds were estimated by averaging the 12 values for each of
the five 1-minute intervals. A total of 1000 RMSP values were obtained and the 10
lowest values were used to establish the 10 best number seeds. For Test 3, the same
sample used for the non-crash case was applied to obtain the 10 best number seeds,
but in this case, volume and speeds were aggregated in twelve 5-minutes intervals.
A sample of 34 crashes was found for the selected loop detector stations meeting
the weekend, dry pavement, and daylight criteria. For 7 crash attributes, the vol-
ume/speed information could not be reasonably matched (average RMSP ≤ 20%
) and therefore these crashes were excluded from the data set. The best number
seeds and respective RMSP for the 27 crash and non-crash traffic attributes are
summarized in Appendix C and D respectively. For test 3, two locations were in-
vestigated from 6:00AM to 6:00PM and the best number seeds with their respective
RMSP are presented in Appendix E.
In general, for the 27 crash and non-crash cases considered in this exercise,
RMSP values were found to be in the range between 3% and 18% respectively
for Tests 1 and 2. It should be noted that for Test 1 only crash conditions were
considered. For Test 3, the RMSP value was found to be in the range 2% to 20%. As
expected, during peak periods the average RMSP values were found to be higher
than those obtained for off-peak periods since the traffic is subjected to a more
unstable and therefore less predictable regime.
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6.6 Test 1 Simulation Results
The time interval 5 minutes prior to each crash was assumed to be an appropriate
interval during which changes in traffic conditions would have a direct effect on
crash occurrence. The two principal factors affecting traffic flow were assumed to
be volume (vph) and speed (km/h).
Based on the 10 best number seeds, the CPI/veh was estimated and averaged
for each one minute time increment. The profiles for this performance measure
were established for each crash event 5 five minute prior to its occurrence. In
this Test, increased crash risk is reflected through increases in the corresponding
simulated performance measure (CPI/veh). It is expected that as the time of the
crash is approached, the values of CPI/veh will increase, reflecting increases in
traffic turbulence and corresponding crash risk.
As summarized in Table 6.1, an increase in average CPI/veh with time to crash
was found to occur in 21 of the 27 crashes sampled. A single factor analysis of
variance performed using values from Table 6.1 revealed that the time to crash has
a significant effect on CPI/veh (p-value = 0.003). These results suggest that the
average CPI/veh for the traffic stream prior to the crash provides an indication of
increased crash risk. The increase in crash risk appears to be especially pronounced
for the period between the first and second minute prior to the crash (Figure 6.5).
Figure 6.5: CPI/veh average and 95% confidence interval - Test 1
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Table 6.1: Simulated CPI/veh Values Over Time - Test 1
Highest
CPI time0-1min 1-2min 2-3min 3-4min 4-5min
1 2 3 4 5
118 1.08 0.89 1.38 1.50 1.42 4
170 1.79 1.49 1.19 0.90 0.80 1
222 0.76 0.82 1.00 0.89 1.13 5
223 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.66 0.65 4
239 1.03 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 1
320 4.29 1.90 1.13 1.10 0.75 1
371 0.88 0.74 0.58 0.55 0.60 1
405 1.15 0.96 0.98 0.84 0.64 1
454 1.36 0.74 0.71 0.75 0.83 1
455 1.74 1.42 1.22 0.92 0.80 1
478 4.01 1.20 1.22 1.50 0.60 1
521 1.04 0.72 0.60 0.70 0.83 1
522 0.73 0.89 0.98 0.96 1.01 5
571 2.22 1.02 1.21 1.08 1.05 1
595 2.23 2.98 3.50 4.20 2.37 4
647 1.11 0.91 0.74 0.86 0.81 1
688 2.72 2.44 1.86 2.27 2.65 1
702 4.42 3.67 1.90 1.68 1.58 1
710 1.50 0.94 0.77 0.68 0.67 1
731 3.16 3.27 2.39 2.01 1.77 2
739 2.58 0.93 1.02 0.89 0.88 1
781 0.91 0.75 0.66 0.59 0.71 1
854 1.26 0.98 0.92 1.08 1.14 1
858 0.98 0.79 0.65 0.63 0.48 1
884 3.03 2.41 2.24 2.23 2.94 1
888 2.18 1.44 1.90 1.33 1.18 1
903 3.10 2.22 1.02 0.65 0.64 1
Average 1.92 1.37 1.20 1.16 1.07




) - Time intervals prior the crash
6.7 Test 2 Simulation Results
In this Test, safety performance measures (CPI/veh) were simulated for traffic
conditions found to be present at the crash location (US and DS detectors) 5
minutes prior to the crash and for comparable non-crash conditions at the same
road segment. It is expected that safety performance between crash and non-crash
cases would differ, such that crashes are more likely to occur when the CPI/veh
profiles are higher than normal for the same 5 minute interval.
Table 6.2 summarizes the CPI/veh values for the 27 sample crashes with their
corresponding non-crash situations. The values are given in cumulative 1 minute
increments 0 to 5 minutes prior to the crash. As noted previously, these measures
of safety performance were obtained by averaging the results from 10 separate
simulation runs with their respective number seeds.
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Table 6.2: Simulated CPI/veh Values Over Time - Test 2
0-1min 0-2min 0-3min 0-4min 0-5min 0-1min 0-2min 0-3min 0-4min 0-5min
118 1.08 1.29 1.19 1.17 1.20 1.81 1.55 1.51 1.39 1.49
170 1.79 1.64 1.54 1.39 1.26 0.92 0.82 0.83 0.76 0.77
222 0.76 0.73 0.79 0.76 0.82 1.41 1.00 0.87 0.86 0.88
223 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.56 0.59 1.11 0.94 1.11 1.01 0.96
239 1.03 0.83 0.76 0.79 0.76 0.68 0.71 0.69 0.70 0.68
320 4.29 3.03 2.16 1.92 1.64 0.69 0.73 0.76 0.72 0.74
371 0.88 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.67 0.75 0.70 0.73 0.76 0.77
405 1.15 1.03 0.93 0.90 0.91 1.50 1.33 1.27 1.30 1.22
454 1.36 0.98 0.89 0.82 0.80 0.94 0.95 0.92 0.91 1.00
455 1.74 1.53 1.39 1.25 1.17 1.81 1.64 1.69 1.59 1.58
478 4.01 3.20 2.69 2.46 2.24 0.97 0.84 0.79 0.75 0.76
521 1.04 0.80 0.72 0.70 0.74 0.97 0.99 1.04 1.11 1.09
522 0.73 0.80 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.82 0.78 0.80 0.75 0.78
571 2.22 2.26 2.36 2.72 3.00 1.90 1.80 1.77 1.78 1.71
595 2.23 2.25 1.98 1.92 1.98 0.53 0.46 0.53 0.56 0.56
647 1.11 0.97 0.87 0.92 0.89 0.91 0.80 0.93 0.96 0.90
688 2.72 2.50 2.29 2.35 2.33 1.24 1.23 1.27 1.27 1.23
702 4.42 3.78 2.94 2.48 2.08 1.34 1.23 1.15 1.15 1.13
710 1.50 1.14 0.99 0.89 0.84 0.80 0.73 0.71 0.71 0.71
731 3.16 2.42 1.95 1.76 1.60 1.71 1.58 1.56 1.49 1.40
739 2.58 1.83 1.58 1.40 1.34 1.02 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.90
781 0.91 0.82 0.86 0.89 0.84 0.65 0.63 0.66 0.70 0.71
854 1.26 1.10 1.11 1.13 1.14 0.99 1.00 0.96 0.98 1.00
858 0.98 0.75 0.70 0.66 0.62 0.65 0.71 0.72 0.68 0.71
884 3.03 2.61 2.38 2.45 2.26 1.22 1.33 1.44 1.42 1.44
888 2.18 2.11 1.91 1.78 1.69 1.85 1.59 1.53 1.49 1.47
903 3.10 3.07 2.36 1.97 1.70 1.25 1.17 1.05 1.04 1.04
Average 1.92 1.65 1.46 1.39 1.33 1.13 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.02
Std. Dev: 1.14 0.94 0.73 0.68 0.64 0.41 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.32
ID CPI/veh (x10
-5
) - Crash CPI/veh (x10
-5
) - Non-crash
A simple ANOVA was carried out on the above values with the results given in
Table 6.3. These results suggest that CPI/veh between crash and non-crash differed
from each other at the 5% level. We note that when crash and non-crash cases are
combined the time measure has almost no effect on safety performance. This is
because there is a dampening effect caused by the cumulative measure of time and
by the combination of crash and non-crash observations in the same sample. This
is illustrated with reference to Figure 6.6 for crash and non-crash cases respectively.
In Figure 6.6 the CPI/veh is reduced with increases in cumulative time to crash
for crash conditions, whereas in the non-crash case, no change in the CPI/veh was
observed over time. The average CPI/veh for attributes is visually compared with
the 95% confidence interval for CPI/veh estimated using non-crash attributes in
Figure 6.7.
6.8 Test 3 Simulation Results
As discussed previously, the fundamental hypothesis underlying the proposed safety
model is that for a given road segment interactions between geometric attributes
and traffic characteristics lead to traffic turbulence that can be expressed in terms
92
Figure 6.6: CPI/veh versus cumulative time to crash for crash and non-crash con-
ditions - Test 2
Figure 6.7: Average CPI/veh for crash and non-crash attributes - Test 2
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Table 6.3: Two-Way ANOVA Results for Test 2










Crash 16.78 1 16.78 39.74 0.00
Time 4.17 4 1.04 2.47 0.05
Crash * Time 2.12 4 0.53 1.25 0.29
Error 109.75 260 0.42
Total 590.12 270
of vehicle interactions. These vehicle interactions can be measured by safety perfor-
mance measures such as CPI. Since crash occurrences are considered a sub-sample
of events in the vehicle interactions “population”, a link between safety performance
measures and crashes should be possible in some degree.
Test 3 investigates the link between simulated safety performance and crash
rates aggregated in periods of 1 hour. This test attempts to address two impor-
tant questions regarding CPI/veh and observed crashes as follows: 1) Is there a
positive correlation between simulated safety measures and crashes? (i.e., average
CPI/veh increases with increasing number of crashes) and 2) Is there a relative va-
lidity between simulated safety measures and crash rates over time? (i.e., CPI/veh
variations over 1-hour periods are consistent with crash rate changes for a given
road segment).
Four years of crash data (1998-2001) for two segments of the QEW freeway
extracted from Toronto ADS were used in Test 3. The freeway segments in this
analysis are between loop detectors 410des and 420des (segment A) and 450des
and 460des (segment B) with 710m and 688m in length respectively. Crash rates
were estimated for twelve 1-hour period from 6am to 6pm for every segment. It
was assumed that volume and speed profiles obtained in the pre-simulation phase
for non-crash attributes are representative of typical traffic attributes for week-
days under good conditions (dry pavement) and therefore, crashes that happened
during weekends,under adverse weather and light conditions were excluded from
the dataset. Table 6.4 summarizes crash rate estimates for every 1-hour period
investigated.
As suggested in Test 2, the CPI/veh estimated one minute prior the crash
(CPIt−1/veh) was found to be significantly higher when traffic attributes corre-
sponding to crash conditions were applied than when “normal” traffic conditions
were simulated. Thus, this can be used as a threshold for defining high levels of
turbulence in the traffic stream where crash occurrences are more likely to occur.
Using the results from Test 2, the threshold to define high level turbulence intervals
(HLTI) can be established by using the average CPIt−1/veh of 1.92x10
−5.
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6:00 7:00 4977 1 0.208 5335 4 0.870
7:00 8:00 4069 4 1.020 5116 5 1.135
8:00 9:00 3922 4 1.058 5141 5 1.129
9:00 10:00 4374 1 0.237 5115 5 1.135
10:00 11:00 4206 1 0.247 4621 3 0.754
11:00 12:00 4055 0 0.000 4426 0 0.000
12:00 13:00 3877 2 0.535 4231 0 0.000
13:00 14:00 3734 1 0.278 4050 1 0.287
14:00 15:00 3840 2 0.540 4155 2 0.559
15:00 16:00 4246 0 0.000 4603 0 0.000
16:00 17:00 4758 1 0.218 5111 1 0.227





Segment A Segment B
1252
770 688
Applying best number seeds as determined in the pre-simulation step, 10 sim-
ulations were performed for the twelve 1-hour periods for each segment (a total
of 12x2x10 = 240 runs). Three safety measures were recorded from the simula-
tion as follows: 1) The average CPI/veh aggregated over 1 hour (CPI1hr/veh), 2)
The average CPI/veh aggregated over 1 minute (CPI1min/veh), and 3) The average
number of simulated HLTI. The average CPI/veh represents the average turbulence
of the traffic stream and the HLTI frequency captures unacceptably high turbulence
periods (1 minute).
Table 6.5 summarizes the average results obtained for CPI/veh and HLTI fre-
quency and rate for the 10 simulation runs. Initially, simple linear regressions
were attempted to provide a link between CPI/veh (averaged over 1hour and over
1minute) and HLTI rate to observed crash rate.
Figures 6.8 and 6.9 show the linear trend for CPI/veh averaged over 1-hour
and crash/rate for segments A and B respectively. These figures indicate positive
correlation for both segments with R-squares of 0.76 and 0.39 for segment A and B
respectively. When using CPI/veh values estimated over 1-minute both correlations
yielded higher R-square values (0.80 and 0.41) suggesting that, CPI/veh aggregated
over 1-minute time interval would better represent aggregated crash rates for the
sites investigated.
Similar linear regression models were developed considering the HLTI rate and
crash rate (Figures 6.10 and 6.11). As described previously, this safety measure
captures the frequency of time intervals the traffic turbulence observed in the sys-
tem surpasses the threshold for high risk situations (CPI1min/veh = 1.92x10
−5)
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Figure 6.8: CPI/veh and crash rate for segment A
Figure 6.9: CPI/veh and crash rate for segment B
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Table 6.5: CPI/veh and HLTI results for segments A and B
1hr 1min Avg/hr Total
(*)
Rate




6:00 7:00 0.77 0.79 0.8 1002 188.3 0.79 0.89 1.6 2003 401.3
7:00 8:00 1.15 1.15 2.4 3005 711.3 1.10 1.13 2 2504 482.5
8:00 9:00 1.21 1.20 3.3 4132 944.5 0.93 0.97 1.5 1878 352.5
9:00 10:00 0.75 0.82 0.5 626 128.5 0.70 0.79 1.1 1377 289.0
10:00 11:00 0.72 0.79 0.5 626 154.5 0.74 0.82 0.8 1002 250.0
11:00 12:00 0.75 0.83 1.3 1628 416.9 0.70 0.77 0.4 501 129.9
12:00 13:00 0.75 0.82 1 1252 320.7 0.74 0.84 0.8 1002 272.5
13:00 14:00 0.74 0.80 1.4 1753 469.7 0.71 0.81 1.5 1878 533.9
14:00 15:00 0.73 0.81 1.1 1377 381.6 0.75 0.84 0.8 1002 277.9
15:00 16:00 0.74 0.76 0.4 501 135.1 0.70 0.78 0.6 751 188.6
16:00 17:00 0.67 0.77 0.4 501 108.8 0.68 0.78 0.2 250 56.5
17:00 18:00 0.67 0.75 0.4 501 103.1 0.75 0.84 1 1252 268.1
(*) expected HLTI for the period of  1998-2001
(**) in  10
6
veh.km






normalized with respect to exposure. These regression models also indicated a
positive correlation between HLTI and crash rate for both segment A and B with
R-squares of 0.70 and 0.55 respectively.
The ability of simulated average CPI/veh and HLTI rate to account for tem-
poral variations in crash rate according to traffic conditions (relative validity) is
graphically represented throughout Figures 6.12 to 6.15. In general, these Figures
suggest that both CPI/veh and HLTI rate were reasonably sensitive to variations
in traffic flow attributes per hour for both segments investigated. Furthermore, a
fairly good level of consistency between the two safety performance measures and
crash rates for different 1-hour periods for both segments A and B was obtained.
This suggests that the simulated safety measures have a good mapping with aggre-
gated measures of crashes, i.e. these safety performance indicators tend to be high
for periods when observed crash rates were also high and vice-versa.
Discrepancies verified in both linear regression and relative validity plots are
likely to be due the following factors:
• The very rare and random nature of crashes that produces large variability
in observational data.
• Situations where “artificial” congestion was necessary in the pre-simulation
phase may have introduced additional differences between the simulated and
real world environments, which may have influenced the results.
• The aggregation time for the study (1 hour) was somewhat arbitrary and,
in reality, there is not such rigid distinction in traffic flow regimes. A more
narrow time interval aggregation can produce better results.
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Figure 6.10: HLTI and crash rate for segment A
Figure 6.11: HLTI and crash rate for segment B
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Figure 6.12: CPI/veh and crash rate over time for segment A
Figure 6.13: CPI/veh and crash rate over time for segment B
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Figure 6.14: HLTI and crash rate over time for segment A
Figure 6.15: HLTI and crash rate over time for segment B
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6.9 Concluding Remarks
This Chapter presented a series of intuitive tests to support the link between safety
performance (CPI/veh) and observed crashes. Three tests were carried out: 1)
Compare safety performance measures in aggregated 1 minute increments for a
period five minutes prior to the time of the crash, 2) Compare safety performance
measures in 1 minute increments over five minutes prior to the crash and compare
this to non-crash results for the same location and traffic volume, and 3) Compare
average safety performance measures to crash frequency estimated over a one hour
period at the same site.
The results suggest objective evidence that crashes tend to occur when the
measure of safety performance (CPI/veh) is high. CPI/veh was found to be sensitive
to the time interval preceding each crash, i.e. as the time to crash is approached
the CPI/veh increases non linearly, particularly for the one minute period prior
the crash. In general, the tests discussed in this paper support two assertions: 1)
Crashes occur during periods when CPI/veh is higher than “normal” at the same
location and 2) Increases in average CPI/veh rates correspond to increases in crash
frequencies (relative validity).
Ideally it would be preferable to perform such tests using “real world” vehicle
tracking data in order to avoid the somewhat simplistic environment provided by
current microscopic simulation models. However, such detailed vehicle tracking
data for crash and comparable non-crash traffic conditions are not readily available.
The CPI expression itself (Equation 4.1) was developed using deterministic re-
lationships from Newtonian physics for two particles in motion and thus it should
yield sound estimates of required braking effort to avoid crashes and consequently
account for the dynamics leading to crashes. Furthermore, the link between CPI
and crashes may not be strictly necessary given that the latter can be viewed as
a small “unlucky” subset of relevant high risk events, which by their very nature





The usefulness of the proposed methodology for safety assessment relies on its abil-
ity to capture the overall level of turbulence for different transportation scenarios
as a function of a number of geometric and traffic attributes. The methodology
must be able to provide meaningful insights about changes in overall safety for dif-
ferent engineering countermeasures. For example, what would the safety benefits
(or disbenefits) be of upgrading a stop controlled intersection into a signalized in-
tersection? Are the results sensitive to changes in volume, lane configuration, and
signal plan?
In this Chapter, the proposed microscopic model for safety assessment is applied
to investigate the safety implications of engineering countermeasures applied to two
transportation scenarios as follows: 1) Upgrading a stop-controlled 4-leg intersec-
tion into a signalized intersection (Case Study 1) and 2) Introducing mandatory
speed control for large trucks in a freeway environment (Case Study 2). A sensi-
tivity analysis has been carried out for different levels of exposure (volume), traffic
composition, and freeway geometric attributes. It is expected that, when combined
at different levels, these factors will produce different levels of traffic interactions
therefore influencing the safety performance of each scenario.
It is worth mentioning that the safety implications of the two case study appli-
cations were investigated using microscopic simulation algorithms that have been
calibrated and validated for safety performance measure (CPI/veh) as obtained
from vehicle tracking data. This calibration/validation procedure has been per-
formed for both transportation scenarios and is described in detail in Chapter 5.
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7.2 Case Study 1: Introducing Signalization to a
4-legged Stop-controlled Intersection
In this exercise, a simulation experiment was designed to investigate differences in
CPI-based measures of safety performance caused by three factors, namely: 1) The
introduction of fixed signal control to replace a previous stop sign on the minor
approach, 2) The changes in traffic volume on the major approach, and 3) The
type of vehicle interaction (rear-end or angled).
The intersection being simulated in this application consists of four-legs with
2 lanes on each major approach (WestBound and EastBound) and 1 lane on each
minor approach. All lanes have a fixed width of 3.5m and the angle between major
and minor approaches is set at 90 degrees. In total, ten different levels of traffic
volumes were investigated for both stop controlled and signalized cases. Table 7.1
summarizes the assumed approach volumes and relevant traffic parameters for the
simulation experiment.
Table 7.1: Intersection approach volumes and traffic attributes
1 300 300 100 100 A C 40 A A
2 400 400 100 100 A C 40 A A
3 500 500 100 100 A D 40 A A
4 600 600 100 100 A F 40 A A
5 700 700 100 100 A F 40 A A
6 800 800 100 100 A F 40 B A
7 900 900 100 100 A F 45 B A
8 1000 1000 100 100 B F 45 B A
9 1100 1100 100 100 B F 50 B B








(*) Levels 7, 8, 9 and 10 satisfy MUTCD warrant 3 for signalization
Level
(*)
Volume (vph) Stop controlled Signalized







For the signalized intersection, right turns on red have been permitted, however,
the traffic signal option does not allow for advanced green left turn manoeuvres.
Signals are assumed to operate independent of timings at other adjacent intersec-
tions with semi-actuated phases optimized using Synchro 7 c©. The traffic directional
split is assumed to be constant for all approaches during the simulation period for
both signalized and unsignalized cases (i.e. 5% for left turns, 5% for right turns,
90% through movements).
The safety performance measures were simulated using VISSIM 4.3 using input
parameters as per the calibration/validation exercise described in Chapter 5 for the
Lankershim Boulevard signalized intersection. In order to better model left/right
turn movements, VISSIM allows users to define “reduced speed areas” which cor-
responds to the maximum operational speeds of turning vehicles. These turning
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speeds are generated according to a user-defined distribution. In this case, “re-
duced speed areas” were defined following a linear distribution with an average of
38km/h and 23km/h for left and right turns respectively and a standard deviation
of 10% of the mean. The average values were obtained for turning radii of 20m
and 15m using the following linear expression suggested by Tarris et al. ([105]):
Speed = 53.8 − 0.27DC , where Speed is operating speeds on low-speed urban
streets (km/h) and DC is the degree of the curve (degree/30m).
Each simulation has a 15 minute duration plus 5 minutes warm-up interval.
In order to account for variations in different simulation runs for the same traffic
volumes, 15 replicates were carried out for each run using different random seeds.
In total, the analysis in this Chapter involved 300 simulation runs.
7.2.1 Measuring Traffic Interactions
As discussed in Chapter 4, two types of vehicle interactions are considered in the
simulation model: rear-end and angled interactions. In the simulation package,
rear-end interactions in both stop controlled and signalized intersections can occur
in the following situations:
1. Stimulus vehicle (SV) stopping for a traffic light, stop signal or a slower vehicle
ahead.
2. SV slowing down to avoid a crash with a vehicle that crossed the road.
3. SV slowing down for a left/right turn.
4. Mandatory or discretionary lane change from the SV.
For rear-end conflicts, it is possible to directly determine DRAC and conse-
quently CPI for every 0.1s simulation time interval, given that VISSIM .fzp output
files provide the information needed to link lead (SV) and following vehicles (RV)
respectively.
For angled interactions, a total of 12 manoeuvres are possible in the vicinity of
a four-leg intersection. Figure 7.1 presents the HCM2000 manoeuvre numbering
scheme considered in this analysis. Estimating angled interactions requires further
specifications when compared to rear-end conflicts, since it needs the definition of
crash zones for every possible combination of crossing trajectories. Furthermore, it
is necessary to verify the existence of a collision course (see Figure 4.4) for every
simulation time interval (0.1s). For a four-leg intersection a total of 24 angled
interactions are possible using the full combination of SV/RV manoeuvres. These
angled interactions are illustrated in Figure 7.2. In this exercise, possible angled
conflicts generated by red light running events were not considered.
VISSIM output files were scanned by a search algorithm coded in visual basic.net















Figure 7.1: Manoeuvre numbering scheme for a four-legged intersection. (Source:
[106])
in 0.1s increments for every vehicle in the simulation. Geometric definitions for
every crash zone, as well as checking for the existence of angled collision courses
were made externally to VISSIM’s environment throughout the VB.net application.
7.2.2 Simulation Results
Four safety performance measures based on CPI were used to reflect changes in
intersection safety that result from signalization: 1) CPI/veh, 2) CPI85th percentile
(CPI85), 3) Percentage of vehicles interacting (CPI ≥ 0), and 4) Percentage of
vehicles in conflict (DRAC ≥ MADR).
CPI/veh is obtained by summing the CPI for all interacting vehicles and dividing
this by the number of simulated interacting vehicles. This measure reflects the
average individual safety performance associated with each traffic scenario. The
CPI85 establishes a threshold for comparing safety performance of individual traffic
control (value of CPI/veh that is exceeded 15% of the time). The percentage of
vehicles interacting represents the total number of vehicles with CPI greater than
zero divided by the total of simulated vehicles. The percentage of vehicles in conflict
captures extreme traffic interactions where the maximum deceleration required to
avoid the crash (DRAC) exceeds the braking capacity of the vehicle (MADR). This
value is also divided by the total number of vehicles in the simulation.
Table 7.2 summarizes the simulated average measures of safety performance for
both stop controlled and signalized scenarios. These are based on the average of
15 simulations carried out using different number seeds. This Table also provides
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Figure 7.2: Possible angled interactions
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1 198 1.03.E-08 1.48.E-08 19.8 0.00 1.45.E-05 9.98E-09 4.8 0.03
2 247 5.87.E-09 6.60.E-09 22.4 0.00 1.98.E-05 2.63E-08 4.5 0.00
3 300 1.17.E-08 9.80.E-09 27.7 0.00 8.77.E-05 2.36E-08 6.2 0.02
4 347 1.85.E-06 7.44.E-09 31.6 0.02 1.36.E-05 1.42E-08 6.7 0.02
5 396 7.48.E-08 5.12.E-09 37.1 0.00 3.14.E-08 1.83E-08 6.9 0.00
6 454 9.90.E-06 7.04.E-09 42.7 0.02 6.30.E-05 2.72E-08 7.1 0.06
7 506 2.58.E-08 4.51.E-09 47.2 0.00 8.53.E-05 3.16E-08 7.0 0.04
8 555 2.64.E-06 4.24.E-09 51.1 0.02 1.82.E-05 3.00E-08 5.9 0.02
9 610 1.88.E-06 3.06.E-09 56.5 0.01 1.02.E-04 3.03E-08 5.1 0.06
10 659 1.67.E-06 2.65.E-09 60.5 0.02 1.04.E-04 3.65E-08 4.2 0.04
1 199 4.08.E-08 6.35.E-08 27.2 0.00 1.59.E-09 1.59E-09 0.2 0.00
2 250 6.22.E-08 5.67.E-08 31.0 0.00 1.68.E-09 3.34E-09 0.1 0.00
3 301 2.09.E-07 5.21.E-08 36.5 0.00 1.18.E-08 3.17E-08 0.4 0.00
4 349 9.45.E-06 4.29.E-08 42.1 0.06 6.74.E-06 1.35E-05 0.3 0.00
5 398 1.32.E-06 4.35.E-08 47.8 0.03 9.15.E-04 1.61E-03 0.4 0.03
6 454 6.03.E-06 4.07.E-08 54.1 0.10 6.40.E-04 1.28E-03 0.5 0.03
7 506 4.61.E-06 3.65.E-08 59.6 0.09 1.00.E-03 2.20E-04 0.9 0.06
8 557 4.84.E-06 3.20.E-08 64.3 0.04 5.27.E-04 1.15E-03 0.7 0.02
9 614 1.13.E-05 3.23.E-08 70.4 0.27 3.28.E-04 2.12E-05 1.0 0.04



























When comparing the two traffic control strategies for rear-end interactions, the in-
troduction of signalization consistently results in an increase in the average CPI/veh
values, suggesting that signalization may yield negative safety dividends. This could
be due to disruptions in traffic flow along the major approach that didn’t exist un-
der stop control. Furthermore, the introduction of the traffic signal results in an
increase in the percentage of vehicles interacting from 7% to 15% conditional on
increasing volume.
The relationship between volume and CPI/veh and percentage of vehicles in
conflict is not as consistent as the percentage of vehicles interacting. This could be
explained by the high variability in these measures. The influence of volume on the
percentage of vehicles in conflict seems to become more apparent for the signalized
scenario at higher levels of volume.
A visual analysis of the results for CPI/veh and CPI85 (Figure 7.3 and 7.4)
confirm the findings from Table 7.2. From Figure 7.3, a high degree of variability in
CPI/veh was observed with increasing volume (heteroscedasticity). This suggests
that experiments to detect differences in simulated CPI/veh should be carefully
designed to account for more subtle differences in the measure of safety performance
and that a large number of simulations may be required to enhance confidence in
the results. Figure 7.4 indicates that for rear-end interactions the CPI85 decreases
with volume regardless of traffic control, stop or fixed signal. This suggests that
high risk drivers are restricted by volume in achieving their desired speeds. Volume
in this instance acts as a kind of speed dampening-effect to discourage high risk
behaviour as measured by the 85th percentile.
Figures 7.5 and 7.6 provide additional evidence concerning the influence of vol-
ume on the number of vehicles in conflict for stop and fixed signal control respec-
tively. These figures show that as volume increases the percentage of vehicles not
interacting (i.e. CPI = 0) decreases with volume for both stop controlled and sig-
nalized scenarios, and the percentage of vehicles interacting (CPI>0) increases with
volume for both control strategies. This result appears to be reasonable consider-
ing that at higher volumes the average spacing between vehicles is reduced with
increased interactions requiring braking.
The introduction of signalization significantly increases the percentage of vehi-
cles with high probability of DRAC exceeding MADR per second. For example,
for a volume of 2600vph, the percent of vehicles with CPI between 1x10−08 and
1x10−07, increases from 4% to 14% after signalization. This suggests that for rear-
end interactions there is a shift in the CPI/veh distribution to the right and hence
a reduction in safety following signalization.
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Figure 7.3: CPI/veh for rear-end interactions
Figure 7.4: CPI85 for rear-end interactions
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Figure 7.5: Distributions of CPI values for rear-end interactions: stop controlled
scenario
Figure 7.6: Distributions of CPI values for rear-end interactions: signalized scenario
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Angled Interactions
For angled interactions, signalization yields lower CPI/veh values at lower traffic
volumes. However, at higher volumes no such trend was observed. At lower volumes
it is expected that there are more opportunities for left turn maneovres from the
major approach, whereas at higher volumes the presence of a traffic signal creates
a kind of “platooning” effect along the major approach reducing the number of
available safe gaps for left turn vehicles (and hence higher average CPI/veh). For
example, for the stop control strategy, at the volume level 8, Table 7.2 suggests
that 5.9% of vehicles are interacting as compared to only 0.7% for the signalized
case. Nevertheless the 0.7% of vehicles yield CPI values for the signalized case
that are considerably higher than for the stop control case. This suggests that in
the absence of an advanced green for left turn maneovres a greater proportion of
shorter gaps is accepted.
For angled interactions and stop controlled, the percent of vehicles interacting
increases at low volumes until a maximum value of 2000vph (volume level 7) is
reached and decreases thereafter. For signalized intersections the percentage of
vehicles interacting was found to increase consistently with volume. Figure 7.7 and
7.8 illustrate the frequency of simulated angled interactions for different CPI values
and volume for stop controlled and signalized scenarios, respectively.
Figure 7.7: Distributions of CPI values for angled interactions: stop controlled
scenario
For angled interactions, a key finding of the simulation runs is that the num-
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Figure 7.8: Distributions of CPI values for rear-end interactions: signalized scenario
ber of vehicles interacting is reduced after signalization. However, a small number
of vehicles with very high CPI values continue to be present after signalization,
especially under high volumes. The signalization scenario considered in this anal-
ysis does not permit advanced left turn control even at high volumes. In practise
an advanced green for left turn movements would be considered at such volumes,
reducing the problem of unsafe gap acceptance and resultant angled interactions.
In order to statistically verify the influence of volume and type of control in the
average CPI/veh, the results in Table 7.2 were grouped into two major categories:
1) low volume (levels 1, 2, and 3) and 2) high volume (levels 8, 9, and 10). A
two-way ANOVA analysis was carried out for rear-end and angled interactions and
the results are summarized in Tables 7.3 and 7.4, respectively.
The ANOVA results indicate that all main factors (volume and type of control)
as well as their interaction have a significant effect on average CPI/veh for both
rear-end and angled interactions. This confirms the findings from visual inspection
that the introduction of fixed signal controls at the stop-controlled intersection can
compromise safety by increasing the potential for rear-end traffic conflicts.
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df MS F Sig.
Volume 15.74 1 15.74 44.20 0
Control 7.03 1 7.03 19.74 0
Volume * Control 6.70 1 6.70 18.81 0
Error 62.66 176 0.36
Total 108.47 180




df MS F Sig.
Volume 21326.50 1 21326.50 5.95 0.02
Control 18432.12 1 18432.12 5.15 0.02
Volume * Control 15209.71 1 15209.71 4.25 0.04
Error 630358.08 176 3581.58
Total 743035.21 180
7.2.3 Major Findings
The merits of the proposed microscopic safety model have been verified with the
investigation of the safety implications of introducing fixed signal control at a stop-
controlled intersection for different traffic conditions. The model produces a number
of meaningful measures of safety performance such as CPI/veh, CPI85th percentile,
percentage of vehicles interacting and percentage of vehicles in conflict.
For rear-end interactions, the introduction of fixed signal control increased the
percentage of vehicles interacting and in conflicts, as well as the average CPI/veh
and CPI85. This suggests that signalization could increase rear-end crash risk when
compared to a stop signal control. Increase in volume on the major approach was
found to yield higher levels of vehicles interacting and in conflict with associated
higher crash risks.
For angled interactions the introduction of fixed signal control resulted in a
reduction in the percentage of vehicles interacting. The effect on safety performance
however, was not consistent for all assumed volumes. At low volumes CPI/veh was
found to be lower after signalization (i.e. safety was enhanced), on the contrary, at
high volumes, CPI/veh indicated a small increase. This inconsistency was due to
the absence of an advanced green signal for left turn manoeuvres from the major
to the minor approach. The relationship between CPI/veh and signal control and
volume was found to be statistically significant at 5% level for both rear-end and
angled interactions.
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Another important finding is that simulation experiments should be carefully
planned according to the expected volume and interaction type. In general, angled
interactions do not occur as often as rear-end interactions especially for low levels
of volume. This introduces higher variability to CPI results for angled interactions
therefore requiring a larger number of simulation runs in order to yield meaningful
results.
7.3 Case Study 2: The Safety Implications of
Mandated Truck Speed Limiters
Several jurisdictions in North America (national and state) are currently considering
the introduction of mandatory speed limiters to reduce energy costs and crash
risks. A speed limiter, also called a governor, is a built-in microchip that limits the
maximum revolutions that an engine can achieve, hence restricting the vehicle’s
maximum speed.
Logically, we would expect a reduction in crashes would follow a reduction in the
maximum speed limit where the reduction is applied uniformly to all vehicles in the
traffic stream, and there is 100% compliance. The challenge for this application has
been to determine the effect on safety of a speed control strategy that targets one
group of vehicles (trucks) and not another (cars). If speed controls produce either
intentional or unintentional increases in speed differentials or variance between cars
and trucks, then there is a chance that both crash frequency and severity could be
compromised by the introduction of these controls.
The focus of this case study is to investigate the safety implications of mandating
speed limiters for large trucks (weight greater than 11,794 kg) using the proposed
microscopic safety assessment model. A number of maximum speed thresholds
(including 105 km/h) and compliance rates were investigated for different freeway
geometric and traffic scenarios. This study was performed for a research project
sponsored by Transport Canada [93].
7.3.1 The Simulation Experiment
In order to assess the safety implications of truck speed limiters, different maximum
speed control strategies must be tested against important factors such as geometric
characteristics, volume, percentage of trucks, and compliance rates. These factors
were assumed to have some effect on the average speed and speed variance, and
hence the CPI of individual vehicles in the traffic stream for different road and
traffic conditions. In this study, we have considered three freeway geometric config-
urations: on-ramp, off-ramp, and straight segments with two-lanes and three-lanes
per direction. The attributes of the off-ramp, straight, and on ramp configurations








Figure 7.9: Geometry and lane configuration (Source: [93])
Two levels of freeway volume (500vphpl and 2000vphpl), percentage of trucks in
the traffic stream (2.5% and 15%), and mandatory truck limiter compliance rates
(75% and 100%) were considered in the study. The above geometric and traffic
scenarios were applied initially to a 105km/h maximum speed control strategy as
suggested by Transport Canada.
Table 7.5 summarizes the different traffic, lane-configuration, and speed control
factors used in this investigation of safety performance. A two-level factorial ex-
periment was undertaken to consider all possible interactions between the above
scenarios and simulated average CPI/veh.











A Volume 500 1250 2000 Volume (vphpl)
B Truck Rate 0.025 0.088 0.15 Truck rate (2.5% to 15%)
C CompRate 0.75 0.875 1 Compliance  rate
D NbrLanes 2 - 3 number of lanes (2 or 3)
E SpeedControl -1 - 1 Speed limiter: -1 = no control; 1 = speed limit 105
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The full 25 factorial design requires 32 simulations. Centre points of volume,
percentage trucks and compliance rate were considered which required 4 additional
simulations to include these centre points combined with low and high levels of
categorical/discrete variables (number of lanes and maximum speed). An addi-
tional 5 replicates of the entire experiment were carried out to account for random
variability in the simulation, and this results in a total of 180 simulation runs per
geometric configuration (i.e. on/off ramp or straight segment). A major objec-
tive in the factorial analysis is to estimate the effect of independent variables on
the average CPI/veh in absence of possible scaling biases introduced by the units
of the variables. The factorial experiment also yields a linear expression relating
independent variables of interest with the average CPI/veh indicator.
Survey results obtained from a study conducted by McDonald and Brewster [64]
indicated that 50% of large carriers are currently equipped with limiters compared
to 25% for small carriers, regardless of whether they are mandated or not. Accord-
ingly, the base case strategy (no mandatory limiter) assumes that 35% of all trucks
are currently equipped on a voluntary basis with speed control devices set at the
maximum 105 km/h. For the non-base case strategies the maximum speed on all
limiters (voluntary and mandatory) has been set by the regulations as given above.
Simulations were performed for a total of 20 minutes including 5 minutes of
warm-up where no information was recorded. The input parameters for the off-
ramp freeway sections in this analysis were as suggested from the best estimate
calibration exercise (see Chapter 5). For the straight and off ramp sections the
combined on/off ramp parameter inputs were used in the simulation.
7.3.2 Simulation Results
Preliminary analysis of residuals suggested that the natural log transform of the
average CPI/veh yields less variability, and hence is more representative of the un-
derlying relationship. The resulting ANOVA table for each geometric configuration
is presented in Appendix F. From these tables, significant factors and respective
interactions were used to develop the following simple linear regression models for
factors in the coded space:
• Off-ramp freeway segments:
ln(CPI/veh) = − 13.07 + 0.94 (A) + 1.11 (B) − 0.30 (D) − 0.22 (E)−
− 0.18 (A) (B) + 0.17 (A) (C) + 0.20 (A) (D) +
+ 0.22 (A) (E) + 0.17 (B) (E) + 0.17 (A) (C) (E) (7.1)
• Straight freeway segments:
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ln(CPI/veh) = − 13.32 + 0.64 (A) + 1.01 (B) − 0.18 (C) − 0.25 (E)−
− 0.24 (A) (B) + 0.16 (A) (C) + 0.21 (A) (E) +
+ 0.18 (B) (E) − 0.18 (C) (E) + 0.16 (A) (C) (E) (7.2)
• On ramp freeway segments:
ln(CPI/veh) = − 10.61 + 2.54 (A) + 0.66 (B) − 0.55 (A) (B)−
− 0.11 (B) (D) + 0.09 (A) (E) + 0.20 (A) (B) (D) (7.3)
where
A = volume (-1 = 500vphpl; +1 = 2000vphpl)
B = truck rate (-1 = 2.5%; +1 = 15%)
C = compliance rate (-1 = 75%; +1 = 100%)
D = number of lanes (-1 = 2 lanes; +1 = 3 lanes)
E = speed limit strategy (-1 = no control; +1 = control)
The above models provide a good explanation of the variance in safety perfor-
mance with R-squares of 0.93, 0.67, and 0.69 for on ramp, straight, and off-ramp
segments respectively. It should be noted that the coefficients in the coded space
provide a relative impact of the independent variable in the response variable. For
example, in Equation 7.3 the influence of volume on ln(CPI/veh) is approximately
4 times greater than the impact of increasing the percentage of trucks.
The residual plot of the fitted model illustrated in Appendix F indicates that
both the normality distribution of residuals and homoscedasticity assumptions are
valid. Additional tests performed using the lack of fit error and pure error for the
three expressions are summarized in table 7.6. These tests suggest that all models
adequately deal with the linear trend in the data (no need for quadratic terms, etc).







On ramp 66.66 144 15.64 29 1.16 0.27
Straight 125.95 144 26.73 29 1.05 0.40
Off-ramp 153.23 144 27.99 25 1.05 0.41
(*) If > 0.05, Ho representing no lack of fit, cannot be rejected




In the off-ramp case, by evaluating the coefficients from Equation 7.1 it can
be said that as compliance is increased, there is a small corresponding increase in
safety for the mandatory speed limiter case. It should also be noted that as volume
and percent of trucks increase, the safety gains associated with full compliance
are offset by additional traffic turbulence caused by higher volume and percentage
trucks.
A graphical analysis of the relationship between CPI/veh, volume, and percent-
age trucks was carried out for 2 and 3 lane freeway segments, with the results for
the off-ramp scenario illustrated in Figures 7.10 and 7.11. The analysis suggests
that for the base case (no limiter), the CPI/veh is higher than for the manda-
tory 105km/h limiter case. This supports the assertion that limiters have positive
safety gains. However, this result does not appear to apply to all volumes and
percentage trucks. When volume is increased, the difference between the limiter
and non-limiter case becomes less pronounced. In fact for volumes in excess of 1250
vphpl the introduction of mandatory limiters set at 105 km/h can actually have a
negative effect on safety (i.e. higher CPI/veh).
It should be noted that this finding holds true for volumes in the uncongested
region of traffic flow. Presumably as the volume approaches capacity, the speed
of vehicles in the traffic stream will be determined by congestion, and hence the
limiter is not expected to have any significant effect on safety. The relationship
between increased volume and CPI/veh in the uncongested region appears to be
especially pronounced with higher percentage trucks. At different volumes, safety
performance is reduced with higher percentage trucks. At certain volumes and high
percentage trucks the CPI/veh for the mandatory limiter case is higher than for the
base case. Given the volumes and percentage trucks experienced on many freeways
in Canada, this result could present some safety challenges for the introduction
truck speed limiters.
Similar results were obtained for the on-ramp segment as for the off-ramp (Ap-
pendix G). As the volume increases, the CPI/veh also increases, especially for
higher percentage trucks. The introduction of limiters set at 105 km/h results in
safety gains with respect to the base case (no limiter mandated). We note that as
volume increases to levels close to capacity the introduction of limiters can have a
negative effect on safety (i.e. higher CPI/veh). This result holds for both 2 lane
and 3 lane configurations. Increases in percentage trucks produces pronounced
negative safety effects for limiters in comparison to the base case. At very high
volumes the CPI/veh versus percentage trucks is lower for the base case strategy.
This suggests that for high volumes the introduction of limiters set at 105 km/h
could have a negative safety effect for higher percentage trucks in the traffic stream
for the on-ramp configuration.
For straight segments the CPI/veh was found to be consistently lower for the
mandatory limiter strategy. This suggests that for this configuration where we
would expect reduced vehicle interaction, the safety gains of limiters set at 105
km/h can be more pronounced than for segments with on and off-ramps (Appendix
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Figure 7.10: Estimates of CPI/veh as a function of volume for off-ramps (Source:
[93])
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A sensitivity analysis of safety performance subject to changes in maximum
speed limit policy was undertaken with the results illustrated in Figure 7.12. For
this analysis, the average CPI/veh estimated for 15 simulation was used. Five levels
of speed control strategies (80, 90, 100, 105, and 110km/h) were explored for the
centre points of volume (1250vphpl), percentage of truck (8.75%), and assuming
100% compliance rate.
Figure 7.12: CPI/Veh under different speed limiter strategies (Source: [93])
Figure 7.12 indicates that the introduction of limiters can enhance safety (lower
CPI/veh values) for all maximum speed settings below 105km/h, with the highest
safety gains corresponding to a maximum speed set at 90km/h. At a speed of
110km/h or greater the mandatory limiter strategy has no significant effect on
safety.
7.3.3 Major Findings
The simulation of the above scenarios has yielded a number of significant conclu-
sions as to the safety implications of truck speed limiters.The introduction of speed
limiters set at 105 km/h increases safety in the uncongested region of traffic flow
for all geometric configurations, especially in the straight segment. As maximum
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speed is set at 110 km/h the safety gains with the introduction of mandatory lim-
iters becomes negligible. This result also applies to the uncongested region of traffic
flow.
As the volumes and percentage trucks are increased the safety gains associated
with mandatory limiters becomes less pronounced. As volume approaches capacity,
increased vehicle interactions are expected resulting in reduced safety in areas with
more merging and lane-change manoeuvres. This relationship is especially pro-
nounced at on and off-ramp freeway segments. As compliance is increased, there
is a small corresponding increase in safety for the mandatory speed limiter case. It
should also be noted that as volume and percent of trucks increase, the safety gains
associated with full compliance can be offset by the additional traffic turbulence
due to higher volume and percentage trucks.
7.4 Concluding Remarks
The main purpose of this Chapter was to assess changes in simulated safety per-
formance for two transportation scenarios as a function of different geometric and
traffic attributes. This exercise serves to provide a sensitivity analysis regarding
the proposed safety performance measure (CPI/veh) and to illustrate the merits of
the microscopic safety assessment framework.
Using previously calibrated and validated microscopic model inputs, two case
study applications were identified in this Chapter as follows: 1) Upgrading a stop-
controlled 4-legged intersection into a signalized intersection and 2) Introducing a
mandatory speed control for large trucks in a freeway environment. The safety
performance was estimated for various combinations of factors that were expected
to affect safety for both scenarios and these included geometry, lane configuration,
traffic exposure (volume), traffic composition, and compliance rate.
The results suggest that the proposed microscopic framework was sensitive to
variations in volume, geometry, lane configuration, type of interaction (rear-end and
angled), intersection control, and percentage of trucks. Furthermore, these results
yielded useful insights regarding changes in safety that could be drawn specifically




Researchers have been attempting to estimate safety using statistical models based
on historical crash data. The underlying assumption of these studies is that crashes
are individually unpredictable, although groups of crashes observed on a given
location can produce predictable statistical patterns. Despite the great research
effort on Bayesian methods and advanced statistical techniques, absolute number
of crashes and crash rates are still difficult to estimate mostly due to issues related
to data reliability and availability, as well as methodological challenges posed by
the very random and unique nature of crashes.
It has been argued that a better understanding of the sequence of events prior
to the crash could provide a more rational basis for the development of engineering
countermeasures. However, this type of knowledge requires real-time monitoring of
vehicles in the traffic stream, including detailed vehicle speed/spacing profiles for
the unusual combination of events that lead to crash occurrences. Unfortunately,
this type of information is not readily available.
Microscopic traffic simulation has been successfully applied to investigate op-
erational performance of traffic systems. Recent developments on microscopic be-
havioural algorithms and traffic data acquisition have fostered a few systematic
studies for the use of such a tool to investigate safety. However, most of these
studies have not fully addressed some of the fundamental issues of microscopic
modelling applied to safety studies, such as the need for a sound measure of safety
performance, appropriate calibration/validation using safety indicators and estab-
lishing a reliable link between safety performance measures and “real world” high
risk situations.
The primary objectives of this thesis were to develop a microscopic framework
to identify potentially unsafe vehicle interactions for different vehicle movements
based on traditional car-following, lane change and gap acceptance protocols. As
part of the thesis objectives, these microscopic algorithms were applied to a new
safety performance measure that has been calibrated and validated using real-time
vehicle tracking data and linked to observed crash occurrences.
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This Chapter highlights the main contributions of this thesis research and
presents directions for future work in the field of safety research using short-term
microscopic approach.
8.1 Major Contributions
The major contribution of this research concerns the conceptual aspects of the
use of microscopic simulation for safety assessments in order to provide sound ele-
ments to enhance the scope of such a tool in road safety studies. Three important
contributions can be highlighted as follows: 1) The development of a safety per-
formance measure that takes into account individual vehicle braking capabilities
(CPI), 2) The development of a heuristic calibration/validation procedure for mi-
croscopic models applied to safety studies, and 3) The development of a systematic
procedure to link safety performance measures to observed crashes.
8.1.1 Development of the Crash Potential Index (CPI)
In safety studies where crash occurrences are not applied as the only measure of
safety, such as in traffic conflict and simulation based safety studies, it is crucial to
define safety performance measures that closely capture inter-vehicle interactions
that could lead to crashes. It is also important that the measure be sensitive to
different vehicle classes and environmental conditions.
In this thesis, a Crash Potential Index (CPI) was defined using the notion of
vehicle interactions as the probability that braking requirements for a given vehicle
to avoid a future crash exceed its maximum braking power during a given time
interval. The crash potential index attempts to capture three important aspects of
vehicle interactions as follows: 1) Braking requirements to avoid the crash during
interactions, 2) Maximum available braking power as a function of vehicle type
(e.g. cars and trucks) and environmental conditions, and 3) Time exposed to the
interaction.
Braking requirements to avoid a crash are deterministically estimated using
Newtonian physics applied to instantaneous spacing/speed profiles of vehicles in-
volved in the conflict. In the CPI index, however, it has been recognized that
different vehicles operating under different environmental conditions are likely to
have variable performance to a given level of braking requirement. This aspect has
been accounted for in the index by introducing a stochastic component defined in
terms of assumed probability distributions for the maximum braking power as a
function of vehicle category and environmental conditions (MADR).
Since the CPI index is mechanistic and highly disaggregated in nature, this
provides a more rational platform to better understand the sequence of events prior
to crashes, therefore serving as more robust basis for the development of engineering
safety countermeasures.
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8.1.2 Calibration and Validation of Microscopic Models for
Safety Studies
The use of simulation in safety studies is only possible if existing microscopic sim-
ulation algorithms are able to capture, with reasonable accuracy, the complex be-
havioural relationships that could lead to crashes. Therefore, a fundamental prereq-
uisite to increase the scope of this tool applied to safety is to ensure that important
model inputs have been accurately determined based on observational data and
that simulation models produce estimates of safety performance that can be veri-
fied from real world observations.
A thorough methodology for calibration and validation of microscopic models
for safety studies has been introduced in this thesis. This methodology makes use
of five sequential steps as follows: 1) Selection of initial model inputs, 2) Statistical
screening of inputs using a Placket-Burnman with foldover factorial analysis, 3)
Establishing linear expression relating significant inputs and CPI/veh, 4) Applying
the genetic algorithm procedure to obtain the model best estimates, and 5) Validat-
ing the selected inputs. This heuristic procedure based on sequential applications
of factorial analysis provides a systematic investigation of input parameters that
influence the response (CPI/veh) leading to more meaningful results as compared
to other screening designs.
The methodology was applied in two different geometric configurations (an in-
tersection in an arterial road and at freeway segments). The results revealed that
the average CPI/veh as obtained from simulation compared well with observed val-
ues as obtained from both intersection and straight segment vehicle tracking data.
Furthermore, the validation results were found to be well within the 95% confidence
interval of the values obtained from the simulation. This suggests that the model
is able to replicate safety performance as reflected in rear-end crash potential for a
sample of vehicles that were not part of the calibration exercise.
8.1.3 Development of a Systematic Procedure to Link Safety
Performance Measures to Observed Crashes
Despite the intuitive and logical link between CPI and crashes, a more regimented
link between these two safety measures supports the assertion that if simulated
safety performance reflects high risk behaviour and crashes are caused by such
behaviour, then these crashes should be taking place when safety performance is
low (higher crash risk).
Three intuitive test were introduced in this thesis in order to provide further
evidence of the link between simulated CPI and crashes. In Test 1, temporal
variations in CPI/veh in 1 minute time intervals for a period of 5 minutes before
the crash were investigated. The underlying assumption of this test is that as the
precise time of the crash is approached, there is an increase in simulated crash
risk (CPI/veh). Test 2 compares simulated safety performance 5 minutes prior the
125
crash to the safety performance of the same freeway segment using traffic attributes
recorded at the same time when no crash occurred. Finally, test 3 establishes a
link between observed crash rates aggregated over periods of 1 hour with simulated
safety performance for equivalent periods of time.
The results indicate objective evidence that crashes tend to occur when the
measure of safety performance (CPI/veh) is high. CPI/veh was found to be sensitive
to the time interval preceding each crash; i.e. as the time to crash is approached
the CPI/veh increases non linearly, especially for the one minute period before the
crash. In general, the tests discussed in this thesis supported the hypothesis that
crashes occur during periods when CPI/veh is higher than normal at the same
location and that average CPI/veh rates correspond to increased crash rates.
8.2 Future Research
The microscopic approach for safety studies presented in this thesis can provide
a mechanistic, highly detailed and controlled environment to investigate crash oc-
currence in real-time. However, a number of areas with potential for improvement
have been identified before this methodology can be systematically adopted by
researchers and practitioners as an effective tool for road safety studies.
The microscopic framework for safety assessment relies on a large collection of
highly detailed vehicle tracking information. This database can be used either to
provide continuous real world vehicle interaction information for empirical studies
using safety performance or to allow the development of improved microscopic algo-
rithms to support short-term safety studies using simulated safety measures. The
development of advanced algorithms for vehicle detection and tracking techniques
applied to “ordinary” closed circuit television cameras (CCTC), as well as the use
of in-vehicle technologies such as GPS or mobile phones can be viewed as natural
ways of obtaining detailed, accurate, and systematic vehicle tracking information
to be applied in safety studies.
The current state of the art microscopic simulation algorithms have not been
strictly developed to include crash occurrences and thus these models can only
replicate disruptive driver behaviour with a certain level of accuracy and detail.
The development of more comprehensive microscopic traffic algorithms that ac-
count for a wider range of behavioural attributes including misjudgments of speed
and distance, visibility restrictions, incorrect decisions due to inexperience, fatigue,
attentional lapses, and motivational factors is not only highly desirable, but would
further support the use of microscopic models in safety studies.
Further experimental research on factors influencing the stochastic component in
the CPI measure that accounts for the maximum braking attributes (MADR) would
improve the scope of this safety performance measure. Ideally, individual MADR
distributions for combinations of different vehicle types (motorcycle, cars, truck
configurations, etc), braking system (conventional, ABS), pavement conditions (dry,
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wet, snow), and pavement type should be available. Furthermore, different driver
attributes such as age, experience, and level of impairment could influence the
maximum achievable deceleration rate during an emergency situation.
In theory, CPI index represented by the deceleration rate to avoid the crash
(DRAC) and the maximum braking power (MADR), presents a robust theoretical
formulation to provide good estimates of crash severity. As noted previously the
speed difference of vehicles at the moment of impact plays a major role in resultant
crash severity due to the kinetic energy of the system right before the collision.
Unfortunately, due to data restriction this aspect was not fully investigated in
this thesis. Additional research using crash tests, accident reconstruction analysis
and driving simulators could provide useful insights regarding average speed at the
impact and therefore expected severity for different levels of CPI values.
Despite its inherent microscopic nature the CPI safety measure can provide a
robust and objective platform for safety assessment of digital urban transporta-
tion networks during the planning process. For this type of application, a flexible
platform capable of integrating macroscopic 4-stage modelling components and mi-
croscopic algorithms must be developed. This platform would fill an important
void in the traditional planning process that is related to the lack of available tools
needed to estimate safety in high level transportation policies.
The proposed crash potential index is sensitive to changes in geometric and
traffic attributes. In this thesis, however, only two major geometric scenarios (in-
tersections and freeway segments) and a limited number of traffic attributes were
explored. Sensitivity analysis of CPI for additional scenarios that include different
geometries (curved segments, roundabouts, overpasses, etc), driver, and vehicle at-
tributes and adverse traffic conditions, such as rain and snow, can ultimately yield
the development of a more comprehensive CPI expression. Regression coefficients
representing a given set of traffic conditions can be included in the initial expression
to account for individual contribution of independent variables in the CPI value.
This way, predictive safety modelling would be possible in early stages of safety
assessments of a given engineering countermeasure.
A natural extension of this work is the investigation of interactions for differ-
ent road users, such as vehicles-motorcycles, vehicles-bicycles, vehicles-pedestrians,
and special transportation components, such as highway-railway grade crossings
and tunnels. The methodology described in this thesis can be applied with lit-
tle modification once data regarding these scenarios or microscopic algorithms to
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Table A.1: Plackett-Burnman design structure and CPI/veh results





1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 37.93
2 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 62.14
3 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 1 5.87
4 -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 9.66
5 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 4.25
6 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 1.73
7 -1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 6.20
8 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 16.02
9 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 6.13
10 -1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 0.64
11 1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 0.00
12 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 10.35
13 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 22.52
14 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1 29.53
15 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1 -1 14.84
16 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 71.87
17 -1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 7.91
18 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 0.37
19 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 20.91
20 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 7.59
21 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 16.85
22 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 22.28
23 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 27.03
24 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 10.69
25 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 1 62.16
26 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 27.32
27 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 47.64
28 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 0.82
29 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 8.90
30 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 10.12
31 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 17.59
32 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.82
33 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.18
34 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16.63
35 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11.46
36 0 0 0 -0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.19
37 0 0 0 -0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23.38
38 0 0 0 -0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11.87
39 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12.12
40 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20.06
41 0 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.39
42 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.20
43 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12.60




Structure and CPI/veh Results
130
Table B.1: 26−1 fractional factorial design structure and CPI/veh results





1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 42.68
2 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 52.04
3 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 13.34
4 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 22.52
5 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 28.38
6 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 48.58
7 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 16.66
8 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 10.56
9 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 11.51
10 1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 47.00
11 -1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 5.74
12 -1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 5.80
13 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 16.63
14 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 3.85
15 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 18.14
16 -1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 22.97
17 1 1 1 -1 -1 1 21.39
18 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 15.17
19 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 20.95
20 1 -1 1 1 -1 1 4.83
21 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 38.48
22 1 -1 -1 1 1 1 7.03
23 -1 1 1 1 -1 1 3.43
24 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 9.12
25 -1 1 -1 1 1 1 9.91
26 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 3.99
27 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 0.01
28 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 33.80
29 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 3.93
30 1 -1 1 1 1 -1 3.75
31 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 0.16
32 1 1 1 1 1 1 16.31
33 0 0 0 0 0 0 21.15
34 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.79
35 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.64
36 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.23
37 0 0 0 0 0 0 17.67
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Appendix C
Pre-simulation Volume and Speed
RMSP - Crash Conditions
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Table C.1: Test 1 and 2 pre-simulation volume/speed RMSP - crash conditions (#118, #170 and #222)
0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5'
3 2940 2700 3360 3300 2700 106.1 107.1 104.5 106.5 103.5 2520 3120 3060 3240 2220 99.8 104.7 94.7 91.7 104.2 0.078
71 2940 2580 3420 3240 2760 106.0 106.6 104.4 104.6 105.9 2940 2700 3420 2700 2400 99.0 104.9 93.8 91.2 105.9 0.070
76 3120 2580 3300 3300 2820 105.4 107.0 105.2 104.9 102.8 2820 2820 3240 3180 2880 100.5 106.3 94.8 91.9 106.7 0.064
95 2940 2760 3300 3180 2820 103.6 105.3 106.2 106.4 107.8 3000 3120 3240 2940 2820 98.3 105.1 94.5 91.9 104.8 0.061
169 3060 2580 3480 3180 2700 101.6 103.1 105.7 106.3 106.8 2820 3180 3420 3060 2280 97.8 102.5 94.4 91.7 106.9 0.062
247 3000 2700 3300 3360 2700 107.2 103.9 104.4 105.1 107.3 3060 3060 3360 3060 2520 99.8 103.4 92.2 91.1 105.4 0.060
648 2820 2640 3420 3180 2760 107.6 108.7 101.8 104.1 104.8 2040 3120 3360 3120 2460 101.2 103.4 93.9 90.4 107.4 0.086
750 3180 2460 3360 3300 2820 106.7 108.3 106.8 101.6 103.2 3120 2400 3300 3000 2640 100.4 107.5 93.7 90.8 104.9 0.082
770 3000 2820 3180 3240 2820 103.7 107.0 106.0 107.3 103.6 2820 3120 2580 3000 2700 100.3 104.5 94.9 91.5 105.5 0.085
801 2940 2580 3420 3240 2760 106.0 106.6 104.4 104.6 105.9 2940 2700 3420 2700 2400 99.0 104.9 93.8 91.2 105.9 0.070
Obs. 2940 2460 3360 3240 2520 99.0 101.3 99.3 95.5 98.9 2820 3240 3480 2940 2760 97.2 107.7 93.1 93.3 98.7
881 4800 6060 6600 6660 5940 46.8 55.7 73.0 76.2 57.9 3900 4560 5160 6180 6060 22.4 28.6 38.8 67.2 70.4 0.102
778 4980 6600 6600 6720 6240 44.2 60.5 73.4 80.9 65.1 4260 4800 5280 6420 6060 21.8 27.5 41.4 67.6 71.4 0.102
507 5700 6000 6480 6060 6360 47.3 54.7 61.8 58.8 61.0 3900 4500 5520 6420 5700 21.8 27.4 42.2 68.2 72.2 0.105
357 4860 5820 7200 6120 6180 42.8 55.5 79.4 58.4 53.9 3540 4500 5640 6420 6240 21.6 27.6 40.7 64.8 69.4 0.106
369 5580 6540 6000 6300 6780 44.9 57.6 58.9 63.1 66.2 4140 4380 5520 6360 6240 22.6 28.1 38.5 67.3 71.4 0.107
462 5400 6300 6060 6660 6240 46.9 58.0 54.9 71.7 56.5 3900 4620 5340 6120 6420 22.0 29.4 39.7 59.6 70.9 0.108
549 5640 6300 6780 6240 6660 42.5 59.7 75.4 63.9 74.2 4020 4560 5580 6360 6360 22.7 28.0 38.4 64.1 70.8 0.110
98 5940 6300 6180 6720 6120 48.5 63.2 55.1 64.2 57.2 3840 4740 5640 6060 6240 21.6 26.9 40.1 68.4 70.9 0.111
727 5520 6060 6600 5880 6360 48.3 56.0 65.5 57.6 58.5 3900 4440 5340 6180 6060 21.1 27.4 39.6 66.4 70.8 0.113
486 5700 6360 6420 6120 6720 46.4 56.5 64.5 56.4 68.1 3900 4620 5700 6120 6480 21.2 28.0 40.7 68.4 69.3 0.114
Obs. 5340 6300 7140 7080 6540 37.9 62.3 67.6 68.1 57.1 3840 4860 6000 5880 5640 26.1 32.4 44.8 68.3 76.3
120 4260 4080 3900 3960 4080 99.4 102.1 104.4 104.3 103.7 4560 3780 3300 4320 3840 86.6 87.8 88.9 91.3 81.3 0.044
183 4260 4080 3900 3840 4200 102.8 102.2 106.2 101.8 104.9 4440 3600 3600 4620 3780 85.4 88.5 87.9 93.5 83.1 0.046
173 4380 3960 3780 3780 4380 98.3 103.4 107.0 103.9 105.0 4200 3900 3720 4260 4200 87.1 86.8 87.4 92.2 80.9 0.049
179 4260 4200 3960 3780 4200 105.3 105.7 104.4 106.5 104.1 4140 3900 3660 4260 4020 87.0 85.7 87.1 93.4 83.9 0.051
42 4080 4080 4020 3720 4260 104.5 101.3 104.7 105.6 100.8 4320 3720 3780 4020 4140 86.6 87.6 88.4 94.1 82.1 0.052
80 4260 4140 4080 3540 4260 104.0 106.8 104.8 105.6 105.2 4380 3660 3900 4320 3900 84.8 89.3 86.0 91.9 82.6 0.053
25 4380 4200 3900 3780 4140 104.9 105.3 105.7 105.9 102.1 4500 3600 3780 4320 4140 85.1 87.5 85.1 93.7 82.5 0.053
3 4380 4140 3840 3840 4260 103.8 104.1 106.2 104.4 102.1 4500 3960 3780 4200 3960 84.7 87.1 86.9 94.1 81.9 0.055
195 4320 4080 3960 3720 4200 104.1 105.7 106.6 106.6 104.0 4440 3960 3780 4200 3660 85.3 87.7 87.2 93.3 84.2 0.056
126 4260 4200 3960 3840 4020 104.9 106.2 104.1 106.6 105.6 4080 3900 3840 4260 4140 86.7 85.9 86.2 94.8 83.4 0.057
Obs. 4260 4200 3960 3720 4200 90.6 100.4 100.0 100.9 106.8 4200 3540 3480 4200 3840 86.2 84.5 86.3 95.9 81.2
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Table C.2: Test 1 and 2 pre-simulation volume/speed RMSP - crash conditions (#223, #239 and #320)
0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5'
339 3480 3780 3180 3480 4200 106.3 106.1 106.7 107.1 104.5 3180 3840 3120 3240 4680 88.5 92.6 97.2 100.0 93.7 0.053
884 3480 3840 3060 3480 3780 103.6 106.3 107.1 106.8 105.2 3180 3600 2880 3660 4500 87.6 91.6 99.8 98.5 93.7 0.054
752 3720 3540 3120 3360 4200 106.7 109.0 108.2 107.4 103.3 3180 3660 3060 3360 4620 89.3 92.8 98.9 99.6 93.9 0.055
560 3600 3660 3120 3300 4080 105.7 105.1 105.7 105.7 106.0 3420 3600 3060 3360 4500 86.5 92.1 98.1 97.3 95.7 0.055
906 3540 3840 3000 3240 4080 107.5 106.5 105.5 107.3 104.4 3540 3720 3060 3180 4380 89.3 92.2 99.8 97.4 95.4 0.055
215 3480 3960 3060 3540 4080 107.7 106.8 107.4 104.4 104.3 3360 3780 3060 3420 4860 89.5 92.3 100.4 97.0 93.8 0.055
504 3660 3780 3300 3360 4020 105.9 103.2 105.8 106.9 104.5 3420 3720 3000 3420 4800 87.5 92.5 99.8 101.5 93.7 0.056
990 3420 3900 3180 3420 3840 105.1 106.0 103.1 105.0 105.3 3240 3900 3120 3420 4560 88.6 90.5 99.8 99.8 94.0 0.056
162 3420 3900 3060 3300 4020 105.6 105.5 105.9 104.6 104.6 3180 3780 3180 3180 5100 87.3 91.4 97.5 97.8 93.6 0.058
351 3420 3900 3240 3120 4020 102.3 107.4 106.5 103.9 106.2 3240 3420 3060 3480 4560 86.7 94.6 99.3 98.1 93.6 0.058
Obs. 3480 3900 3120 3360 3840 112.8 109.4 112.4 112.9 115.6 3120 3600 2760 3120 4620 91.0 92.3 99.2 100.2 96.0
378 6060 6360 6840 6420 5220 97.4 95.0 97.7 100.7 104.0 6180 6420 6720 5040 6120 59.5 74.6 91.6 103.6 97.1 0.088
141 6000 6540 6480 6480 5160 92.6 100.9 88.1 97.7 103.5 6120 6540 6600 4860 5460 62.3 66.3 91.9 104.0 100.5 0.091
398 5940 6780 6660 6540 5220 102.2 87.6 91.5 97.2 93.7 6480 6540 6600 5280 6000 62.6 74.2 91.0 103.0 100.1 0.091
485 6060 6480 6840 6480 5160 99.8 96.5 90.7 102.5 100.6 6240 6600 6540 5280 5880 63.6 74.8 92.3 103.2 101.8 0.091
316 6000 6480 6840 6720 4860 103.3 101.0 100.3 97.1 100.8 6060 6540 6720 5400 5820 61.4 74.7 89.2 99.6 98.4 0.094
351 5760 6540 6960 6420 4920 96.1 86.8 100.7 101.6 104.3 6120 6540 6900 5280 5520 62.4 75.7 88.8 102.6 96.8 0.094
356 6120 6540 6720 6780 5100 86.3 100.2 94.4 99.9 106.0 6120 6300 6540 5160 6120 57.5 74.8 89.2 102.6 101.9 0.094
438 5700 6780 5820 6660 5160 95.8 90.5 94.7 94.6 104.3 6240 6540 6360 5100 5700 61.4 76.2 93.3 102.3 101.3 0.096
90 6000 6420 6900 6360 5160 102.2 98.1 99.9 95.9 99.2 6360 6660 6600 5400 5820 59.1 69.8 87.6 102.4 102.2 0.096
237 6240 6420 6780 6720 5040 102.4 90.7 95.7 101.1 92.9 6660 6420 6600 5100 6120 56.0 67.9 87.7 101.6 101.9 0.096
Obs. 6120 7380 7740 7140 4800 96.8 94.2 92.9 89.5 104.3 6480 8160 7140 4320 6180 63.7 74.8 90.6 105.4 102.2
83 5160 4320 5940 5820 5700 87.0 103.6 101.6 99.7 82.8 2340 4860 6420 6600 5640 44.8 72.2 84.5 82.4 84.3 0.115
20 5340 3960 6000 5940 5880 89.5 106.1 97.2 98.2 81.6 2100 5220 5940 5760 6180 35.6 68.6 85.4 87.6 84.5 0.118
18 5220 4200 6120 5820 5580 99.9 105.0 100.5 104.3 82.0 2040 4920 6240 5760 5520 33.3 68.8 86.0 85.0 89.6 0.130
59 5400 4140 6120 5760 5880 92.7 104.8 86.0 95.6 83.2 2100 5040 5880 5820 6540 32.2 70.9 85.0 86.6 83.7 0.130
156 5520 4080 6120 5700 5640 92.3 103.1 96.9 90.5 101.2 2400 5160 5580 5700 5640 42.7 70.3 86.3 87.0 86.1 0.138
75 5280 4140 5880 5760 5880 92.9 102.6 104.1 103.5 91.6 2220 4920 6120 5580 6540 45.7 71.9 85.2 86.0 84.1 0.141
21 5460 4080 6120 5580 5760 100.9 104.8 98.9 97.0 93.1 2400 4440 6240 5880 5580 43.0 71.5 79.0 87.7 87.8 0.144
158 5280 3900 6180 5880 5880 102.9 103.7 100.4 100.6 69.9 2100 4800 6360 6180 6060 37.2 71.4 83.4 83.5 83.8 0.147
65 5340 4140 5940 5820 5760 98.5 95.6 98.0 103.2 84.5 1980 5520 5940 5820 6480 36.0 67.1 85.1 86.2 85.7 0.147
60 5400 3960 6240 5760 5880 99.8 101.9 99.4 103.7 84.5 2100 4740 5880 5940 6600 40.9 68.3 84.1 86.4 87.0 0.148










Table C.3: Test 1 and 2 pre-simulation volume/speed RMSP - crash conditions (#371, #405 and #454)
0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5'
188 4020 5340 4500 3960 4080 101.1 103.9 104.6 106.0 104.4 4440 5160 3900 4320 4080 78.4 90.0 98.4 104.6 102.8 0.075
47 3960 5340 4380 4080 3840 105.1 98.5 99.3 105.2 103.8 4440 5040 4020 4080 4260 80.4 91.2 99.2 104.0 103.6 0.079
9 4080 5400 4260 4080 3840 104.2 103.9 105.1 105.8 101.3 4380 5280 3660 3960 4260 78.8 91.9 101.3 103.6 101.1 0.079
43 4320 5040 4320 4020 3900 100.9 103.6 103.6 104.7 106.0 4740 4980 3960 3780 4380 77.5 91.2 98.2 105.5 103.6 0.081
108 4080 5460 4260 3960 3900 103.7 104.3 103.4 105.7 105.5 4260 5100 3960 4020 3900 81.1 89.9 99.8 104.2 104.9 0.082
101 4020 5400 4380 3960 4020 103.7 104.5 101.7 105.3 104.4 3900 5340 3960 4260 4080 81.6 89.8 101.4 102.9 103.5 0.082
128 3900 5400 4380 4020 3840 104.6 104.6 104.6 104.7 105.6 4500 5100 3960 3900 3960 76.9 90.2 99.2 102.8 103.7 0.085
69 4080 5220 4440 3900 4140 105.2 96.5 105.2 105.9 105.5 4800 4920 3960 3960 4320 76.0 92.8 100.8 104.4 103.4 0.087
41 4140 5160 4380 4200 3780 105.7 104.8 105.2 104.8 105.0 4260 4740 4200 3840 3960 78.0 92.2 99.5 104.8 103.6 0.090
130 4080 5400 4080 4140 3960 104.4 103.1 105.6 105.4 104.2 4920 4740 4020 4140 3900 72.7 91.7 99.0 103.9 101.9 0.095
Obs. 4140 5580 4620 3960 3840 80.2 97.2 96.6 100.5 100.0 4200 4980 3780 4080 4320 77.8 97.4 103.5 104.2 100.1
4 6480 5940 5520 5520 5880 98.9 101.2 102.9 102.7 100.0 5640 4620 4680 5580 4560 75.8 84.1 90.6 94.3 98.9 0.051
8 6360 6120 6060 5160 5940 101.2 101.7 100.4 103.1 102.5 5400 5100 4920 5160 4440 77.2 81.7 89.3 97.1 98.9 0.054
9 6540 5880 5280 5640 5640 98.2 103.9 103.1 101.8 101.6 5220 4920 4860 5040 4800 75.4 83.7 91.6 97.2 99.1 0.055
1 6660 6000 5820 5820 5340 98.2 100.3 101.7 100.5 103.3 5520 4740 5520 4680 4560 74.5 82.6 88.5 97.1 99.3 0.055
5 6720 5820 5820 5580 5820 95.2 102.7 102.6 103.3 102.3 5340 5100 5100 5100 4920 75.9 83.7 91.1 97.0 100.7 0.058
2 6360 6000 5640 5880 5640 102.4 101.0 101.9 100.7 100.9 5340 5220 4680 5580 4620 76.1 81.0 89.8 93.4 99.2 0.058
6 6900 5880 5340 5760 6000 99.7 100.6 100.5 101.1 103.0 5520 4500 5280 5040 4920 75.7 83.2 88.2 97.4 101.0 0.058
3 6720 6120 5760 5640 5700 98.4 98.9 102.8 100.3 104.3 6060 4860 5460 4800 4500 74.9 82.3 89.6 99.3 101.1 0.059
7 6540 5940 6120 5160 5400 100.8 100.7 102.1 104.0 104.0 5400 5160 5100 5040 4500 75.9 82.0 90.3 96.9 101.6 0.060
10 7260 5880 5520 5340 5520 99.1 99.8 105.5 102.7 100.7 5640 5340 4920 5040 4380 75.5 82.7 91.0 98.6 101.0 0.061
Obs. 6600 6240 5580 5580 5760 91.4 94.1 97.7 99.5 96.3 5340 4740 4920 5040 4320 75.5 81.8 83.0 91.7 96.9
266 6180 6240 5880 6660 6000 52.7 56.0 51.0 56.3 47.0 5280 6360 6120 6180 6300 38.6 69.9 81.4 77.3 74.8 0.124
576 6540 6060 6120 6000 6060 53.6 53.4 54.4 53.6 49.0 5640 5820 6300 5940 6000 42.7 72.0 80.7 78.6 75.1 0.127
712 6360 6000 6120 6300 5940 59.0 54.3 54.6 55.0 46.6 5760 6180 5940 6300 6180 46.5 70.2 81.0 76.5 74.6 0.131
169 6240 6300 5940 6180 6000 53.1 59.0 52.7 54.6 48.0 5520 6240 6600 5880 6060 41.3 72.4 80.0 78.8 75.5 0.132
464 6060 6240 6120 6000 5880 52.9 51.2 52.8 59.0 50.4 5580 6240 5940 6180 6180 45.2 71.4 80.2 76.5 73.0 0.133
446 6240 6060 6240 6300 5940 50.5 56.9 54.6 54.3 48.5 5400 5340 6240 6180 5880 38.8 73.7 82.3 78.0 76.9 0.134
401 6300 6060 5940 6120 6060 52.4 51.4 53.4 56.5 50.8 5400 5940 5820 6480 6000 41.7 72.5 81.8 77.2 74.2 0.134
265 6120 6180 6360 6240 6000 55.7 55.8 59.4 52.9 47.7 5640 6060 6600 6060 6060 43.1 72.1 81.4 78.6 75.5 0.137
611 6240 6120 6300 6180 6000 60.8 50.1 51.7 55.6 48.7 5400 6240 6180 6120 6180 42.7 71.3 81.0 76.9 75.2 0.137
120 5940 6120 6420 5640 6300 55.4 54.2 57.1 50.5 50.1 5400 6060 6180 6180 5940 42.4 71.5 79.6 76.9 75.2 0.137
Obs. 6556 6439 6433 6158 5558 44.4 47.0 46.6 45.4 36.3 5182 6131 6339 6390 6403 46.2 63.8 75.7 72.3 68.6









Table C.4: Test 1 and 2 pre-simulation volume/speed RMSP - crash conditions (#455, #478 and #521)
0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5'
7 6300 6060 6120 6240 6180 66.0 75.6 64.1 52.6 54.6 5640 6060 6120 6060 6060 51.8 58.7 75.4 83.9 84.6 0.105
9 6000 6480 5940 5940 5940 58.1 79.7 61.5 57.7 53.3 5760 5880 5760 6060 6060 56.5 60.9 74.2 84.8 90.0 0.111
4 6480 6420 6060 6240 5760 71.3 82.5 84.5 65.8 49.6 6000 6240 6120 6000 5820 57.2 59.7 74.1 85.6 88.4 0.111
2 6420 6480 5820 5880 6120 59.6 62.9 57.7 56.3 56.8 5640 6000 5760 5880 6060 44.8 55.8 75.9 85.3 86.0 0.111
10 5820 6240 5580 6180 6000 54.1 55.4 68.6 62.8 57.9 6240 5460 6120 5880 6000 61.7 60.8 74.6 84.0 89.0 0.116
6 6600 6480 6000 6120 6240 99.3 92.0 74.0 72.2 56.2 5880 6120 6180 6240 5940 49.0 59.6 74.2 82.9 90.2 0.127
8 6480 6180 6060 6180 6240 95.4 91.0 79.5 65.0 53.9 5820 5640 6360 6000 5820 45.0 53.0 73.6 86.4 88.7 0.130
1 6120 5880 6300 5580 6180 56.6 74.7 85.2 49.6 56.5 6060 5820 6000 5820 5880 49.5 56.3 75.3 84.6 87.3 0.133
3 6480 6300 6240 6000 5880 77.5 94.9 77.9 60.2 51.8 5940 6060 6180 5940 5700 43.6 59.1 74.3 84.4 90.1 0.137
5 6600 6360 5880 6060 6300 99.4 99.3 98.8 94.4 73.8 5640 6000 6180 6240 6180 42.2 56.7 74.3 86.8 89.5 0.188
Obs. 5880 6480 5760 6060 5940 78.0 67.4 69.8 72.6 65.7 5160 5940 5640 6360 5340 56.3 53.6 74.2 85.8 89.9
9 6060 6180 6660 5760 5880 59.3 73.2 71.3 57.2 46.4 3120 5640 5760 6060 6060 37.9 54.9 64.7 75.7 76.6 0.094
201 5940 6060 6360 6000 5940 52.9 59.8 62.8 76.3 59.3 3420 4260 5940 6240 6000 44.4 44.1 63.0 72.8 78.1 0.095
397 6060 6360 6240 6240 5820 52.9 71.8 74.8 58.7 47.1 3420 4740 6180 6120 6060 36.6 40.6 64.1 73.9 76.4 0.099
6 5640 6180 6360 6180 5820 55.8 47.4 58.2 69.6 59.4 3180 5340 6000 6300 5940 40.2 48.6 64.3 74.2 77.4 0.107
398 6000 6180 6600 6180 5700 51.5 52.4 78.2 79.9 47.3 3420 4800 6060 6120 5940 35.1 52.8 64.2 76.9 77.0 0.108
370 6360 6180 6300 6180 5760 56.8 48.7 77.1 65.4 45.7 3000 4560 6000 5880 6420 42.3 42.7 66.8 77.8 77.5 0.110
59 5880 6240 6240 6300 5700 42.3 54.3 70.0 75.3 58.8 3420 5100 6360 5880 6000 38.1 43.6 61.4 78.1 78.9 0.118
53 6120 6420 6360 6060 5700 58.9 63.3 55.7 53.9 62.3 3360 5160 5820 6420 5520 33.6 53.5 66.8 74.6 78.9 0.122
94 6180 6000 6180 6000 5820 48.7 45.1 59.7 76.3 52.6 3480 5220 5580 6360 6120 37.2 59.4 70.4 75.0 76.4 0.123
401 6060 5940 6120 6120 5820 56.0 47.5 67.9 64.4 59.0 2640 5040 5820 5820 6120 32.9 45.5 64.0 76.5 75.7 0.128
Obs. 5580 6180 6300 5760 5100 53.8 66.6 65.8 67.8 48.2 3120 4860 5940 6120 5400 47.2 51.0 66.2 71.1 75.1
264 6720 6000 6420 6660 5820 68.0 65.2 55.0 61.1 57.5 6120 6240 6540 5880 6120 50.8 64.9 68.7 73.8 72.9 0.071
739 6120 6300 6840 6600 6060 60.9 65.1 57.0 70.3 54.0 6000 6540 6480 6180 5940 52.3 64.6 68.9 73.6 72.4 0.074
546 6840 6240 6300 6420 6300 70.5 82.2 56.0 58.9 52.1 6000 6480 6420 6120 6420 52.3 62.3 69.7 73.7 72.6 0.075
572 6600 6480 6060 6780 6060 75.1 78.9 57.8 64.4 55.2 6120 6360 6420 6360 6120 52.7 63.8 69.7 73.3 73.0 0.076
118 6540 6240 6240 6300 6120 75.7 68.1 56.7 66.7 56.3 6120 6120 6420 6180 6000 51.6 62.4 70.3 72.3 73.1 0.077
169 6060 6360 6180 6780 6000 63.1 70.7 56.4 70.8 54.6 6000 6420 6420 6300 6120 51.2 60.9 71.6 73.5 71.2 0.079
820 6540 6360 6240 6240 6180 61.6 72.3 57.5 60.6 54.5 5820 6000 6360 6240 6120 49.3 65.4 70.9 73.7 72.5 0.080
734 6360 6120 6360 6300 5820 55.0 67.2 59.2 55.6 53.5 6180 5940 6240 6420 5940 53.4 64.0 71.8 72.7 73.3 0.080
703 6300 6540 6120 6300 5820 70.1 72.3 56.4 61.4 56.7 5700 6240 6180 6060 5940 51.3 63.6 71.6 72.2 72.6 0.081
251 6480 6120 6300 6180 6000 61.9 64.4 55.9 51.2 50.3 6000 6240 6300 6180 6000 53.0 63.4 70.7 73.8 72.9 0.081










Table C.5: Test 1 and 2 pre-simulation volume/speed RMSP - crash conditions (#522, #571 and #595)
0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5'
11 6540 6120 5100 4380 5220 98.6 102.1 100.2 106.1 103.2 5880 5400 4980 5220 5520 96.8 101.9 102.3 103.6 101.1 0.048
19 6480 5820 5280 4560 5340 103.8 95.8 104.0 103.5 103.8 6420 5640 4560 5220 5340 99.1 104.2 104.7 101.6 104.5 0.051
9 6420 6180 4740 4500 5580 100.4 99.3 100.2 104.6 97.8 6240 5820 4020 4920 5640 98.6 102.1 104.7 103.8 97.6 0.055
3 6600 5880 4980 4320 5700 91.9 99.6 104.6 102.4 101.4 6300 5460 4740 4980 5460 98.9 101.8 100.4 100.6 100.5 0.057
1 6120 6000 5040 4560 5340 99.1 101.0 103.8 104.2 102.8 6000 6000 4380 5040 5340 98.5 96.6 102.4 98.3 95.5 0.057
13 5880 6120 5160 4560 5640 101.6 91.1 97.6 104.2 101.1 5580 6300 4260 4980 5940 102.2 97.9 104.3 101.6 100.3 0.067
7 6180 6060 5100 4380 5460 90.8 90.0 101.3 101.6 96.8 5700 5340 4800 5100 5280 98.6 101.8 100.5 98.0 99.9 0.069
10 6540 6060 5220 4080 5760 102.3 102.6 103.7 105.2 103.2 6300 5520 5160 4200 5160 99.6 100.3 103.9 102.7 103.5 0.073
15 6120 6300 4500 4380 6060 104.1 92.7 103.1 105.4 94.6 6000 5760 3900 5700 6000 100.5 97.0 104.9 97.4 101.5 0.078
6 6360 6120 5040 4440 5700 94.6 95.6 102.4 103.3 94.8 6120 5280 5220 4860 6300 100.1 98.3 100.0 102.0 101.1 0.078
Obs. 6420 6120 5100 4320 5520 99.4 104.3 101.2 112.7 109.4 5880 5520 4380 5220 5520 99.3 101.3 108.7 113.4 107.9
69 4740 5580 5640 5400 4980 41.1 53.5 72.9 52.6 49.9 5220 5220 5400 4740 5460 50.3 52.9 47.1 54.1 56.5 0.113
28 4860 5400 5280 5160 5460 43.4 54.8 56.8 51.6 53.3 5100 5040 5160 5220 5040 41.9 44.7 51.1 54.5 49.2 0.115
3 4980 5040 5460 5340 5160 42.9 44.5 51.1 61.9 61.4 4740 5160 4980 4860 5100 58.5 51.6 50.8 53.0 60.7 0.121
38 4980 4980 5580 5400 5100 42.0 49.9 47.8 48.5 56.5 4560 5520 5220 4860 5880 45.8 52.4 55.6 42.0 56.4 0.127
16 4500 5700 4860 5700 5280 45.1 53.8 40.5 58.7 59.2 5160 5100 5580 4860 5280 38.9 50.0 52.2 46.3 51.1 0.131
82 5340 5460 5280 5220 5100 44.2 53.6 59.6 48.1 46.7 5400 4980 5340 5220 5100 50.4 55.2 48.5 55.1 54.8 0.136
26 5160 5460 5280 4500 5700 47.4 48.9 59.3 45.4 65.6 5160 5040 5040 5220 4740 47.3 51.8 59.8 52.0 63.1 0.137
12 5340 5160 5520 4500 5460 48.6 51.1 60.3 40.1 67.5 5340 5280 5220 4920 5160 46.6 51.6 55.7 57.7 60.7 0.140
18 4740 5040 4500 5520 5040 42.3 59.9 51.1 54.5 64.6 5520 5100 4620 4860 5220 63.0 57.4 47.9 40.8 52.3 0.142
74 5100 5280 5580 5460 4800 46.7 50.1 67.6 59.2 43.0 5280 5460 5220 4680 4920 53.4 58.4 46.8 46.9 53.8 0.143
Obs. 4140 5100 5100 5280 4800 41.2 63.0 63.2 59.7 67.9 4320 4980 5040 4560 5340 46.6 54.3 54.1 57.1 54.9
446 5940 5820 5640 4500 5520 102.9 102.9 103.0 105.5 89.8 4620 5280 3540 4080 4860 50.0 61.3 44.9 46.6 68.9 0.098
349 5820 6000 5460 4620 5460 105.4 103.9 106.6 106.7 87.5 5280 4860 3480 4140 5340 53.4 59.1 45.7 46.0 70.4 0.099
851 5760 5880 5580 4740 5460 103.3 103.5 104.1 105.5 91.6 4740 4680 4140 3720 5340 52.6 60.4 44.7 46.8 68.9 0.099
523 5640 6180 5400 4620 5460 102.9 104.3 104.2 104.4 89.0 4440 4500 3960 3960 5160 54.2 63.6 44.9 46.2 70.5 0.100
529 5760 6000 5640 4620 5460 103.8 103.9 105.3 104.8 78.0 5100 4980 3660 4020 5280 53.6 61.2 45.4 47.7 69.0 0.100
15 5760 6060 5580 4620 5520 104.2 103.7 103.9 104.5 91.3 4860 5220 4140 3900 4980 53.7 59.7 45.1 47.3 69.3 0.101
734 5820 5880 5580 4680 5400 105.1 103.8 104.4 104.6 90.0 4860 5280 3540 3960 5280 52.7 59.2 45.1 46.8 69.6 0.101
373 5640 6000 5580 4680 5340 88.6 103.4 104.0 104.1 93.0 4980 4740 4140 3960 5640 54.0 64.9 42.3 47.2 69.9 0.102
787 5880 5880 5520 4440 5340 103.6 102.5 104.0 103.2 85.7 5040 4320 3780 3780 4980 53.2 64.4 44.2 46.5 70.4 0.102
790 5760 5820 5460 4740 5400 104.1 102.6 105.0 104.7 85.6 4980 4500 4020 4260 4800 52.5 64.7 44.2 45.2 70.9 0.102










Table C.6: Test 1 and 2 pre-simulation volume/speed RMSP - crash conditions (#647, #688 and #702)
0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5'
518 4980 5640 6180 6000 5820 90.5 83.9 102.3 102.5 94.6 4800 5640 6000 6420 5880 66.8 73.2 71.6 74.6 73.9 0.095
820 5220 5340 6420 5940 5880 76.5 101.6 101.8 96.7 82.2 5100 6060 5820 6180 6420 64.9 73.0 73.7 72.1 66.4 0.100
285 5040 5940 5820 6000 5640 90.3 82.7 99.9 89.6 102.2 5160 5700 6120 5640 5580 66.5 74.6 74.7 75.0 74.6 0.104
660 4980 5520 6360 5820 5520 97.9 101.6 78.0 96.1 87.5 4440 6180 6240 5940 5220 68.0 75.8 70.8 76.9 74.2 0.105
88 4860 5460 6360 6180 5520 95.9 100.4 101.9 99.7 103.3 4800 5940 5940 5640 5880 67.1 74.6 73.7 75.0 74.4 0.105
119 4920 5520 6180 5760 6000 96.8 99.0 101.1 102.1 79.1 4680 5760 5940 6240 6060 67.9 75.3 72.5 73.3 74.2 0.106
45 5040 5700 6360 5700 5640 95.1 104.1 88.4 100.4 101.2 4860 6060 5820 6300 5940 65.6 73.8 74.1 69.9 73.8 0.106
399 4920 5460 6240 6060 5760 98.4 90.1 100.6 98.1 100.3 4620 6420 6120 5940 4920 66.0 70.1 70.8 75.4 75.0 0.106
607 5040 5460 6300 5940 6000 92.7 103.4 102.8 101.2 101.9 4920 6120 6120 6120 5400 66.9 71.8 71.5 72.6 76.8 0.107
756 5220 5160 6360 6060 5580 98.4 103.8 100.4 100.8 97.6 4500 6360 5940 6240 5040 66.1 75.3 72.7 76.4 75.2 0.107
Obs. 4920 5580 6180 5940 5820 73.7 91.2 92.2 90.6 90.7 3960 5820 5220 5760 5460 65.8 75.0 74.5 75.3 76.1
14 5880 4500 5460 5580 5280 99.3 86.5 48.4 60.8 46.6 5580 6240 5580 5700 5580 49.5 73.7 57.0 47.7 47.0 0.145
1 4680 5220 4980 5640 4680 88.6 85.5 64.3 54.6 50.1 5280 5880 4980 5760 5280 46.0 72.1 45.1 61.5 41.1 0.150
17 5700 5400 5400 5820 5400 64.0 70.8 53.4 70.8 57.8 5400 5940 5940 5580 5160 46.3 67.4 55.9 48.7 44.8 0.152
6 4500 4740 5400 5700 5100 102.8 85.2 45.3 51.9 49.5 5400 6180 5280 5820 5340 43.2 66.8 50.2 57.1 48.9 0.153
19 5460 5460 4920 5400 5040 61.1 81.5 49.9 55.3 49.4 5640 6060 5100 5760 5280 46.3 72.5 51.6 54.7 46.5 0.157
3 5100 5100 5280 4860 4800 101.5 84.7 57.5 48.8 57.0 5580 6000 5700 5220 4980 43.9 52.6 57.4 44.3 49.9 0.162
18 5760 5580 5280 5580 5220 70.7 51.1 63.1 58.6 44.7 5340 5940 5460 5820 5280 46.3 72.8 56.4 51.5 47.3 0.162
10 5460 5580 5520 5580 4680 83.5 59.9 61.7 63.2 46.3 5580 5640 5640 5400 5340 41.7 61.7 45.7 56.3 43.5 0.165
2 5220 4560 5460 5040 4800 103.2 73.8 71.0 84.8 44.0 5340 6060 5640 5220 5760 41.4 65.9 56.8 51.6 51.4 0.169
4 5220 4920 5820 5400 5040 98.7 53.8 63.2 49.0 47.7 5460 5580 6120 5280 5520 44.3 40.9 65.7 58.1 45.9 0.169
Obs. 5520 4680 5640 5640 5220 85.8 80.0 60.0 60.1 59.3 4800 5520 5460 5160 6000 47.7 73.6 79.3 72.9 58.2
11 4680 5700 6120 5820 6240 88.1 83.6 60.2 69.2 66.6 5040 5220 5580 6300 6000 39.1 40.6 80.6 87.0 89.2 0.095
5 4620 5520 5820 6480 5880 101.7 96.6 85.6 75.4 85.0 5400 4860 6000 5880 6300 40.8 41.1 78.7 89.3 87.4 0.105
84 4500 5520 5940 6300 6060 103.8 101.0 86.8 58.0 59.4 5160 5100 6360 6060 5760 42.2 42.2 75.2 86.7 87.0 0.112
54 4380 6000 5940 5940 5880 106.1 96.6 94.9 75.8 57.7 4920 5040 6180 5700 6180 40.9 46.4 79.7 90.1 86.7 0.115
3 5100 5340 5760 6120 5340 97.1 96.8 63.1 64.5 83.3 5400 5100 6000 5760 5400 41.6 39.2 78.4 87.5 88.3 0.117
40 4680 5640 5880 5400 6180 104.3 103.1 95.5 96.8 75.9 5100 5160 5460 6120 5820 40.6 43.0 80.5 86.2 88.7 0.119
66 4440 5100 6060 5880 6300 104.8 90.8 58.5 59.1 59.4 5100 5220 5700 6240 5940 41.6 42.0 80.3 86.5 88.3 0.120
4 4860 4980 6600 5940 5820 104.0 92.8 95.9 69.1 57.1 4800 5160 6360 5700 5820 38.1 37.0 76.8 87.6 88.1 0.121
77 4140 5160 5940 6000 5760 103.8 93.2 55.1 57.1 58.5 5040 5160 5700 5940 5640 42.7 45.3 79.8 88.6 89.4 0.123
51 3900 5880 6120 6000 6000 106.4 79.7 68.0 56.4 62.3 5160 5220 6000 5880 5940 40.1 40.9 80.4 88.2 86.3 0.124










Table C.7: Test 1 and 2 pre-simulation volume/speed RMSP - crash conditions (#710, #731 and #739)
0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5'
65 6600 5760 6600 6360 6540 65.8 57.6 73.4 93.6 84.3 4980 6060 6240 6480 6600 38.2 62.1 66.5 79.3 77.8 0.107
22 6180 6120 5940 6300 6360 62.2 53.2 80.9 72.2 67.6 5160 5940 6360 6180 6540 34.6 62.3 67.9 80.5 76.9 0.117
958 6480 6060 6480 6480 6300 57.6 57.4 58.1 83.4 65.5 5220 6240 6120 6480 6300 34.0 60.0 66.5 80.3 80.5 0.122
323 6180 5940 6360 6600 6360 59.0 59.4 56.6 65.1 69.8 4980 6480 6360 6240 6120 38.3 63.2 65.0 77.6 75.2 0.124
798 6180 5940 5940 6720 6360 56.6 61.4 59.5 73.9 94.6 5100 6300 6360 6480 6300 33.5 61.4 65.8 81.2 80.1 0.128
567 6300 6120 6240 6060 6360 53.2 53.4 59.7 72.1 66.9 4980 6180 5820 6600 6540 32.5 63.8 67.9 77.5 76.6 0.128
804 6060 6300 6000 6480 6540 65.8 56.9 78.5 96.3 83.3 5040 6300 6120 6660 6300 35.3 55.9 66.3 73.3 76.4 0.129
797 6660 6000 6060 6060 6180 70.0 64.9 59.8 71.9 66.5 5040 6000 6240 5820 6000 36.9 65.4 64.6 83.3 82.3 0.131
132 6120 5760 6540 6540 6360 66.6 53.9 61.1 68.0 78.8 5160 6120 6300 6180 6180 35.2 58.5 65.8 82.3 83.4 0.131
728 6600 5940 6420 6360 5820 71.2 57.2 63.7 67.1 80.8 4980 6000 5940 6060 6420 35.4 63.2 67.1 79.2 78.8 0.133
Obs. 6540 5760 6600 6780 6120 53.5 64.1 82.1 82.2 76.9 4740 6120 5760 6540 6300 48.9 72.8 71.7 87.3 91.8
749 6060 6120 5520 6120 5580 83.6 79.7 98.3 88.2 101.0 4440 4380 5700 5640 5700 31.9 35.4 56.0 74.3 80.9 0.119
944 5700 6360 6180 6000 6000 87.9 86.1 79.6 88.2 88.9 4500 4500 5820 6060 5940 31.9 35.4 57.1 74.0 78.4 0.123
99 5640 6300 5880 5760 6060 90.5 88.1 87.6 89.2 94.1 4200 4320 5340 6060 5940 30.8 34.9 58.6 74.0 78.7 0.127
407 5580 6000 5940 5820 5940 85.8 98.5 91.4 90.0 97.7 4440 4500 5640 5940 6060 30.4 35.2 53.1 71.8 67.9 0.131
371 6000 6180 5820 5940 5820 92.9 78.0 89.1 96.4 91.6 4380 4320 5400 5880 6180 31.7 35.0 56.8 74.3 78.7 0.132
198 6060 6240 5880 5220 6240 89.9 89.3 88.7 101.7 98.4 4440 4500 5400 5700 5940 31.7 36.0 58.6 73.7 78.8 0.133
862 5700 5760 6540 5700 6180 86.3 100.3 90.0 94.3 88.7 4380 4320 5400 6240 5820 31.9 35.4 56.5 73.7 80.4 0.134
357 5880 6060 5640 6240 6240 92.2 78.7 93.9 97.8 93.9 4020 4200 5820 6000 6240 31.4 35.8 57.6 73.5 78.2 0.135
727 6300 5520 6480 5580 6360 85.0 97.6 91.7 95.7 87.0 4200 4620 5820 6060 5940 31.7 34.8 55.5 73.2 78.8 0.137
133 6180 5100 6120 6120 6060 86.4 100.7 91.6 94.4 98.8 4440 4440 5760 6000 6060 31.8 34.7 54.0 71.0 78.8 0.140
Obs. 5134 5593 5706 5703 6309 62.6 75.0 81.8 89.7 93.6 4196 4546 5068 5671 5885 37.4 36.5 52.8 65.4 78.3
78 5520 6780 5580 6360 5220 86.2 94.6 99.4 100.6 101.4 2520 5760 6060 5760 4560 33.2 100.3 98.6 99.7 100.3 0.126
52 5340 6720 5880 6300 5160 100.4 100.7 100.4 98.8 101.7 2280 5700 6540 5640 4920 33.1 100.6 95.2 101.8 99.6 0.132
68 5100 7080 5400 6240 5400 100.5 102.0 102.7 100.9 102.5 2580 5400 6120 5880 5040 32.8 103.5 100.6 92.6 101.3 0.133
97 5220 6960 5280 6900 5220 94.6 100.5 103.7 102.3 102.5 2460 5820 6060 6060 5100 29.0 100.1 97.4 102.1 103.1 0.136
73 5460 6540 5760 6300 5340 95.2 100.5 101.2 98.3 97.4 2640 5880 6300 5640 4800 31.5 101.2 102.7 100.8 101.6 0.138
99 5520 6900 5400 6480 5400 91.7 95.1 101.9 101.6 101.0 2580 5820 6060 5880 4800 30.0 99.4 93.3 99.9 101.3 0.138
85 5520 6660 5220 6720 5160 99.1 98.8 97.1 89.9 102.7 2580 6000 6180 5340 5160 32.6 100.7 97.4 101.1 101.4 0.140
30 5340 7020 5460 6720 5100 100.1 100.6 101.9 97.5 99.4 2520 5640 6480 5400 4380 29.9 103.2 97.1 102.0 102.3 0.140
88 5280 6660 5580 6720 4860 95.0 100.2 96.3 90.7 103.1 2580 5880 6240 5280 4920 31.3 101.1 96.1 98.3 101.8 0.141
60 5460 6720 5580 6540 5160 85.6 100.0 103.8 101.9 105.4 2520 6060 6060 6000 4680 26.7 100.2 97.5 101.0 103.6 0.142










Table C.8: Test 1 and 2 pre-simulation volume/speed RMSP - crash conditions (#781, #854 and #858)
0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5'
57 6180 6420 6720 6480 6900 73.3 86.3 81.6 83.4 81.8 6360 6540 6720 6540 6360 66.2 76.5 87.6 85.9 88.1 0.054
916 6540 6300 6300 6780 6780 67.9 77.4 89.3 80.3 77.0 6240 6180 6600 6660 6540 69.6 71.3 93.4 89.4 88.3 0.062
779 6660 6120 6540 7080 6300 89.1 85.4 89.1 82.6 76.0 6360 6480 6720 6360 6300 69.8 76.8 89.9 93.7 88.5 0.065
747 6360 6540 6360 6660 6900 77.7 66.8 83.4 76.9 88.8 6180 5940 6780 6360 5700 66.6 76.8 95.5 85.8 89.7 0.071
978 6480 6360 5880 6720 6720 87.0 77.4 72.7 87.9 90.0 6420 5700 6540 6540 6600 64.4 83.8 97.1 89.1 88.4 0.072
7 6360 6240 6780 6660 6720 77.6 68.7 83.2 77.6 98.4 5940 6360 6240 6840 6720 57.4 79.5 93.1 86.2 86.8 0.073
447 6420 6540 6300 6780 6720 86.6 70.8 68.7 83.9 89.7 6060 6120 6480 6720 5880 69.2 78.4 88.5 86.3 87.7 0.074
395 6000 6480 6780 6600 6900 87.0 77.5 88.9 97.7 92.4 6180 6420 6780 6720 6480 63.3 73.5 87.1 84.1 85.1 0.074
267 6480 6120 6720 6960 6420 62.5 72.9 90.0 79.5 78.9 6240 6480 6240 6660 6360 64.9 75.8 95.4 90.8 88.7 0.074
709 6420 6420 6480 6600 6900 90.5 84.5 82.9 86.2 93.0 6660 6360 6480 6600 6540 58.5 74.4 85.0 88.5 88.2 0.076
Obs. 6480 6180 6720 6840 6780 79.2 81.5 82.9 82.1 82.1 5580 6060 7020 6900 6540 64.7 78.4 92.0 90.8 82.8
47 5460 6300 5760 4680 4740 91.1 92.8 87.6 105.1 104.0 5940 6540 4380 4620 4680 75.2 95.9 103.5 105.2 102.9 0.050
34 6120 6180 5760 4440 4920 98.8 92.1 100.3 105.5 103.6 6180 6360 4260 4620 4980 72.7 94.9 103.3 103.6 103.0 0.050
26 5880 6420 5880 4440 4740 97.9 97.9 101.1 103.8 103.5 6060 6300 4620 4560 5040 74.4 96.9 103.2 102.3 102.6 0.057
15 5700 6480 5460 4500 5100 103.6 97.9 99.3 106.7 102.7 5940 6120 4260 5460 4680 74.4 95.8 105.1 99.5 103.3 0.060
90 5880 6180 5940 4320 4800 103.6 98.5 100.4 106.2 104.5 6120 6360 4500 4560 4260 74.0 99.9 102.4 102.7 103.2 0.060
9 5940 6240 5700 4620 4560 95.8 97.3 102.4 105.2 96.8 6000 6300 4560 4740 4800 70.2 100.4 101.3 103.0 102.4 0.060
128 5760 6540 5940 4320 4500 101.3 102.3 100.9 105.9 105.5 5820 6720 4500 4500 4440 74.9 94.4 104.0 102.6 102.7 0.062
105 6000 6240 5760 4500 4500 103.4 102.9 101.9 105.2 104.8 6180 6300 4320 5160 4200 70.4 100.7 103.8 101.5 103.4 0.063
74 5880 6360 5760 4740 4800 99.5 101.1 102.8 103.9 102.1 6420 6180 4620 4740 5040 74.9 101.0 103.7 103.4 100.7 0.065
101 5940 6120 6180 4440 4800 100.3 79.9 102.1 105.2 104.0 6000 6180 4680 4800 4740 75.1 97.2 103.4 102.8 101.5 0.065
Obs. 5940 6300 6060 4440 4620 94.4 94.4 91.2 103.0 102.2 6360 6120 4080 4980 4620 77.4 89.7 97.8 98.6 100.7
120 6420 4560 5280 4740 5280 100.7 105.6 104.6 103.9 103.2 5580 4620 4680 5040 5160 76.9 102.1 100.2 96.6 98.9 0.058
437 6660 4260 5340 4680 5220 100.8 103.9 100.6 105.3 101.6 5880 4320 4620 5580 5340 77.4 99.5 103.1 92.0 98.8 0.060
419 6420 4500 5160 4680 5280 101.9 106.8 98.1 103.6 102.4 5340 4380 4740 4980 4800 77.7 105.5 103.6 96.0 99.2 0.060
661 6180 4920 5160 4740 5340 101.4 103.5 105.2 105.5 100.5 5580 4680 4500 5520 5580 74.8 103.6 105.2 94.3 97.7 0.063
751 6000 4620 5340 4500 5340 96.2 104.7 101.8 102.5 103.5 5400 4680 4560 5340 5280 78.5 102.7 102.5 95.6 98.3 0.063
614 6420 4500 5400 4500 5220 101.3 103.2 103.7 104.5 101.1 5400 4680 4620 5520 4980 76.1 102.5 100.8 94.4 100.5 0.063
892 6300 5040 5220 4440 5580 102.7 103.3 104.3 107.5 103.2 5760 4620 4800 4980 5400 77.9 102.8 102.5 96.5 98.4 0.063
961 6360 4320 5220 4740 5340 100.0 99.3 104.7 103.2 99.6 5700 4440 4680 4920 5640 76.7 101.2 103.0 95.3 99.1 0.063
592 6480 4380 5460 4800 5100 102.0 106.6 105.1 101.4 103.2 5820 4440 4920 5160 4860 76.3 101.1 104.3 95.9 100.7 0.063
683 6300 4440 5460 4500 5160 104.2 105.8 106.3 102.7 104.1 5460 4800 4680 4920 5040 77.0 103.6 103.4 95.2 101.1 0.064










Table C.9: Test 1 and 2 pre-simulation volume/speed RMSP - crash conditions (#884, #888 and #903)
0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5'
779 5040 5580 6060 5940 5400 58.2 60.9 60.3 56.8 49.7 5160 5340 6060 5340 5460 45.3 39.4 74.7 47.1 49.9 0.104
397 5640 5520 5580 5820 5280 80.0 59.4 59.8 58.1 45.1 5280 4920 5760 5520 5520 45.1 35.4 73.0 59.0 46.9 0.104
179 5580 5400 6180 5700 5220 56.4 57.8 77.0 52.6 44.4 5280 5040 6180 5760 5220 44.0 37.3 69.9 56.8 44.9 0.109
118 5820 5760 5460 5580 5340 48.2 60.0 62.1 57.3 50.9 5100 5220 6060 5700 5760 46.1 39.2 82.0 66.5 46.3 0.115
595 5580 5520 5760 5520 5820 59.6 55.0 63.9 50.4 43.1 5160 5040 5940 5760 5580 38.3 39.9 55.4 44.6 52.4 0.124
987 5580 5340 5820 5580 5280 69.7 46.6 55.2 55.5 47.3 5040 4980 5940 5580 5760 42.7 39.9 47.3 58.5 53.3 0.127
165 6000 5100 5760 5460 5520 88.2 52.4 65.3 60.7 48.3 5160 5040 6120 5580 5340 48.2 36.2 71.0 60.2 41.6 0.138
271 5940 5700 5460 5640 5700 60.9 63.1 59.3 70.9 47.3 4860 5160 5820 5820 5580 38.7 42.2 59.0 59.1 47.5 0.139
369 5820 4740 6120 5580 5460 69.8 52.4 78.4 70.5 45.2 4980 4860 5940 5580 5580 49.0 39.8 65.7 52.8 46.9 0.139
479 5520 5280 6000 5340 6060 62.2 54.2 60.9 59.3 63.9 5040 5520 5940 5760 5520 48.3 43.4 82.7 53.3 44.7 0.154
Obs. 5220 5460 5520 5400 5100 63.5 59.4 61.2 51.7 42.4 4500 5040 5700 6000 5100 56.6 38.1 73.4 59.6 55.8
282 4920 5880 4080 5940 4320 101.7 102.1 102.9 99.5 103.9 5220 5040 5160 4320 5640 60.0 83.2 99.5 102.5 100.3 0.051
394 5760 5820 4020 6060 4620 100.2 99.8 104.5 101.4 102.7 5400 4800 4980 4560 5640 59.6 83.7 99.2 101.7 100.6 0.055
100 5820 5760 4320 6360 4380 103.0 101.3 102.5 101.4 104.0 5640 4860 5220 4680 5580 59.7 83.4 97.8 100.8 101.4 0.056
411 5220 5940 3960 5580 3960 100.1 95.9 103.7 102.6 103.0 5280 5160 5100 4140 4920 61.5 83.4 92.3 101.5 97.4 0.056
320 5520 5940 4680 6780 4260 100.8 102.3 98.9 97.7 103.6 5040 5340 6240 4440 5340 60.9 81.3 97.5 102.9 102.5 0.060
11 5280 6300 4680 6180 3840 99.8 102.6 103.1 103.0 105.8 5160 5460 5400 4920 4620 58.4 83.9 95.9 102.7 102.9 0.063
87 5460 6420 4680 5820 4320 101.6 102.5 96.6 90.6 106.5 5580 5220 5640 4860 4800 59.1 82.5 101.4 103.9 102.3 0.063
253 4800 6420 4440 6000 4260 104.0 100.2 100.7 93.5 104.0 5580 5460 5220 4800 5220 58.9 84.0 99.7 101.1 99.9 0.064
147 5340 5880 3960 6060 3900 103.6 96.4 105.5 102.1 103.5 5520 5040 5100 4740 4860 59.9 84.7 101.0 103.2 100.5 0.064
263 6120 6240 4800 5580 3900 95.9 91.4 101.6 98.2 106.9 5580 5280 5460 4320 5100 61.0 84.4 99.2 104.6 97.2 0.064
Obs. 5460 6300 4440 6060 4380 98.0 99.8 103.7 99.6 107.5 4980 4860 5460 4380 5220 58.2 80.7 92.1 104.9 93.6
42 5074 6152 6662 6692 6956 58.7 95.7 102.0 96.1 94.4 2353 4994 6966 7169 6333 39.2 60.5 91.4 91.6 92.0 0.030
46 5074 6278 6793 7142 6377 61.8 102.2 98.4 93.6 92.9 2306 4994 6900 6708 6533 38.7 59.9 86.2 92.5 92.5 0.035
12 5385 6278 6793 6949 6699 56.0 93.6 102.0 96.8 93.5 2494 5271 7033 6972 6000 40.7 65.4 91.5 91.6 94.2 0.038
77 4919 6466 6597 6821 6312 62.2 98.8 98.5 90.2 96.0 2588 5160 6900 6906 5867 35.6 59.7 91.4 92.6 94.8 0.039
26 4919 6403 6858 7014 6634 61.4 104.1 101.2 81.2 86.7 2494 5326 6834 6643 6267 35.0 60.7 91.0 92.7 92.6 0.044
55 5022 6089 6728 7142 6505 65.9 103.9 92.2 96.5 94.8 2400 4994 7232 6972 5867 35.4 61.4 90.8 90.6 95.3 0.049
69 5281 6027 6793 6756 6827 47.9 94.6 95.3 99.2 95.6 2400 5105 6701 7103 6133 36.1 56.4 93.9 91.8 94.0 0.050
47 4867 6340 7054 6499 6827 68.3 104.6 89.1 81.0 91.5 2541 5215 6568 6708 6267 38.1 59.2 94.4 92.6 93.5 0.062
4 5229 6529 6466 6821 6634 50.8 80.7 89.1 85.2 79.7 2165 5326 6900 6840 6400 40.3 66.0 92.5 92.2 94.2 0.070
64 5229 5838 7054 6563 6827 39.5 96.6 94.6 97.4 83.6 2259 5215 6966 6380 6133 37.6 59.4 93.3 94.4 93.6 0.079
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Table D.1: Test 2 pre-simulation volume/speed RMSP - non-crash conditions (#118, #170 and #222)
0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5'
124 2940 2880 2940 3000 3060 106.5 106.8 107.0 104.0 106.5 2820 3000 3120 2880 3000 105.4 106.7 104.8 107.2 106.6 0.039
125 2880 2940 2940 3000 3000 106.2 106.6 107.4 106.5 104.8 2880 2880 3060 3060 2880 106.1 106.7 105.6 104.3 107.6 0.040
127 3000 2820 2940 3060 2940 106.7 107.5 106.3 106.0 107.5 2940 2880 2940 2940 3120 106.0 104.1 106.3 105.6 106.5 0.040
198 2820 2940 2940 3060 2940 106.0 105.9 105.9 105.2 107.7 2880 2940 3180 2940 2940 103.6 106.4 104.4 107.1 105.5 0.041
197 2940 2880 3000 2880 3060 106.3 105.9 105.1 107.8 107.2 2880 3120 3000 2940 2880 106.1 104.2 106.3 107.5 106.1 0.043
196 2880 2940 2820 3000 3180 105.7 104.2 107.7 106.7 106.8 3120 2880 3000 3000 3000 105.0 106.5 107.4 104.2 105.7 0.043
192 2880 3000 2820 3000 3180 105.2 105.9 107.9 106.2 106.9 2940 2760 3000 3060 3060 106.8 107.5 106.8 104.2 106.2 0.043
194 2760 2880 2940 3120 2940 107.1 107.6 106.8 105.6 107.2 2760 2880 3120 2820 3060 106.8 105.8 106.0 106.4 107.4 0.043
129 2820 2820 3060 2940 3060 106.5 106.9 106.9 106.5 106.1 2880 2760 3000 3000 2940 106.3 105.5 105.3 104.7 104.5 0.044
10 2820 2880 2940 2940 3120 105.5 106.3 106.3 104.1 107.2 2700 3060 3060 2940 3180 106.5 106.5 105.9 104.3 105.6 0.044
Obs. 2880 2929 2965 3000 3071 110.3 116.8 114.1 113.2 108.4 2967 3022 3136 3016 3115 105.9 106.8 105.5 106.6 105.4
198 6240 6360 6060 5880 6060 85.0 71.8 59.8 76.2 83.7 6240 6300 5640 5880 6420 78.1 77.9 75.1 76.1 73.3 0.080
639 5460 6420 5760 6480 6120 88.4 93.4 85.1 81.6 78.0 5820 6180 5940 6360 6060 77.4 78.8 73.4 75.6 73.6 0.083
784 6420 6240 5760 6060 6360 87.1 71.7 93.3 73.4 60.2 6120 5460 6540 6180 6180 74.7 77.8 73.8 76.6 73.6 0.086
204 6240 6240 5700 6240 6540 90.2 83.5 88.6 81.9 60.3 6180 6060 6660 5940 6120 75.8 73.0 74.6 76.1 75.2 0.087
495 5940 6240 5880 6120 6360 69.1 66.6 80.0 87.7 58.2 6120 5700 6360 6240 6180 74.7 77.4 74.5 76.5 74.3 0.088
995 6240 6600 5880 6060 5760 80.5 89.6 99.1 68.1 69.3 6420 5880 6300 5940 6000 70.5 76.0 75.0 75.9 75.5 0.086
258 6120 6360 5700 6240 6300 95.2 88.4 86.2 79.0 69.4 6660 6480 6360 6180 6180 74.4 75.2 75.2 77.1 73.3 0.086
5 6300 6300 5940 5880 6240 77.0 68.7 99.9 84.9 65.3 6360 5700 6000 6240 6300 75.5 76.1 74.6 74.4 74.6 0.084
710 6240 6240 5880 6180 6240 99.5 75.1 85.5 73.0 59.5 6240 6360 6060 6240 5760 73.9 75.6 74.9 75.4 74.7 0.086
306 6000 6600 5940 5880 5880 84.9 85.3 79.5 83.8 99.6 6360 6660 5640 5880 5460 75.0 74.6 75.6 75.8 74.0 0.089
Obs. 6270 6315 5935 6020 6150 76.8 76.5 74.2 75.2 71.4 5662 5836 5678 5662 5689 77.4 79.1 79.0 76.0 76.8
197 4200 3840 3780 3780 3960 105.9 104.9 104.4 106.7 106.5 3840 3900 3660 4020 3900 92.4 90.8 92.2 93.2 92.7 0.022
58 4320 3900 3660 3840 4080 105.0 104.7 107.5 105.3 104.8 4080 3960 3660 3960 3840 92.7 91.5 93.4 91.9 91.7 0.022
19 4140 3720 3900 3840 3960 106.8 106.6 105.9 105.6 105.1 4080 3780 3660 4080 3960 91.9 92.2 92.2 91.5 90.8 0.023
123 4320 3720 3840 3900 3900 106.0 106.0 106.8 106.3 104.9 4200 3780 3780 4200 3840 93.2 91.6 92.0 92.0 92.2 0.024
124 4260 3900 3660 3960 3960 105.2 106.4 105.9 104.2 104.1 4020 4080 3780 3780 3960 91.6 92.8 91.5 92.4 92.2 0.025
71 4320 3780 3780 3840 4140 106.0 104.9 105.5 106.3 104.9 4020 3840 3780 4080 3660 93.1 91.9 91.2 92.5 93.8 0.026
125 4200 3840 3840 3780 3960 106.1 106.0 106.6 104.1 105.6 3900 3720 3960 4140 3720 92.0 91.8 93.0 91.9 93.0 0.028
95 4140 3780 3840 3960 3900 105.9 105.0 104.4 105.7 105.6 3960 3660 4080 3840 3900 91.0 92.4 92.4 92.7 92.2 0.028
108 4140 3960 3660 3840 4020 103.5 106.4 105.7 106.2 105.4 3900 3900 3540 4080 3720 93.1 91.6 93.6 92.2 92.0 0.029
5 4320 3660 3840 3840 3840 103.4 103.2 105.7 105.9 106.2 4020 3900 3900 3720 4080 91.8 90.5 90.9 92.8 91.7 0.029
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Table D.2: Test 2 pre-simulation volume/speed RMSP - non-crash conditions (#223, #239 and #320)
0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5'
666 3780 3240 3420 3480 3660 105.2 106.8 106.4 105.9 102.1 3600 3120 3360 3720 3480 104.1 104.9 104.9 102.9 101.4 0.037
90 3600 3300 3420 3480 3720 105.6 104.9 106.1 106.0 104.6 3720 3300 3240 3480 3420 103.2 104.4 103.5 104.8 105.2 0.037
41 3660 3360 3420 3660 3600 102.9 106.0 106.0 106.0 105.7 3360 3300 3300 3480 3360 104.2 103.9 104.8 105.1 106.1 0.038
322 3660 3360 3420 3660 3780 105.9 106.2 106.6 104.4 104.1 3540 3240 3240 3840 3660 104.3 103.4 103.2 103.5 102.3 0.040
966 3660 3420 3300 3540 3720 105.8 106.2 107.8 107.3 105.0 3540 3240 3420 3660 3660 103.8 105.8 106.0 104.6 101.7 0.040
671 3780 3480 3420 3360 3720 106.3 102.8 105.0 105.1 106.9 3600 3300 3240 3600 3600 105.5 105.2 104.9 105.1 104.0 0.041
208 3780 3300 3480 3660 3480 106.0 105.9 105.7 106.5 103.7 3720 3000 3480 3660 3420 104.8 106.3 106.3 105.9 102.5 0.041
548 3840 3180 3600 3660 3480 102.5 106.3 105.9 105.9 106.7 3480 3060 3420 3600 3360 103.4 106.6 104.6 103.5 105.2 0.041
947 3660 3240 3600 3540 3540 106.8 104.1 106.5 103.1 105.6 3600 3300 3180 3720 3600 104.6 103.9 106.2 101.3 104.6 0.041
497 3660 3360 3420 3600 3420 107.1 106.0 105.6 105.2 103.9 3660 3240 3360 3720 3480 105.5 105.6 104.7 104.1 102.7 0.042
Obs. 3670 3385 3433 3575 3685 107.9 109.1 109.7 108.5 108.2 3502 2929 3060 3475 3453 103.6 104.5 104.2 102.2 102.6
341 5940 5520 6000 5880 5940 87.0 92.1 98.3 93.2 99.1 5820 5820 5400 6240 5520 102.1 100.3 102.3 98.7 99.3 0.056
525 6000 6000 5880 5760 5940 86.2 92.9 97.5 98.0 91.7 6360 5940 5760 5760 5820 100.3 101.3 101.1 101.4 99.5 0.056
305 6060 6060 5940 5520 5880 87.9 86.8 88.2 103.5 97.6 6300 6060 5580 6000 5700 99.9 101.4 101.7 98.0 98.6 0.059
108 5880 5940 5940 5760 5760 94.7 94.0 90.4 90.8 103.1 5760 6000 5760 5820 5700 101.4 96.7 101.8 101.1 101.5 0.059
444 5880 5940 6060 5760 5820 90.3 92.2 98.9 102.1 99.8 6180 5940 5640 6360 5700 101.4 99.8 100.7 98.6 101.4 0.060
1 5760 5940 6060 5880 6060 103.2 87.4 87.6 87.5 91.7 5940 6120 5640 5940 5760 100.0 99.0 99.1 98.1 96.1 0.060
528 5760 6180 5880 5880 5760 81.1 101.8 100.2 97.2 93.9 5760 6180 5580 6180 5460 102.0 97.1 101.6 99.7 101.0 0.062
293 5820 5760 6240 5880 5460 90.0 94.0 95.3 96.9 98.4 5700 6060 5760 6180 5580 103.4 101.5 101.1 99.7 98.8 0.062
110 6120 5820 6120 5760 5700 76.6 87.1 102.7 102.3 93.0 6060 5940 5460 6120 5400 98.5 99.2 102.8 89.3 101.9 0.062
195 5700 5820 6180 5640 5940 82.3 90.8 98.4 88.9 92.4 5760 5820 6180 5940 5580 101.8 103.2 101.8 103.9 102.4 0.063
Obs. 5820 6016 6060 5809 5907 81.7 87.9 90.1 91.3 92.0 5865 5945 5485 6050 5705 90.9 91.1 92.1 95.9 95.9
756 5820 5700 5880 6000 6000 94.4 74.7 83.1 75.2 57.0 5700 5580 6240 5940 6060 79.0 79.2 76.9 80.5 76.0 0.100
461 5760 5820 5580 5460 6000 87.6 86.9 93.1 95.7 76.4 5640 5460 5760 6300 5040 80.5 79.8 78.9 76.3 81.0 0.116
744 5760 5700 5880 5940 5580 88.1 99.8 77.9 73.1 99.5 5820 5940 5820 5700 5940 79.1 77.7 79.4 81.0 77.1 0.118
638 5700 5760 6000 5580 6000 104.2 89.2 70.1 93.5 82.9 5760 6060 5940 5640 5520 81.1 77.5 76.7 78.9 79.9 0.118
711 6000 5760 5820 5820 6180 91.1 75.5 62.6 91.0 55.4 6360 6120 5700 6720 6120 78.3 75.3 77.9 74.4 79.3 0.119
468 5700 5940 5640 6000 5880 98.9 93.4 99.7 83.4 82.0 5880 5760 5880 5760 5940 79.4 80.1 78.8 78.9 79.5 0.124
375 5700 5940 5760 5940 5760 103.2 83.9 91.0 87.3 90.8 5760 5580 6180 5640 5580 79.2 79.0 77.8 78.0 77.1 0.126
451 6000 5580 5940 5820 5880 90.9 74.1 81.7 102.4 102.9 6180 5400 5520 6240 5760 76.3 78.0 82.0 77.4 78.5 0.126
706 5820 5460 5880 5880 5880 87.9 87.3 97.6 88.8 92.1 5520 5760 6060 5760 6420 78.0 79.5 77.1 80.0 76.8 0.128
957 5700 5700 6120 5820 6060 93.9 103.1 86.1 96.4 68.8 5940 6000 5640 6780 5820 79.5 79.1 78.7 73.8 78.1 0.130
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Table D.3: Test 2 pre-simulation volume/speed RMSP - non-crash conditions (#371, #405 and #454)
0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5'
364 5580 5340 5220 5580 5040 85.5 88.0 99.9 98.2 102.9 5400 4740 5520 5400 5160 83.7 84.4 82.7 81.5 82.9 0.106
484 5460 5220 5280 5460 5280 103.5 93.5 104.7 81.7 99.9 5100 5340 5340 5580 4680 84.9 83.1 83.4 83.9 82.9 0.108
488 5520 5280 5400 5400 5280 98.0 103.5 103.9 90.5 89.7 5460 4860 5820 5460 4920 84.0 85.7 82.6 82.2 85.6 0.109
254 5520 4920 5340 5520 5160 98.3 104.7 95.3 101.8 80.6 5280 4920 5160 5700 5280 83.5 83.7 83.8 82.2 83.8 0.111
666 5580 5100 5220 5580 5220 100.4 104.3 103.6 86.4 94.4 5280 4980 5340 5520 5220 82.9 84.0 81.8 81.8 80.9 0.112
677 5460 5340 5220 5460 5220 101.0 92.1 92.2 97.9 100.8 5160 5280 5400 5760 4500 81.9 84.2 82.3 82.1 84.9 0.112
114 5340 5220 5400 5400 5340 86.1 96.2 103.0 96.3 100.9 5640 4740 5700 5280 5040 80.5 81.8 82.2 83.5 83.0 0.113
454 5100 5160 5340 5580 5340 91.2 93.5 94.8 102.0 101.4 4860 5640 5100 5460 5220 85.7 83.4 83.9 84.0 83.5 0.113
995 5340 5400 5280 5400 5220 81.9 100.8 94.9 103.5 101.5 5520 5220 5160 5220 5160 82.2 83.4 84.5 80.6 79.9 0.114
583 5460 5280 5400 5100 5280 100.4 103.1 83.0 97.6 102.3 5040 5220 5400 5460 5040 82.8 82.9 81.1 84.5 81.4 0.116
Obs. 5290 5125 5110 5290 5080 76.4 78.2 79.2 76.3 75.2 5145 5080 5370 5300 4885 85.5 86.2 84.8 84.8 86.2
37 4980 5160 5340 5520 5940 102.9 102.6 100.8 96.0 96.2 4320 5100 4860 5340 5100 84.9 89.9 83.8 78.6 78.2 0.118
52 5100 5280 6480 5160 5100 102.7 101.1 101.4 102.9 105.8 4740 4920 4920 4320 4980 86.8 86.2 85.6 82.2 77.2 0.122
72 6660 5400 5520 4860 5580 93.7 101.3 103.5 103.8 102.8 5340 4800 4380 4260 4800 82.7 86.8 88.7 80.5 76.1 0.128
99 5640 5280 5520 4680 6960 101.4 104.3 103.3 103.4 97.5 5100 5040 4380 4680 6480 86.5 86.3 88.9 80.4 74.0 0.149
15 5700 5640 5220 6300 5520 100.7 103.1 102.4 100.9 103.9 4380 5100 5340 5400 4740 88.2 87.2 84.3 80.5 77.4 0.135
31 6120 5580 5280 5520 5280 101.5 102.0 104.8 102.2 103.5 5940 4560 5220 4080 4860 84.3 86.8 88.2 84.0 78.3 0.138
41 5280 5280 5400 6180 4920 101.6 101.4 101.7 102.5 103.3 4740 4920 4920 5280 5040 86.8 85.7 85.4 81.7 76.6 0.129
44 5220 5640 5040 5280 5700 102.2 103.8 103.3 101.6 100.8 4500 5160 4560 4740 5820 87.8 86.8 87.3 80.8 75.1 0.130
50 6480 5160 5220 4980 5400 101.4 102.9 104.6 103.3 101.2 4920 4320 4380 4740 5160 85.6 87.7 88.5 77.3 75.7 0.130
70 5520 4860 5640 6540 5580 103.5 103.8 102.2 97.2 101.8 4380 4260 5760 5400 4140 88.7 88.1 80.9 76.4 78.9 0.140
Obs. 5215 5190 5430 5000 5300 85.5 81.5 78.4 80.5 78.7 4398 4618 4625 4368 4548 81.7 81.5 80.9 79.8 84.9
922 6060 5520 5760 5880 6060 54.1 45.4 46.4 52.1 51.4 6120 6240 6060 5940 5700 59.6 60.0 55.4 52.7 47.5 0.115
869 5820 6180 5460 6120 6000 53.2 51.4 45.5 54.7 48.5 6180 6300 6240 5940 5580 56.8 62.8 63.7 54.7 48.3 0.116
854 6120 5700 5520 5940 6180 56.3 46.7 45.8 52.9 60.3 6180 6120 6240 6000 5760 58.3 60.5 58.6 55.5 51.7 0.116
39 5760 5880 5880 5940 6060 46.6 53.6 47.7 54.6 50.9 6240 6420 6060 6060 5640 58.0 64.8 66.0 55.7 47.4 0.118
567 6000 5820 5580 6240 6120 48.3 48.3 43.7 52.1 52.3 6240 5880 6240 6180 6060 60.0 53.9 52.5 56.5 54.9 0.119
858 6000 5700 5880 6240 5940 51.6 45.5 50.3 52.1 56.2 6180 6180 6000 6000 5760 61.6 60.4 52.8 50.8 54.5 0.121
717 6420 6120 5160 6180 5700 54.8 50.2 40.4 55.9 51.6 6060 6420 6120 5880 6000 61.7 60.3 62.7 53.1 57.7 0.121
610 6180 6000 5520 6120 5520 53.3 52.9 42.9 53.7 47.3 6060 5760 6240 5940 6060 58.0 51.4 58.9 60.9 52.8 0.122
366 5820 5760 6180 5880 5640 56.2 46.8 52.1 46.6 52.7 6120 6420 6300 6120 5520 56.3 62.6 66.3 60.7 45.9 0.122
724 5880 5880 5340 6300 5820 54.8 53.2 46.9 53.9 50.1 6180 6180 6060 6000 5940 59.1 64.3 57.2 57.4 47.9 0.122
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Table D.4: Test 2 pre-simulation volume/speed RMSP - non-crash conditions (#455, #478 and #521)
0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5'
780 5940 5580 5520 5580 5820 91.0 84.7 96.7 95.4 67.8 5700 5280 5580 5820 5760 59.3 68.7 69.7 73.1 75.2 0.116
907 6120 5580 5760 5100 5700 97.6 100.2 87.0 92.6 80.2 6060 5520 5640 5220 5820 64.3 62.4 65.3 73.8 76.6 0.122
113 5280 5760 5520 5460 5760 76.0 95.0 100.7 87.8 70.5 5280 5760 5280 5940 5580 62.8 64.8 64.3 68.1 74.0 0.135
664 5760 5640 5700 5340 5640 80.8 64.9 101.0 91.3 94.6 5400 5460 5700 6120 4980 68.0 67.0 66.8 69.7 71.6 0.124
703 5580 5820 5520 5460 5760 89.3 94.8 96.4 87.9 68.3 5880 5520 5220 6000 5880 62.2 66.4 67.9 65.8 73.8 0.126
487 6180 5520 5400 5460 5820 90.0 99.2 99.7 89.0 69.0 5640 5460 5640 5940 5940 59.8 64.9 69.8 74.0 76.0 0.123
440 5880 5580 5400 5880 5100 91.9 99.2 98.8 93.4 99.2 5640 5340 5520 5940 4440 69.6 66.2 71.3 75.5 74.3 0.122
765 6120 5760 5280 5400 5580 99.2 86.2 98.2 97.7 98.7 5760 6000 5280 4980 5340 63.3 63.0 70.7 76.3 77.7 0.132
904 6060 5160 5880 5040 6000 90.6 99.9 99.5 96.3 68.3 5160 5460 5460 5700 5640 67.8 63.9 68.5 67.8 72.5 0.129
706 5640 5700 5400 5280 6000 98.7 68.7 81.3 97.6 88.9 6000 5340 5340 5820 5820 61.4 61.5 66.1 68.3 74.7 0.135
Obs. 5722 5531 5324 5313 5258 77.5 79.0 77.4 75.5 78.3 5525 5210 5335 5255 5130 75.2 76.2 77.4 80.1 81.0
825 6000 6060 6360 6180 6480 69.4 66.0 69.8 84.9 64.6 6000 6180 6600 5760 6420 74.8 74.8 74.0 78.3 74.6 0.068
923 6240 6360 5820 6540 6360 85.9 63.7 61.6 68.9 67.1 6240 6360 5940 6300 5880 73.4 72.8 74.7 76.5 74.8 0.075
982 5940 6420 5940 6540 6480 82.1 60.1 81.2 60.2 74.1 6060 6480 6000 6360 6480 74.2 74.5 75.7 76.5 74.1 0.076
31 6120 6420 6060 6360 6480 67.7 66.2 54.0 66.7 61.2 6300 6480 6360 6060 6300 76.0 74.9 74.8 74.3 75.1 0.080
454 6000 6180 6060 6420 6360 86.4 80.8 82.9 68.5 83.1 6180 5400 6360 6240 6420 75.2 78.3 74.4 75.1 74.2 0.085
875 6060 6120 6180 6300 6420 100.5 76.0 74.5 66.8 77.2 6480 6600 6000 6060 6360 75.3 74.3 73.6 76.8 74.1 0.086
602 6120 6240 6300 6480 6360 77.4 92.6 76.1 60.5 64.1 6180 6660 6180 6540 6060 73.8 73.0 75.1 75.9 75.9 0.086
522 6180 6240 6060 6420 6600 96.0 70.2 73.5 67.4 71.0 6480 6420 6480 6600 5760 74.2 74.1 74.3 71.3 74.8 0.088
45 6240 6180 6240 6180 6480 93.1 62.4 68.2 79.9 74.2 5820 6420 6540 6600 6420 75.7 74.6 74.0 71.6 75.9 0.088
364 6240 6180 6180 6540 6420 82.2 82.0 77.0 72.5 71.1 6120 6420 6240 6840 6060 76.1 74.9 67.9 69.1 75.1 0.088
Obs. 6080 6190 6180 6385 6390 70.3 70.0 68.8 67.4 70.5 6135 6135 6250 6225 6425 78.2 79.9 79.5 79.3 79.0
633 6000 5880 5640 5820 5280 56.2 51.2 55.8 56.0 50.3 6000 5940 5760 5760 5640 55.4 50.5 51.2 45.8 50.0 0.068
782 5820 5400 5700 5820 5340 53.3 52.0 45.8 49.6 42.0 5940 5880 5700 5580 5940 54.5 50.3 49.4 43.5 48.8 0.096
823 5640 5400 6000 5580 5280 51.2 51.1 55.2 50.2 46.4 5820 5640 5700 5400 6060 51.1 49.0 46.2 44.8 46.9 0.096
711 6000 5580 6060 5880 5700 51.3 50.2 52.4 47.7 48.7 6060 5820 6000 5460 5700 54.4 45.7 50.8 43.6 45.6 0.096
356 5580 5340 5940 5640 5760 54.5 53.6 57.1 47.7 49.7 6000 5580 6120 5520 5880 57.3 43.8 49.8 45.7 45.1 0.098
586 5580 5520 5760 5940 5460 49.0 49.9 53.6 51.4 49.2 5940 5880 5880 5400 5820 51.6 48.0 46.3 45.1 46.2 0.099
731 6000 5700 6000 5220 5160 53.3 59.6 52.3 44.7 47.0 6000 5880 5460 5460 5580 56.2 50.6 46.2 43.6 44.2 0.101
113 5820 5340 5640 5700 5640 54.7 46.0 51.1 53.2 46.8 5820 5640 5460 5520 5520 55.9 45.7 50.6 42.9 47.2 0.101
484 5820 5940 5520 5820 6300 51.2 54.1 48.1 51.4 54.8 6060 5820 5880 5760 6060 51.8 45.1 47.3 47.0 49.1 0.102
955 5340 6120 5820 5400 5700 49.3 55.1 52.5 53.1 48.7 6060 6000 5580 5640 5700 50.6 52.2 46.4 44.9 43.3 0.102
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Table D.5: Test 2 pre-simulation volume/speed RMSP - non-crash conditions (#522, #571 and #595)
0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5'
58 5940 5400 4920 5460 5040 101.0 104.2 102.3 99.1 104.1 5460 5400 5160 4980 4800 102.0 102.0 102.7 104.5 102.2 0.026
99 5880 5400 4920 5340 4920 101.6 103.7 103.1 102.8 102.7 5340 5340 5100 5280 5280 103.7 100.5 100.2 101.7 101.2 0.026
189 5580 5640 4740 5460 4980 100.7 102.6 103.0 103.7 104.7 5700 5220 4980 5160 5040 101.3 101.6 101.8 103.4 102.7 0.029
11 5640 5460 5040 5460 4980 95.8 104.4 103.9 101.6 100.3 4980 5460 5160 5580 5040 103.8 102.9 101.8 103.7 102.2 0.030
180 5880 5400 4920 5460 5160 98.8 103.9 105.6 98.9 103.5 5640 5040 5100 5160 5040 103.4 103.2 100.8 102.3 103.6 0.031
190 5760 5460 5040 5220 5220 101.4 103.0 103.9 102.5 102.1 5640 5280 4980 5460 4980 94.8 101.8 101.0 101.2 103.0 0.031
45 5640 5580 5160 5100 5160 100.6 104.5 101.8 103.6 101.3 5040 5340 5160 5460 5280 101.0 101.6 103.2 101.9 101.5 0.031
30 5760 5580 4860 5640 4860 102.6 101.1 104.8 102.5 104.1 5760 5220 5280 4980 4920 99.1 103.4 99.6 104.5 102.4 0.032
97 5640 5460 4860 5700 4920 101.0 102.0 102.6 101.5 104.1 5580 5220 5040 5700 5100 100.5 102.9 100.8 101.7 101.8 0.033
187 5460 5640 5040 5340 4980 101.4 103.4 105.0 102.6 105.4 5580 5280 5220 5220 4620 99.8 101.8 101.5 101.9 103.4 0.034
Obs. 5716 5558 4934 5405 5111 98.8 100.4 100.9 100.5 101.0 5398 5485 5285 5240 5090 100.1 102.6 103.0 104.4 104.5
399 5040 5100 5460 5340 5220 95.7 90.9 95.1 97.9 101.7 4800 5520 5340 5040 4680 71.8 69.1 73.1 75.7 77.1 0.124
304 5100 5340 5280 5040 5520 95.1 93.7 101.8 102.1 95.7 5340 4980 5340 4800 5340 75.6 76.1 72.7 78.9 74.0 0.124
569 5340 5520 5460 4920 5280 94.8 100.3 90.1 99.9 94.2 5100 5400 5340 5340 5400 73.2 72.6 70.6 69.2 74.5 0.126
235 5640 4920 5640 5160 5160 84.4 103.8 98.0 99.5 96.4 5400 5160 5280 5040 5160 70.1 71.1 74.7 72.9 73.6 0.127
688 5340 5220 5520 5700 4800 97.2 99.3 99.2 92.5 100.4 5160 5400 5400 5460 4920 74.5 74.1 73.5 75.6 74.4 0.128
677 5700 5400 5340 5220 4800 91.5 99.8 97.4 97.6 102.8 5280 5520 5400 5280 4920 71.8 71.9 70.9 72.8 75.4 0.128
233 5580 5220 5100 5340 5640 93.6 98.9 96.4 96.7 98.5 5400 5220 5640 5100 5340 73.6 71.6 69.7 71.4 73.1 0.128
369 5760 5100 5340 5340 4740 95.4 96.8 95.2 99.1 100.7 5460 5340 5400 4980 4920 70.5 73.4 69.2 72.1 76.3 0.129
315 5400 5520 5160 5280 5580 96.6 95.2 98.0 96.8 97.6 5100 5460 5340 5400 5340 73.5 74.2 72.5 69.9 66.6 0.130
225 5580 5340 5100 5100 5400 92.9 100.5 98.7 100.6 100.3 5220 5160 5340 5220 5280 75.0 73.3 72.2 72.3 73.3 0.130
Obs. 5165 5195 5205 5085 5040 72.5 78.4 78.4 76.1 77.8 5145 5060 5015 5160 5175 80.0 79.4 77.9 79.0 81.9
161 5220 4920 4980 5160 5460 105.2 103.7 103.9 103.3 103.2 4800 4380 3900 4500 4740 105.5 103.6 104.5 102.4 104.5 0.064
40 5100 4920 5040 5340 5400 102.2 104.1 104.1 104.8 102.7 4320 4320 4200 4680 4440 103.6 104.1 103.5 104.6 105.0 0.064
180 5160 5100 4980 5280 5460 105.9 104.8 104.3 104.1 105.1 4440 4440 4260 4440 4560 105.4 104.2 102.9 104.0 104.1 0.066
21 5220 4920 5040 5160 5700 104.4 104.8 105.0 103.6 104.6 4620 4260 4260 4560 4800 105.4 105.6 104.0 104.5 104.9 0.066
127 4980 5040 5160 5220 5340 104.3 103.7 103.5 103.4 103.8 4620 4440 4260 4320 4860 103.4 104.6 103.7 104.6 103.7 0.067
192 5280 5040 4980 5280 5340 105.1 104.2 105.3 104.4 103.7 4860 4080 4140 4680 4320 105.5 103.4 105.6 104.4 104.9 0.067
28 5220 4980 5100 5040 5580 103.8 104.1 104.2 105.5 103.6 4560 4380 4260 4260 4440 104.4 102.8 104.9 105.1 103.7 0.068
137 5160 5040 5160 5220 5280 103.9 103.1 105.5 104.5 104.9 4680 4080 4380 4380 4440 103.7 104.5 103.5 105.3 103.6 0.068
69 5340 4980 5040 5160 5340 104.6 102.8 105.2 106.0 105.0 4740 4500 3840 4740 4500 104.3 104.0 105.8 106.2 103.8 0.068
10 5280 5100 4980 5280 5460 104.0 103.4 104.9 103.6 105.9 4980 4080 4440 4560 4260 102.3 104.8 104.1 104.8 105.5 0.068
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Table D.6: Test 2 pre-simulation volume/speed RMSP - non-crash conditions (#647, #688 and #702)
0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5'
829 6480 5940 6480 6420 6060 74.6 83.7 82.5 76.4 79.1 6000 6600 6600 6180 6300 76.9 75.3 75.1 75.1 75.7 0.056
923 6480 6240 6240 6420 6000 85.1 69.6 84.1 77.6 73.5 6360 6240 6120 6480 6180 77.9 75.3 77.3 76.9 76.4 0.058
533 6360 6420 6240 6240 6420 88.5 84.5 73.1 78.2 74.7 6660 6360 6180 6180 5940 75.3 77.5 75.8 77.8 73.2 0.061
279 6360 6240 6660 5940 6660 76.6 86.8 75.9 92.3 83.2 6240 6540 6120 6120 6600 75.9 75.9 77.6 78.6 75.1 0.063
788 6420 6300 6360 6480 6240 75.4 87.1 78.8 87.8 73.9 6420 6300 6480 6360 5880 75.4 73.1 73.6 77.0 76.5 0.064
454 6300 6180 6720 6000 6180 81.5 82.7 77.1 64.5 80.2 6300 6780 6000 5880 6360 72.8 73.8 76.8 76.8 76.1 0.067
579 6240 6420 6300 6360 6240 90.9 69.7 75.8 80.3 94.6 6660 6480 5940 5880 6300 74.8 74.5 77.0 77.7 75.3 0.071
679 6600 6360 6240 6600 6300 83.0 73.4 84.4 77.0 65.6 6420 6660 6360 6180 6060 71.1 74.7 76.2 76.6 76.0 0.073
935 6600 6180 6540 5880 6540 81.5 76.2 84.5 98.1 91.6 5940 6480 6120 5940 6240 74.5 74.0 76.1 75.1 76.5 0.074
70 6360 6360 6000 6480 6300 82.1 73.9 79.9 90.7 67.3 6300 6120 6240 6720 6420 77.8 75.8 79.0 74.7 76.8 0.074
Obs. 6500 6270 6525 6180 6425 75.6 75.7 76.7 76.8 78.7 5986 5913 5918 5793 5995 78.0 77.5 79.4 80.6 79.3
45 4140 4920 5100 4800 4860 101.0 102.4 102.7 93.0 88.1 4200 4860 4980 5340 4320 90.0 90.6 89.8 82.3 87.2 0.077
29 4320 4620 5100 4500 5520 105.2 105.2 103.3 92.9 102.3 4500 4920 4560 5100 4860 92.0 84.5 89.9 85.4 84.4 0.078
346 4500 4560 4680 4800 5400 103.0 104.5 105.1 103.7 92.9 4380 4800 4980 4620 4920 88.4 89.3 87.3 83.4 84.4 0.078
304 4080 4920 4620 4500 5640 101.1 104.6 106.0 102.3 89.6 4320 4740 4680 4380 5460 92.0 87.3 89.6 88.1 85.8 0.078
415 4140 4680 4980 4740 5340 105.0 104.9 101.4 105.7 87.5 4620 4860 4680 4860 5340 90.4 89.1 91.9 82.7 84.9 0.078
267 4380 4560 5040 4800 5280 104.9 101.1 105.3 97.7 92.2 4680 4800 4620 5340 5100 90.2 87.4 92.0 81.6 84.6 0.078
108 4380 4740 4920 4680 5220 103.0 105.2 101.5 104.0 100.1 4200 5100 4680 4980 4860 92.1 88.2 90.7 82.3 83.7 0.079
324 4260 4680 4860 4800 5280 105.1 102.0 103.6 104.7 96.5 4380 4680 4920 4920 5040 88.9 89.7 89.5 85.3 82.1 0.079
384 4320 4620 5040 4680 5460 106.0 104.9 105.2 104.7 94.8 4800 4800 4500 4980 4920 91.1 89.3 92.6 84.0 85.2 0.080
65 4140 4800 4860 4800 5160 104.0 97.2 102.2 102.2 103.0 4380 5100 4800 5040 4740 85.6 87.1 91.3 84.5 86.4 0.080
Obs. 4227 4380 4636 4396 5100 93.4 91.6 89.5 88.8 88.6 4340 4735 4485 4620 4730 94.9 93.9 94.4 88.8 91.2
492 5340 4740 5520 5340 5280 101.7 101.1 100.8 97.2 105.1 5160 5040 5520 5100 4980 95.0 93.9 92.6 90.6 89.9 0.053
411 5460 4920 5400 5220 5520 96.7 98.0 95.4 103.5 98.5 5760 4980 5400 5280 4980 94.4 93.8 93.5 87.8 89.0 0.056
442 5220 5100 5040 5460 5700 103.7 99.6 94.8 104.6 98.8 5160 5460 5100 5280 5580 96.4 94.2 93.8 91.8 90.9 0.056
468 5160 5280 5340 5280 5340 100.7 100.4 102.4 97.1 101.7 5100 5280 5160 5400 5400 95.8 93.8 95.3 87.3 88.3 0.057
385 4920 5280 5220 5340 5400 100.6 100.8 102.7 102.4 104.4 5160 5340 5400 4920 4980 95.2 92.5 92.7 92.6 89.0 0.058
136 5220 5160 5340 5340 5340 94.9 102.6 102.6 99.5 96.4 5040 4980 5400 5700 5460 96.4 92.7 92.9 89.5 90.6 0.058
73 5400 4920 5640 5160 5460 101.8 104.6 102.8 99.3 101.4 5040 5160 5100 5520 5220 95.7 92.8 98.2 89.2 88.1 0.058
384 5460 5160 5280 5280 5520 104.6 96.9 101.7 103.5 92.6 5700 5100 4860 5340 4920 95.9 94.3 96.9 90.9 89.3 0.058
467 5700 4860 5280 5280 5520 92.3 98.6 102.4 104.3 103.6 5280 4800 5400 5160 5340 97.4 93.9 95.0 88.3 88.7 0.058
197 5160 5100 5460 5400 5340 104.0 104.1 102.8 99.0 91.8 4980 5460 5460 5340 4860 96.1 93.0 95.0 92.6 91.6 0.058
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Table D.7: Test 2 pre-simulation volume/speed RMSP - non-crash conditions (#710, #731 and #739)
0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5'
531 5700 5880 5880 5880 6420 99.6 101.5 94.9 92.6 91.7 6000 5760 5700 6240 6120 88.4 88.1 86.8 86.5 88.9 0.040
828 5940 5820 5940 5760 6240 97.7 95.1 90.7 96.7 83.4 6420 5880 5820 6060 5820 87.7 87.3 86.4 87.6 88.3 0.041
786 5760 6120 5940 5640 5880 93.0 87.2 91.6 86.9 98.0 6300 5820 6000 5580 5640 90.1 87.0 86.7 87.6 91.0 0.041
324 5880 5880 5880 6000 6060 102.6 99.5 92.7 88.9 94.1 5580 6000 6060 5820 5700 88.5 86.0 85.9 86.2 90.3 0.041
282 5940 5880 6060 5820 6060 91.7 102.8 96.7 95.2 95.9 5700 6120 5940 5880 5880 88.7 86.0 86.6 87.9 89.0 0.042
677 6000 5760 5880 6120 5520 90.4 99.3 92.4 89.9 97.6 5820 5760 5940 5820 5640 89.6 86.9 86.0 88.6 90.4 0.042
687 5760 5880 5940 6300 6060 103.7 95.1 98.1 95.0 91.6 6000 6060 6120 5760 6120 87.5 87.4 85.9 87.7 90.3 0.042
830 5760 5700 5760 5820 6060 95.4 95.0 91.7 100.2 97.1 6060 5580 6120 5940 5760 87.5 88.0 85.5 88.2 88.6 0.042
322 6060 5940 5880 5940 6120 96.6 102.9 102.5 97.4 89.0 5940 5820 6180 5880 6000 91.3 87.7 85.6 87.4 89.5 0.043
123 5820 5640 5940 5940 6240 98.5 102.6 92.3 91.9 100.0 5760 5820 6240 6240 5640 91.4 86.9 85.4 89.4 90.8 0.044
Obs. 5910 5975 5870 5975 6105 92.9 92.6 92.4 89.5 90.1 5975 5865 6025 6035 5918 92.7 90.2 89.4 90.7 92.7
699 5700 5700 6540 6060 5700 89.3 75.1 70.9 90.8 92.6 6120 5880 6180 6180 6240 65.3 63.6 62.2 65.2 67.8 0.078
286 5640 5940 6060 6060 5520 93.2 88.0 89.4 93.6 91.3 6060 5760 5880 5820 5640 69.1 64.6 68.7 69.0 64.7 0.087
60 5820 5880 5640 6000 6360 98.1 80.2 68.5 76.1 72.5 6360 6240 6240 6300 6060 63.9 67.2 68.0 65.6 67.1 0.091
609 6060 5820 6000 5820 6300 94.6 93.7 91.8 85.6 81.0 5820 5760 6060 6120 6180 69.0 69.5 67.8 65.4 68.5 0.095
634 6000 5880 6360 5940 6000 94.6 96.1 86.1 93.1 83.2 6180 6000 6060 5760 6060 67.1 68.2 67.7 69.0 67.6 0.097
146 6000 5640 6360 5880 6060 93.1 99.1 84.9 89.9 86.2 5700 6240 6120 5880 5880 67.1 67.3 70.4 67.6 69.7 0.097
240 6120 5820 5400 6240 5940 85.1 86.6 100.3 92.1 92.7 6180 5520 6240 6180 6120 68.5 67.4 69.6 69.0 67.8 0.098
466 5520 5640 5820 6000 5820 99.8 92.0 79.9 70.7 70.1 6120 5940 6120 6120 6000 70.2 69.1 59.8 63.7 69.8 0.098
154 5100 5880 5700 6240 6180 100.2 89.6 91.2 86.4 82.7 5940 6060 5940 6240 6060 69.0 64.2 61.7 64.5 63.8 0.099
521 6180 5400 6060 6000 6000 93.0 94.5 87.4 92.7 91.5 5580 6060 6120 5640 5940 66.8 61.6 65.2 69.5 67.6 0.101
Obs. 5610 5685 5730 5770 5550 74.5 75.0 75.9 80.1 79.7 5645 5700 5665 5740 5730 65.7 68.3 66.8 66.4 65.4
31 5820 5760 5520 5160 5220 102.2 101.4 101.4 103.1 101.3 5520 5820 5220 5400 4980 100.3 100.3 101.4 99.2 101.9 0.025
188 5940 5520 5580 5340 5160 103.4 103.0 103.2 100.2 99.4 5760 5580 5160 5220 5220 100.7 100.9 102.3 100.9 102.1 0.026
187 5640 5880 5520 5160 5400 103.1 102.8 102.7 102.2 103.8 5820 5400 5460 5160 5100 101.4 101.0 96.8 101.5 102.3 0.026
189 5880 5820 5280 5340 4860 102.5 102.9 103.1 104.5 105.5 6060 5340 5400 5040 5280 99.1 101.9 101.4 102.4 102.3 0.027
199 5940 5760 5280 5220 5280 100.0 102.2 103.3 103.4 99.6 6120 5640 5100 5220 5400 100.9 101.6 101.0 100.8 101.4 0.027
186 5940 5880 5400 5040 5100 103.3 104.0 101.1 105.1 102.6 5760 5640 5340 5460 4740 101.8 101.2 101.7 100.4 102.8 0.029
136 5760 5820 5400 5160 5040 97.3 100.7 102.4 103.4 104.1 5580 5460 5580 5400 4860 102.3 100.4 100.5 101.6 102.8 0.029
4 5760 5820 5460 5160 5100 99.9 99.3 98.3 102.2 103.0 6240 5580 5280 4980 5520 97.1 100.5 102.1 101.2 102.3 0.029
59 5820 5940 5400 5160 5160 98.1 102.2 105.0 104.7 102.8 6060 5400 5580 5040 5460 98.3 103.0 101.4 103.0 101.5 0.029
117 6060 5520 5640 4980 5160 100.4 102.5 102.7 99.6 100.6 5760 5400 5340 5520 4980 97.2 98.9 99.9 101.0 102.6 0.029
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Table D.8: Test 2 pre-simulation volume/speed RMSP - non-crash conditions (#781, #854 and #858)
0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5'
697 6540 6060 6060 6120 6360 90.1 83.1 75.5 83.1 78.2 6180 6300 6180 6060 6000 78.4 80.4 74.6 81.6 84.6 0.049
269 6000 6060 6240 6120 6240 81.5 85.2 90.1 76.5 96.0 5940 6420 6300 5880 6060 79.9 79.2 81.8 82.3 85.2 0.050
788 6360 6000 6060 6300 6300 71.0 89.6 88.1 76.6 79.1 5700 6120 6540 6300 5880 79.0 78.2 80.0 83.0 84.6 0.051
691 6360 5760 6420 6120 5880 88.7 81.5 85.1 91.0 80.1 6000 6120 6360 6000 5760 76.7 80.8 78.6 81.5 83.7 0.051
195 5940 5880 6180 6240 6300 82.2 90.2 96.8 85.5 86.4 5700 5820 6540 6300 6180 78.1 82.1 81.4 82.0 82.3 0.055
27 6180 6180 5880 6060 6360 87.2 75.2 81.3 97.9 96.3 6000 6240 6060 6060 6060 78.3 81.0 81.1 83.2 83.6 0.062
974 6180 6000 6240 6000 6900 75.2 92.7 99.0 83.7 78.4 5580 6240 6600 6660 6000 80.5 81.1 78.6 79.3 84.4 0.064
828 6000 5940 6420 5820 6420 84.2 97.9 86.0 81.4 95.4 6000 6300 6060 6120 5580 76.4 80.0 76.0 81.0 84.9 0.064
596 6060 6060 5700 6660 6240 75.4 78.2 103.9 89.5 82.7 6120 6240 5940 6360 6480 79.9 80.8 81.3 82.2 82.5 0.065
58 6540 5940 6420 5820 6300 93.1 77.1 77.8 94.1 96.0 6180 6000 6120 5940 6300 79.4 81.6 81.3 84.4 83.3 0.065
Obs. 6310 6005 6130 6128 6330 80.2 82.5 82.7 81.5 82.3 5960 6185 6020 6265 6044 82.3 83.3 83.0 85.4 87.0
31 5400 5640 5400 4980 5040 103.8 102.4 102.9 104.2 103.5 5400 5460 5280 5160 4800 103.8 100.2 103.6 100.7 102.8 0.020
188 5520 5400 5400 5040 5100 103.1 101.2 104.1 105.1 101.0 5340 5460 5040 5160 4800 102.0 101.8 103.1 102.7 103.9 0.022
181 5280 5640 5340 5040 4860 100.3 103.3 104.0 103.9 102.6 5520 5340 5100 4980 4740 100.8 102.3 103.8 101.8 102.9 0.023
71 5700 5340 5400 4860 4920 102.0 102.7 102.2 103.7 104.2 5280 5640 5040 5220 4680 103.4 99.0 101.0 103.2 103.6 0.023
3 5400 5580 5220 4980 5100 100.7 102.3 103.8 103.0 102.9 5460 5280 5160 5280 4800 100.3 101.1 101.5 99.7 102.2 0.024
186 5460 5700 5220 4920 4920 104.2 104.1 100.2 104.6 103.6 5460 5520 5220 5400 4440 102.1 101.0 102.1 101.6 103.1 0.026
179 5460 5580 5400 5100 4740 103.5 102.4 102.5 104.9 103.8 5520 5460 4920 5100 5220 102.1 100.2 102.3 101.7 102.5 0.027
5 5340 5580 5340 5040 4740 100.7 100.2 101.3 102.1 104.1 5460 6000 5040 4920 5100 99.7 97.6 100.6 101.7 101.8 0.027
108 5400 5640 5160 4980 4800 102.4 99.7 101.8 103.4 104.8 5100 5760 4860 4860 4560 102.3 99.1 102.4 102.6 104.5 0.027
76 5520 5460 5220 5040 4740 100.5 103.6 99.6 103.4 105.1 5100 5700 5340 4920 4620 102.7 99.3 102.6 104.0 103.9 0.028
Obs. 5373 5660 5325 5055 4900 100.8 101.7 102.5 104.7 105.3 5345 5675 5040 5220 4780 100.4 99.2 102.4 102.0 104.0
580 5460 5340 5520 5280 5100 99.2 101.0 95.3 85.5 97.4 5760 5040 5580 5100 5040 86.8 88.3 86.8 87.9 89.6 0.051
998 5520 5400 5280 5700 5280 99.0 101.1 92.6 89.3 100.1 5400 5220 5580 5640 4920 88.2 87.8 86.5 86.8 87.9 0.051
702 5580 5460 5280 5580 5760 91.7 102.0 94.5 89.4 96.6 5340 5280 5400 5340 5760 87.6 87.1 86.0 85.9 86.9 0.054
346 6000 5220 5100 5700 5400 91.1 104.2 103.5 97.8 96.4 5340 5340 5580 5040 5040 85.8 88.8 84.7 86.8 87.1 0.054
2 5700 5220 5220 5700 5400 96.6 103.9 97.9 100.6 99.3 5460 5220 5460 5340 5280 86.6 88.5 86.4 87.2 87.7 0.055
408 5520 5340 5280 5760 5220 99.2 103.4 103.7 98.0 96.8 5400 5220 5460 5280 5040 87.5 86.8 87.4 86.5 86.4 0.056
691 5640 5220 5580 5520 5100 99.8 101.5 86.3 94.6 103.5 5340 5400 5820 5040 5220 86.2 84.4 88.5 86.7 85.9 0.056
364 5880 5340 5280 5760 5100 93.7 90.2 98.7 93.9 99.3 5820 4620 5640 5520 5040 87.8 87.0 86.6 85.9 87.6 0.056
613 5700 5280 5280 5700 4980 101.0 103.7 91.0 97.3 104.2 4980 5400 5760 4980 4920 87.2 86.9 86.2 86.1 86.6 0.057
889 5640 5280 5100 5760 5340 104.6 101.1 96.8 87.0 99.0 5580 5040 5520 5400 5520 87.6 87.1 87.3 88.2 87.9 0.057
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Table D.9: Test 2 pre-simulation volume/speed RMSP - non-crash conditions (#884, #888 and #903)
0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5' 0 - 1' 1 - 2' 2 - 3' 3 - 4' 4 - 5'
768 4800 4260 4020 4980 4440 103.1 102.4 102.9 103.3 102.5 4440 4680 4260 4500 4200 103.1 102.4 101.7 99.4 100.6 0.053
903 3960 4560 3960 4500 4500 103.9 101.1 103.2 102.2 101.7 4140 4680 4140 4800 4380 103.7 101.6 102.1 102.2 102.8 0.054
236 4320 4200 3840 4620 4740 104.6 105.1 104.6 102.3 103.6 3960 4260 4560 4320 4320 103.5 103.9 101.4 99.1 101.5 0.055
133 4800 4200 4260 4560 4560 101.7 103.8 103.3 104.1 104.0 4080 4320 4140 5040 4440 103.1 101.6 102.3 102.3 103.6 0.055
171 4560 4140 3900 4560 4320 104.9 103.7 104.2 102.6 102.3 4320 4500 3960 4260 4560 105.6 102.7 102.1 101.6 102.2 0.058
396 4260 4500 4380 5040 4200 103.3 103.7 105.6 104.4 100.9 4200 4560 4500 4740 4320 102.1 104.5 101.9 100.7 103.9 0.058
802 4860 4020 4020 4800 4800 105.1 104.3 102.2 101.9 102.9 4200 4200 4380 4920 4740 105.0 98.8 104.0 100.9 99.8 0.058
381 4080 4260 4440 4860 4080 101.7 104.9 103.8 102.3 104.1 4260 4380 4320 4560 4680 103.8 100.4 104.0 101.9 100.2 0.059
961 4260 4440 3960 4320 4440 103.6 103.5 106.2 103.7 102.6 4500 4020 4200 4440 4620 102.8 102.3 104.1 101.6 101.8 0.059
183 3840 4320 4380 4320 4800 103.2 102.6 102.1 102.3 100.8 4080 4380 3900 4560 4620 100.4 102.3 102.8 100.2 101.8 0.060
Obs. 4391 4336 4151 4696 4636 96.0 95.9 95.4 93.5 94.2 4175 4385 4275 4530 4425 101.0 100.8 101.0 98.2 98.1
3 4800 4980 4620 4680 4800 101.7 103.0 101.6 103.2 99.4 4980 4620 4680 5040 4620 100.9 102.4 102.9 100.4 102.2 0.046
31 4920 4740 4800 4560 4920 104.0 100.3 103.4 104.2 100.5 4920 4800 4800 4860 4740 103.2 101.8 104.4 100.7 105.1 0.051
6 4800 4920 4620 4680 4800 104.6 99.2 102.6 102.7 98.3 4920 4560 4980 4860 4380 104.4 101.7 99.3 101.6 102.4 0.051
4 4680 4920 4740 4560 4740 102.9 102.0 99.7 103.9 103.8 5280 4920 4500 4680 4620 98.4 101.1 103.4 101.7 103.9 0.052
28 4740 4920 4680 4740 4620 101.5 104.0 104.4 103.1 104.0 4860 4440 4860 4980 4860 100.6 102.8 102.9 102.7 101.3 0.053
39 4800 4980 4620 4740 4740 102.2 102.9 104.2 102.7 101.1 4980 4560 4380 5160 4560 102.0 104.6 103.9 99.8 103.5 0.057
19 4680 4800 4800 4620 4860 104.0 102.7 104.8 104.3 104.7 4980 4800 4500 4920 4440 102.2 99.2 103.6 102.2 103.0 0.058
29 4860 4800 4860 4500 4860 102.4 104.0 99.6 103.8 102.8 4980 4920 4200 4800 4800 104.0 100.9 104.6 102.2 103.2 0.060
25 4920 4920 4680 4500 4740 102.3 104.8 83.3 101.4 103.5 5040 4680 4500 4740 5100 102.4 103.9 103.0 102.7 101.6 0.060
18 4740 4920 4740 4560 4800 103.8 102.4 104.6 103.8 105.0 4740 4800 4740 4380 5160 103.4 103.7 103.5 105.5 102.8 0.064
Obs. 4835 4870 4745 4658 4750 95.1 94.9 95.0 95.3 93.4 4985 4645 4745 4845 4845 94.5 95.1 96.6 99.4 102.3
733 6180 6240 6120 6180 5460 82.4 87.5 86.6 91.6 94.4 6300 6060 6000 5700 5940 86.4 85.2 87.5 86.4 86.5 0.047
680 6180 5940 6240 6000 5880 82.7 90.7 91.5 94.9 97.2 6060 6000 6360 5700 6060 87.1 84.9 87.8 85.5 92.2 0.051
417 6060 6180 5940 6000 5940 72.7 82.1 98.5 99.7 100.4 6000 5640 6180 6120 5340 86.0 87.6 86.5 87.1 95.1 0.059
6 6300 6000 6000 6180 5760 75.0 82.4 95.5 99.9 103.0 6300 5640 6420 5940 5940 85.6 85.2 85.2 85.0 93.8 0.061
826 6060 5760 6120 5880 5700 67.3 84.4 88.0 94.1 95.4 5880 5820 6240 5640 6060 85.7 84.7 84.8 84.9 89.3 0.063
721 6240 5880 6240 6240 5520 89.1 96.2 92.8 81.5 98.0 6360 5580 6420 5640 5580 85.3 88.9 87.3 85.8 93.4 0.065
636 6300 5640 6120 5940 5700 73.9 92.2 74.9 91.9 102.2 5940 5880 6120 5640 5460 83.6 86.7 83.4 86.6 94.8 0.065
483 6300 6240 5940 6060 5460 94.0 77.5 98.5 97.6 102.9 6120 6000 6000 5760 5460 86.9 82.4 87.0 87.0 92.2 0.067
581 6000 5940 5820 6360 5400 72.2 96.7 101.0 95.0 99.5 5940 6000 5760 6060 5460 86.6 86.9 87.8 84.7 92.3 0.068
716 6360 5940 5580 6420 5700 70.8 87.0 99.8 99.7 102.5 5580 5940 5940 6120 5520 85.5 86.1 88.6 87.3 91.0 0.068
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Appendix E
Pre-simulation Volume and Speed
RMSP - Test 3
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Table E.1: Test 3 pre-simulation number seed and RMSP values - Segment A
Seed RMSP Seed RMSP
6:00 7:00 2 0.172 7:00 8:00 11 0.168
273 0.173 127 0.170
230 0.175 742 0.170
111 0.175 9 0.170
622 0.175 488 0.170
695 0.177 912 0.170
329 0.177 741 0.170
114 0.177 578 0.170
231 0.177 434 0.170
229 0.177 819 0.170
8:00 9:00 376 0.201 9:00 10:00 572 0.189
574 0.201 695 0.189
551 0.202 138 0.191
533 0.202 587 0.192
358 0.202 726 0.192
405 0.202 557 0.192
456 0.202 422 0.193
85 0.202 465 0.193
688 0.202 257 0.194
225 0.202 8 0.194
10:00 11:00 23 0.049 11:00 12:00 3 0.053
56 0.049 80 0.053
155 0.049 41 0.053
38 0.049 12 0.053
578 0.049 143 0.053
200 0.049 345 0.054
137 0.050 765 0.054
798 0.050 456 0.054
12 0.050 9 0.055
70 0.051 13 0.055
12:00 13:00 4 0.053 13:00 14:00 10 0.052
7 0.053 7 0.053
5 0.053 5 0.053
8 0.053 1 0.053
6 0.053 8 0.053
2 0.054 3 0.053
3 0.054 6 0.053
1 0.054 4 0.054
9 0.054 2 0.054
10 0.055 9 0.054
14:00 15:00 5 0.049 15:00 16:00 5 0.051
2 0.049 3 0.051
1 0.050 1 0.051
6 0.050 2 0.051
4 0.051 6 0.052
7 0.051 7 0.052
8 0.051 4 0.052
9 0.052 10 0.052
10 0.052 8 0.052
3 0.052 9 0.055
16:00 17:00 1 0.047 17:00 18:00 8 0.066
4 0.048 3 0.067
6 0.048 6 0.067
9 0.048 7 0.069
3 0.048 1 0.069
5 0.048 10 0.069
7 0.049 4 0.070
8 0.049 5 0.070
10 0.050 9 0.070
2 0.051 2 0.072
Time Time
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Table E.2: Test 3 pre-simulation number seed and RMSP values - Segment B
Seed RMSP Seed RMSP
6:00 7:00 747 0.106 7:00 8:00 317 0.150
679 0.108 834 0.150
886 0.108 558 0.151
963 0.109 398 0.151
682 0.109 737 0.151
677 0.110 354 0.151
931 0.110 584 0.151
680 0.111 937 0.151
8 0.111 473 0.151
610 0.111 818 0.151
8:00 9:00 106 0.149 9:00 10:00 145 0.111
892 0.151 713 0.113
935 0.152 678 0.113
206 0.153 214 0.115
342 0.153 492 0.116
155 0.154 505 0.116
533 0.154 830 0.116
999 0.154 829 0.116
802 0.154 345 0.117
560 0.154 864 0.117
10:00 11:00 5 0.031 11:00 12:00 99 0.030
4 0.032 71 0.030
8 0.032 69 0.031
7 0.033 94 0.031
6 0.033 54 0.031
1 0.034 84 0.031
2 0.034 45 0.031
10 0.035 78 0.032
3 0.036 15 0.032
9 0.036 11 0.032
12:00 13:00 16 0.028 13:00 14:00 71 0.029
33 0.029 67 0.029
20 0.029 57 0.030
31 0.030 61 0.030
11 0.030 70 0.030
32 0.030 56 0.030
25 0.030 55 0.030
8 0.030 86 0.030
27 0.030 32 0.031
5 0.030 31 0.031
14:00 15:00 23 0.025 15:00 16:00 70 0.023
7 0.025 8 0.023
72 0.025 58 0.023
90 0.025 4 0.024
47 0.026 100 0.024
27 0.026 57 0.024
55 0.026 16 0.024
32 0.026 31 0.024
66 0.026 5 0.024
54 0.026 69 0.024
16:00 17:00 86 0.024 17:00 18:00 86 0.024
65 0.025 65 0.025
83 0.025 83 0.025
90 0.025 90 0.025
5 0.025 5 0.025
6 0.025 6 0.025
23 0.025 23 0.025
77 0.025 77 0.025
58 0.025 58 0.025




Case Study 2: ANOVA Tables
and Residual Plots
Figure F.1: Residual Plot for Case study 2 - Off-ramp
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Figure F.2: Residual Plot for Case study 2 - Straight segment
Figure F.3: Residual Plot for Case study 2 - on ramp
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A 142.70 1 142.70 134.10 0.00
B 197.67 1 197.67 185.76 0.00
C 3.06 1 3.06 2.87 0.09
D 10.46 1 10.46 9.83 0.00
E 5.55 1 5.55 5.21 0.02
A * B 5.48 1 5.48 5.15 0.02
A * C 4.42 1 4.42 4.15 0.04
B * C 3.67 1 3.67 3.45 0.07
A * B * C 1.69 1 1.69 1.58 0.21
A * D 6.54 1 6.54 6.15 0.01
B * D 0.46 1 0.46 0.43 0.51
A * B * D 0.09 1 0.09 0.08 0.78
C * D 0.06 1 0.06 0.06 0.81
A * C * D 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.95
B * C * D 0.02 1 0.02 0.02 0.90
A * B * C * D 0.06 1 0.06 0.05 0.82
A * E 7.53 1 7.53 7.07 0.01
B * E 4.73 1 4.73 4.45 0.04
A * B * E 3.32 1 3.32 3.12 0.08
C * E 3.06 1 3.06 2.87 0.09
A * C * E 4.42 1 4.42 4.15 0.04
B * C * E 3.67 1 3.67 3.45 0.07
A * B * C * E 1.69 1 1.69 1.58 0.21
D * E 0.17 1 0.17 0.16 0.69
A * D * E 0.32 1 0.32 0.30 0.58
B * D * E 0.41 1 0.41 0.38 0.54
A * B * D * E 0.25 1 0.25 0.23 0.63
C * D * E 0.06 1 0.06 0.06 0.81
A * C * D * E 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.95
B * C * D * E 0.02 1 0.02 0.02 0.90
A * B * C * D * E 0.06 1 0.06 0.05 0.82
Pure Error 153.231 144 1.064
Dependent Variable:  Ln(CPI/veh)
157








A 65.48 1 65.48 74.87 0.00
B 181.22 1 181.22 207.19 0.00
C 4.98 1 4.98 5.70 0.02
D 0.26 1 0.26 0.30 0.59
E 7.51 1 7.51 8.58 0.00
A * B 9.32 1 9.32 10.66 0.00
A * C 3.95 1 3.95 4.52 0.04
B * C 3.31 1 3.31 3.79 0.05
A * B * C 2.98 1 2.98 3.41 0.07
A * D 2.50 1 2.50 2.85 0.09
B * D 0.22 1 0.22 0.25 0.62
A * B * D 0.12 1 0.12 0.14 0.71
C * D 0.12 1 0.12 0.14 0.71
A * C * D 0.24 1 0.24 0.28 0.60
B * C * D 0.20 1 0.20 0.23 0.63
A * B * C * D 0.33 1 0.33 0.37 0.54
A * E 6.99 1 6.99 7.99 0.01
B * E 4.98 1 4.98 5.70 0.02
A * B * E 2.79 1 2.79 3.19 0.08
C * E 4.98 1 4.98 5.70 0.02
A * C * E 3.95 1 3.95 4.52 0.04
B * C * E 3.31 1 3.31 3.79 0.05
A * B * C * E 2.98 1 2.98 3.41 0.07
D * E 0.31 1 0.31 0.35 0.55
A * D * E 0.50 1 0.50 0.58 0.45
B * D * E 0.26 1 0.26 0.29 0.59
A * B * D * E 0.74 1 0.74 0.85 0.36
C * D * E 0.12 1 0.12 0.14 0.71
A * C * D * E 0.24 1 0.24 0.28 0.60
B * C * D * E 0.20 1 0.20 0.23 0.63
A * B * C * D * E 0.33 1 0.33 0.37 0.54
Error 125.95 144 0.87
Dependent Variable:  Ln(CPI/veh)
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A 1033.12 1 1033.12 2231.63 0.00
B 69.29 1 69.29 149.67 0.00
C 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.99
D 0.08 1 0.08 0.17 0.68
E 0.14 1 0.14 0.31 0.58
A * B 48.13 1 48.13 103.96 0.00
A * C 0.07 1 0.07 0.15 0.70
B * C 0.03 1 0.03 0.06 0.81
A * B * C 0.05 1 0.05 0.11 0.74
A * D 0.06 1 0.06 0.14 0.71
B * D 1.91 1 1.91 4.13 0.04
A * B * D 1.51 1 1.51 3.26 0.07
C * D 0.18 1 0.18 0.39 0.53
A * C * D 0.00 1 0.00 0.01 0.93
B * C * D 0.08 1 0.08 0.17 0.68
A * B * C * D 0.22 1 0.22 0.47 0.49
A * E 1.38 1 1.38 2.98 0.09
B * E 0.38 1 0.38 0.82 0.37
A * B * E 0.07 1 0.07 0.16 0.69
C * E 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.99
A * C * E 0.07 1 0.07 0.15 0.70
B * C * E 0.03 1 0.03 0.06 0.81
A * B * C * E 0.05 1 0.05 0.11 0.74
D * E 0.05 1 0.05 0.12 0.73
A * D * E 0.59 1 0.59 1.28 0.26
B * D * E 0.10 1 0.10 0.21 0.64
A * B * D * E 0.03 1 0.03 0.05 0.82
C * D * E 0.18 1 0.18 0.39 0.53
A * C * D * E 0.00 1 0.00 0.01 0.93
B * C * D * E 0.08 1 0.08 0.17 0.68
A * B * C * D * E 0.22 1 0.22 0.47 0.49
Error 66.66 144 0.46
Dependent Variable:  Ln(CPI/veh)
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Appendix G
Case Study 2 CPI/veh changes
with volume and % trucks - On
ramp Segments
160
Figure G.1: Estimates of CPI/veh as a function of volume for on ramps.
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Case Study 2 CPI/veh changes
with volume and % trucks -
Straight Segments
163
Figure H.1: Estimates of CPI/veh as a function of volume for straight segments.
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